Washington and Lee University School of Law

Washington and Lee University School of Law Scholarly Commons
Supreme Court Case Files

Lewis F. Powell Jr. Papers

10-1978

International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs,
Warehousemen & Helpers of America v. Daniel
Lewis F. Powell Jr.

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.wlu.edu/casefiles
Part of the Administrative Law Commons, Energy and Utilities Law Commons, and the Securities Law
Commons

Recommended Citation
International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen & Helpers of America v. Daniel.
Supreme Court Case Files Collection. Box 56. Powell Papers. Lewis F. Powell Jr. Archives, Washington &
Lee University School of Law, Virginia.

This Manuscript Collection is brought to you for free and open access by the Lewis F. Powell Jr. Papers at
Washington and Lee University School of Law Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Supreme
Court Case Files by an authorized administrator of Washington and Lee University School of Law Scholarly
Commons. For more information, please contact christensena@wlu.edu.

c

Preliminary Memo
February 17, 1978 Conference
List 3, Sheet 2
No. 77-754
LOCAL 705,
INTERNATIONAL
BROTHERHOOD,
etc.

v.
DANIEL

Timely
Cert to CA 7
(Cummings; Tone,
concurring;
Jameson [D.J.])
Federal/Civil

Please see preliminary memo in No. 77-753,
International Brotherhood of Teamsters, etc. v. Daniel,
February 17, 1978 Conference (List 3, Sheet 2).
There is a response.
1/27/78
ME

Cole

Opinion attached
to Petition

( l4

;:z;:::;

~~)

C:.IJ1

~~~~~s

No. 77-753
INTERNATIONAL
BROTHERHOOD
OF TEAMSTERS,
etc.

v.
DANIEL

Timely
Ce:rt to CA 7
(Cummings; Tone,
concurring;
Jameson [D.J.])
Federal/Civil

No. 77-754
LOCAL 705,
INTERNATIONAL
BROTHERHOOD,
etc.

-

v.
DANIEL

Timely
Cert to CA 7
(Cummings; Tone,
concurring;
Jameson [D.J.])

F:er=~ 9~!
~

·

1.

SUMMARY:

Petrs (a Local of the Teamsters Union

and the International Brotherhood of Teamsters) challenge
the landmark holding of the CA 7 that an employee's interest
in a compulsory, employer-funded pension plan constitutes a
"security" within the coverage of the Federal securities laws
and that material misrepresentations concerning the likelihood
of obtaining a pension can be made the basis for a private right
of action.
2.

FACTS:

Respondent joined Teamsters' Local 705 in

1950 when he became a truck driver with an employer who had a
collective bargaining agreement with that union.

He worked

continuously for Local 705 contracting employers for the next
23 years, except for a four-month interruption in 1960-61 when

(

he was involuntarily laid off because of adverse economic conditions.

Respondent retired in 1973 because of cataracts and has

not worked since.
In 1955, Local 705 negotiated a collective bargaining
), agreement with several multi-employer bargaining associations.

t

The contract established a Pension Trust Fund to which the
employers agreed to contribute at a rate of 5 cents for each hour
worked.

The Fund was to be administered by a Board of Trustees

composed equally of employee and employer representatives.

The

trustees adopted a plan under which employees would become
eligible for a monthly pension after 20 years of continuous service.
1955.

The trustees would give credit for years worked prior to
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Accot:'ding to the affidavit 'filed by respondent in
this case, respondent learned of the Pension Fund in 1955 and
understood that he would be eligible to receive a pension after
20 years of service with Local 705 covered employers.

The

possibility . of s ·.1ch a pension was a material factor in respondent' s
decision to continue employment with those employers.

In June,

1971, respondent received a letter from the Secretary-Treasurer of
Local 705 notifying him that after 20 years of covered service an d
at 60 years of age, respondent would be eligible for a pension of
$400 per month.

After his retirement, however, respondent's ap-

plication for a pension was denied by the trustees, on the ground
that the 4-month involuntary lay-off in 1960-61 constituted a
break-in-service which rendered him ineligible for his pension .
Respondent commenced this lawsuit in federal court with
a complaint which, as amended, contained six counts.

1/

-- -

two counts -

The firs t

----

were based on Section lO(b) (and Rule lOb-5) of t he

1934 Act and Section 17(a) of the 1933. Act.

These counts alleged

material misrepresentations in the form of omissi.ons to inform
the members of the requirements for vesting, the possibility of
forfeiting all contributions made and the actuarial likelihood tha t
any member would receive a pension.

1/

/

Respondent sought as relie f

The. other four counts alleged a breach of the union's duty of
fair representation under § 9a of the NLRA, the failure of t he
pension fund to be established for the "sole and exclusive benefits
of the employees," as required by § 302(c)(5) of the NLRA, and common law theories of breach of fiduciary duty, fraud, and deceit .

c
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the reformation of the pension furid agreements by deleting
the continuity requirements, and a judgment ordering petrs to
pay pension benefits unlawfully withheld.

Respondent also

sought certification as a representative of the class of all
members of the Teamsters International who had an interest in a
pension fund.
Petrs moved to dismiss the complaint on several grounds
but the district court (Kirkland, J.) refused.

It held that

Counts I and II stated claims upon which relief could be granted
under the federal /securities acts.

Since the reasoning of the

district court was expanded in the CA 7 opinion, I shall not
discuss it here.

The district court also held that petrs were

not entitled to summary judgment on the basis of the statute of
limitations, because factual disputes remained as to when
respondent actually learned of the break-in-service rule and
whether he exercised due diligence in discovering the fraud.

!:_I

The district court certified an application for interlocutory
appeal with respect to its rulings on Counts I and II of the
complaint.
3.

The CA 7 affirmed.
CA 7 OPINION:

the statutory language.

The CA 7 opinion began by looking to
"Security," as defined in the 1933 and

1934 Acts, encompasses "investment contract," which was defined by
this Court in~---------------~-----------SEC v. W.J. Howrey Co., 328 U.S.C. 293,

298-99~

to

mean:

2/

The district court also found that respondent had stated a
claim for relief in alleging that the pension fund rules were not
"for the sole and exclusive benefit of the employees," as required
by § 302 of the NLRA.

- 4 "a contract, transaction or scheme
whereby a person invests his money
in a common enterprise and is led
to expect profits from the efforts
of the promoter or a third party.

"
In the view of theCA 7, all of the elements of the Howrey
) test were satisfied here.

The employee was an "investor" because

part of his compensation, in the form of an employer contribution,
was placed in the fund.

That the employee's expectancy was "con-

tingent" did not change the characterization of the process, for
the same might be said of an investment in the stock market.
pension fund was obviously a "common enterprise."

The

The employee

might receive a "profit" because his pension would clearly exceed
the amount of his contributions.

While some of his pension might

be financed by the contributions of others, this did not mean it
was not a "profit" within the meaning of the securities laws, for
two circuits had already held . that the contributions obtained in
pyramid sales schemes constituted "profits."

In any event, petrs

conceded that some portion of respondent's pension, at least as
great as 25%, would be derived from the investment income on the
assets of the trust fund, and would thus be "profits" in the
classic sense.
Passing beyond this literal analysis of the term
"security," the CA 7 examined what it called the "economic
realities."

Respondent's interest in the trust fund embodied many

of the significant characteristics typically present in instruments
covered by the securities laws.

Respondent has an undivided
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interest in a portfolio of stocks, 'bonds, mortgages and other
!

investments which was managed for his benefit by a third party.

I

Hence his interest resembled an investment in a mutual fund or
t

I

in a variable annuity contract.

The $1,248 invested each year
I

by a Local 705 member in his pension plan would probably be his
I

'
largest investment. __on an aggregate basis, pension
funds hold

I

11% of the value of all New York Stock Exchange
count for 23% of the dollar value of all

1

trad~d

stock~

shares.

and acIf the

sole investment vehicle for millions of Americans is exempt from
the anti-fraud provisions of the securities laws, then the
policing of the capital markets is significantly neutralized.

(

--

The CA 7 next turned ..to-le i lative materials .
--....;'

Although

it conceded that "The legislative history of the 1933 and 1934
Acts themselves is silent on the question of pension plans,"
App. at 25, the court noted that in 1934 a conference committee
had rejected an amendment to the 1933 Act which would have exempted offerings made in connection with "a bona fide plan for the
I

r

payment of extra compensation . . • for the ixclusive benefit of
such employees" for the reason that participants in such plans
I
I

might be in "as great need of protection afforded by availability
I

of information concerning the issuer for whiJh they work as are
I

most other members of the public."

In testi~ony before the Congres ,

in 1941, a Commissioner of the SEC had intert reted the rejection
of the amendment as requiring the inclusion Lnder the Act of any
I
"plan under which employees are given the opportunity to place
part of their earnings in a fund which is to be invested for their
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benefit and returned to ·t hem at a iater date."
(Testimony of Commissioner Purcell).

App. at 26

This interpretation was

confirmed in 1970, when Congress enacted an exemption to the
registration requirements of the 1933 Act for "any interest in
or participation in a single or collective trust fund maintained
by a bank or in a separate account maintained by an insurance
company . •

..

II

15 U.S.C. § 77c(a)2(A).

In the view of the

CA 7, this amendment codified a long-standing administrative
practice of the SEC that interests in pension funds were exempt
from the registration requirements of the 1933 Act, even though
they were in fact securities.
The CA 7 recognized that the anti-fraud provisions of
(~

the securities acts would cover this case only if it involved a
"sale,"
defined in the 1933 Act as "every
---...:

disposition of a

security or interest in a security for value."

15 U.S.C. § 77b(3).

TheCA 7 found that the employee's contribution of his services
to the employer met the "for value" requirement.

It rejected a

proposed distinction between "contributory" plans (in which the
employee pays over cash received to the pension plan) and
contributory" plans such as the one at issue here.

'~on

Although the

SEC had utilized this distinction for many years, SEC counsel
(participating as amicus curiae) advised the court that the agency
now felt that a "sale" occurred in both situations and the SEC
distinguished its earlier position as based on the concept that
employer contributions were "gifts" and the outdated supposition
that pension benefits would not be material to an employee's decision whether to become or remain employed.

- 7 -

TheCA 7 also rejected petrs' argument that no "sale"
occurred here because contribution to the fund was compulsory.
The definition of "sale" did not require volition.

Even if it

did, volition is present because of the vote of Local 705 members to accept the contracts providing that the employer would
compensate them through contributions to the fund rather than

3/

through wages. -

Volition was also present in the employee's

decision to retain his job.
On the basis of the foregoing, the CA 7 concluded that
the transaction at issue here was covered by the securities laws.
Only three more hurdles remained.

First, in order to support

its "unitary" analysis -- based on the assumption that the
anti-fraud sections of the 1933 and 1934 Acts were identical
the CA 7 found it necessary to confront and resolve the question
whether a private right of action was available under the 1933
Act.

It held that such a right could be properly inferred.
Second, the CA 7 held that the anti-fraud provisions of
"-

ot been pre-empted by ERISA.

the securities

--

Sec-

ion 514(d) of ERISA, 29 U.S.C. § 1144(d) is a general savings
clause which provides that ERISA shall not be construed to
supercede any federal law or rule.

-----

------

-

Even though the SEC had told

the Congress at the time ERISA was under consideration that pen_

____..,___--------------------------------------'
~ SEC
sian plans
were exempt from
coverage under the 1933 Act, the

3/

-

--

Although the vote of an individual union member might be
overridden, this was also true of the vote of the individual
shareholder in the corporate merger context.

- 8 -

was referring only to the registration, not the anti-fraud
provisions.

The securities laws and ERISA could be

complementary:

while ERISA requires only disclosure of the

provisions of the plan within 90 days of employment, the
securities laws would require disclosure upon a job offer of
all material information, including the statistically determined
risk that an employee covered by the plan will ever receive his

4/

pension benefits. -

Third, the CA 7 rejected as "specious" the argument of
the Secretary of Labor that affirmance of the judgment below
would undermine a union's authority as exclusive bargaining agen t

,, ..

for its employees or will disrupt the bargaining process.

"The

'

only negative effect on ·unions qua unions will be in preventing
them from defrauding their rank and file with impunity."

App.

at 49.
In conclusion, the CA 7 emphasized that it was not holding
either the registration requirements of the 1933 Act or the reporting requirements of the 1934 Act applicable to pension funds.
In a separate concurring opinion, Judge Tone noted that
he agreed with much of the majority opinion, but felt compelled
to express some doubts.

The CA 7 decision was admittedly in

conflict with several district court decisions and the series of

4/

-Due to such factors as risk of loss, breaks-in-service, death
before retirement agela , and plan termination, the actuarial
probability of obtaining a pension may be as low as 8%. CA 7 Op.,
App. at 8; DC Op., App. at 71.

- 9 -
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transactions by which respondent scquired his interest did
not fit neatly into the traditional concept of a "sale."
Nevertheless, considering the breadth of the definitions of
"investment contract" and "Sale," the balance tipped in
respondent's favor.

Judge Cummings also ·noted that he "found

little comfort in the opinion expressed by the SEC" because

"Apparently for the first time ever,
[the SEC] takes the position in its brief
before us that the employee's interest or
expectancy in a plan such as this is subject to the anti-fraud provisions of the
securities laws. _] he Commission has not
been as candid as we mi ght have hope d in
acknowledijing an d exp la ~n~ng ~ t s c hange - in
p ~ 1t ion ,
App. at 52.
Although the members of Congress considering legtslative proposals
after the passage of the securities acts may have relied on the
SEC's earlier interpretation, they also understood
"that the SEC is not infallible, that the
Seupreme Court has been known to disagree
with that agency's interpretation of t he
securities acts, and that the applicability
of those acts to various kinds of transactions, including non-contributory pension
plans, has yet to be determined by the Supreme
Court. It appears likely that Congress has
chosen to leave the matter in that posture."
App. at 53.
4.
and

CONTENTIONS:

Since there are two petns, a response

amici briefs, I condense here petrs' arguments:
(1)

The CA 7 failed to follow the teaching of United

Housing Foundation v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837, that the securities
acts were intended to apply to the capital markets.
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r·
(2)

The interest held 'by respondent is not an

"investment contract" because his return depends on such factors
(entirely extraneous to commercial investment) as whether he meets
the eligibility requirements, whether he is discharged by his employer, the . truf.tees' determination of how much should be paid,
and his life expectancy.
(3)

The decision of the court below that employees

acquire their interests in a pension as a result of a "sale" is
inconsistent with the reasoning of Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug
Stores, 431 U.S. 723, 746, which emphasized the need for an actual
sale to provide an evidentiary basis for finding reliance.
(4)
( '

The court below was wrong in assuming that the

SEC's statements that the securities acts did not cover mandatory,
pension plans referred only to the registration provisions.

The

theory of this disclaimer of jurisdiction, explained as recently
as the SEC's Institutional
'~ecurities

I~vestor

Study of 1971, was that

Act does not apply because there is not 'sale' or

'offer for sale' of a security."

The SEC has never before sought

to enforce the anti-fraud provisions with respect to such pension
plans.
(5)

The CA 7 misreads the subsequent legislative

actions of Congress.

The rejected 1934 amendment and the 1941

testimony did not deal with the kind of mandatory, noncontributory
plan at issue here.

The purpose of the 1970 Amendment to the

1933 Act was not to exempt from registration requirements the
employees' interests in pension funds, but rather to exempt
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transactions between the trustees of the fund and the bank or
insurance company with which the trust fund was maintained.
(6)

During the congressional deliberations on

ERISA, the SEC Chairman testified that pension plans should be
subject to disclosure requirements, presumably because he felt
that the Securities Acts did not cover them.

One of the explicit

statutory purposes of ERISA is "to protect • • . the interests of
participants in employee benefit plans • • • by requiring the
disclosure and reporting to participants and beneficiaries of
financial and other information with respect thereto . . • . "

29

,......

-

u.s.c.

§

1001.
(7)

The decision of the court below that § 17(a) of

the 1933 Act encompasses a private right of action is in direct
conflict with the decisions of the CA 8, Greater Iowa Corp. v.
McLendon, 378 F.2d 783 (1967); Shull v. Dain, Kalman & Quail,
561 F.2d 152 (1977).
(8)

Petrs emphasize that the CA 7 opinion has created

massive, debilitating uncertainty in the pension field.

The CA 7

decision conflicts with a number of district court decisions.

The

CA 7 opinion does not make clear precisely what material information must be disclosed or on what occasions.

Pension fund trustees

fear that the CA 7 decision has created an enormous retroactive
liability for failure to disclose actuarial information.

Because

of the impossibility of disproving the "reliance" of employees who
claim to have remained on the job in order to receive their pension

··~
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(

the claims against the funds may deplete them and thereby
impair the interests of other employees legitimately entitled
to their pensions.

:2.1

The respondent naturally repeats the arguments of the
CA 7 and emphasizes that the CA 7 opinio:1 did not deal

~vith

the

question of appropriate relief, so that claims of massive liability
are premature.
The SG has filed an amicus curiae brief urging the Court
grant review:
"The decision has left the administrators
and plan sponsors of many pension plans in
considerable uncertainty as to possible
liability which may arise from their past,
as well as their future, conduct, and raises
the possibility of significant liability for
such plans as have not heretofore complied
with the anti-fraud provisions." Brief at 4.

--

Since the Labor Department and SEC participated in the proceedings
below as amici curiae

on _9~ osite

sides of the case, the SG has
>'

6/

not yet determined what position the Government will take.

5/

Petrs also make a somewhat technical argument that because
the CA 7 gave several different explanations of why pension plans
were exempt from the registration requirements of the securities
laws, plan administrators cannot determine whether or in what
circumstances registration is required. See, e.g., App. at 50 n. 6

6/

.,

Other amici urging a grant of certiorari (for somewhat differing
reasons) include the National Association of Manufacturers, the
National Coordinating Committee for Multi-employer Plans, the
American Bankers Association, the AFL-CIO, and the ERISA Industry
Committee. The Grey Panthers, represented by the National Senior
Citizens Law Center, urge the Court to decline review .

- 13 -

5.

DISCUSSION:

It seems to me that petrs raise very

substantial questions about the correctness of the CA 7 decision.
The opinion's construction of the statutory language is obviously
strained.

The subsequent legislative history upon which the CA 7

relies is at best ambiguous.

The

traditi~nal

position of the SEC

seems to have been that mandatory, noncontributory pension plans
do not involve a "sale."

Most importantly, ERISA was apparently

enacted on the basis of an understanding that the securities laws
did not require disclosure.

The Congress has specified in ERISA

the disclosure it feels is appropriate.

It is simply too late to

assert that Congress intended the securities laws to handle this
problem.
According to some of the amici,

Zl

the CA 7 opinion is

disturbing not only because of its holding that the securities lat·7S
apply to respondent's interest in his pension, but also because of
its broad view of the type of the "material" information v.1hich must
be disclosed -- including, but not limited to, "the statistically
determinable risk that many employees covered by a plan would never
receive their pension benefits."

App. at 47.

Because the case

reaches the Supreme Court on a motion to dismiss, it may lack the
facts necessary to evaluate the correctness of the CA 7 view that
such information is material and helpful to an employee.

Zl
J

E.G., Brief of· AFL-CIO;

However,

Brief of American Banking Association

- 14 in all other respects this case ap'p ears to be a good vehicle
for deciding the broader question as to whether the antifraud provisions of ,the securities laws provide any protection
at all to employees participating in mandatory, employer-funded
pension plans.

3ince this question would not seem to turn on

specific facts, I see no reason to wait for additional case law
to develop.
Grant.
There is a response and an amicus curiae brief from the
SG.
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BENCH MEMO TO:
FROM:
RE:

Mr. Justice Powell

Paul
International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. Daniel, No. 77-753
Local 705, International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. Daniel,
No. 77-7 54

DATE:

August 21, 1978
The primary question presented by this case is whether a

compulsory, noncontributory, defined-benefit pension plan is a
security for purposes of the antifraud provisions of the
Securities Act of 1933 and Securities Exchange Act of 1934.

If

the Court were to hold that such a plan is covered by the
antifraud provisions, the case would present further questions as
to the propriety of judicial implication of a retrospective
damages remedy for such fraud.

Because the answer to the primary

question seems clear, however, I will not discuss these secondary

...

2•

problems.
Respondent Daniel retired as a teamster after 22 years
of service, during 18 of which his

employer~

paid contributions

in the Local 705 pension fund on the basis of the number of weeks
he worked.

Under the terms of the plan, an employee needed 20

years of continuous service with covered employers in order to
qualify for a pension.

Daniel applied for a pension, but the

trustees turned him down because of a four-month involuntary
layoff 12 years before his retirement.

Daniel then sued the

fund, its trustees, Local 705, and the International Union,
alleging, inter alia, that these defendants had violated Section
17(a) of the Securities Act, Section lO(b) of the Securities
Exchange Act, and the SEC's Rule lOb-5.1
Because the characteristics of pensions plans vary, it
is important to focus on the nature of the Local 705 plan.

The

plan is compulsory, in the sense that coverage is a condition of
employment over which an employee has no choice.

The plan is

noncontributory, in the sense that only the employer makes
contributions to the plan's fund.

The plan is called

"defined-benefit" because the benefits a retiree will receive are
fixed in advance on the basis of length of service and age, with
employer contributions adjusted to meet these obligations.

1. Daniel also alleged state law and labor law
violations which are not at issue here. A good
discussion of these alternate grounds of recovery is
contained in the amicus brief of the American Bankers
Association at pp. 26-33.

3.

Defendants moved to dismiss the securities law counts of
the complaint on the ground that Daniel's interest in the pension
fund was not a security sold to Daniel within the meaning of the
Securities and Securities Exchange Acts.

The district court

denied the motion but certified its order for an appeal under 28
U . S • C • § 12 9 2 (b) .

410 F . S u pp . 5 41 ( N . D. I 11. 19 7 6) .

Seventh Circuit affirmed.

The

561 F.2d 1223 (1977).

The district court and court of appeals both found
Daniel's interest in the pension fund to be an "investment
contract" and hence a security as defined by§ 2(1) of the
~

Securities Act and § 3 (a) (10) of the Securities Exchange Act.
Each applied the definition of an investment contract developed
in SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 298-99 (1946):
"[A]n investment contract for purposes of the Securities
Act means a contract, transaction or scheme whereby a
person invests his money in a common enterprise and is
led to expect profits solely from the efforts of the
promoter or a third party, it being immaterial whether
the shares in the enterprise are evidenced by formal
certificates or by nominal interests in the physical
assets employed in the enterprise."
The lower courts believed an investment occurred because Daniel
for~ore

fund.

direct wages in return for employer contributions to the
"Realistically speaking, employers are putting money into

a fund for an employee's future use which he would otherwise be
getting in his paycheck."

561 F.2d at 1232.

The pension fund,

the investments of which were controlled exclusively by the
fund's trustees, constituted the common enterprise.

An

expectation of profit existed to the extent successful management

4.

of the fund resulted in increased or more secure benefits for the
pensioner.
United Housing Foundation, Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837
(1975), intervened between the two decisions.

The court of

appeals acknowledged the admonition in Forman that "[i]f an
interest is not a security in economic reality, abuses should be
remedied by Congress rather than by an over-liberal extension of
the securities laws."

Id. at 849.

The court believed, however,

that Daniel's interest in the pension fund in economic reality
was a security.

The court analogized the transaction between an

-

-

employee and the fund to both a mutual fund investment and the
purchase of a variable annuity.

Although, like a variable

annuity, a pension fund interest has non-investment aspects, "the

7

employment fringe benefit aspect of a pension fund can be
separated from its security aspects."

561 F.2d at 1237.

This

\

separable security aspect transformed the entire transaction into
a security.
Both courts also held that Daniel had obtained his
interest in the pension fund through a "sale", as defined by §
2(3) of the Securities Act and § 3(a) (14) of the Securities
Exchange Act, but their analyses differed somewhat.

The district

court believed there was a disposition of a security interest for
value because Daniel eschewed greater pay in return for the
employer's contributions to the fund on his behalf.

It further

ruled that this disposition was voluntary inasmuch as Daniel
along with other union members was given an opportunity to ratify

5.

the wage and benefit packages of which pension fund contributions
were a part.

The court of appeals agreed that "plaintiff's

giving of his services and the employer's contribution on behalf
of the employee constitutes value," 561 F.2d at 1242, but thought
it to be unnecessary to determine if the acquiring employee
exercised any volition as the statute made no mention of that
element.

To the extent volition was necessary, the court of

appeals found it to be present either because of plaintiff's
ratification vote or because, "[w]hen an employee decides to
retain his job, his decision results in his continuing to give
value in the future and in his further acquisition of interests
in the pension fund."

Id. at 1243.

The lower courts also agreed that congressional action
subsequent to enactment of the Securities and Securities Exchange
Acts and the SEC's behavior with respect to pension funds
indicated that the antifraud provisions of the securities laws
applied to compulsory, noncontributory, defined-benefit pension
plans.

They saw nothing inconsistent between their

inter~retation

of the securities laws and Congress's enactment of

the Welfare and Pension Plans Disclosure Act of 1958 or the
Employment Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, as the latter
legislation "is concerned with administration of such funds, so
as to protect the interest of its [sic] participants, rather than
regulation of circumstances of entry into the plan."

410 F.

6.

Supp. at 549.2
The decision below seems so far off base that I have
--~-~·------

trouble knowing where to begin my discussion.

_____...,______------ -------

~I
.

I will deal first

with the application of the Howey "investment contract" test as ~~
~~~
it relates to pension plans of this type. As far as I can
~~ ~
determine, none of the elements set forth by gowey is present
here.

Next I will discuss the definition of a "sale".

~

Finally,

I will survey the evidence of congressional and administrative
perceptions of the scope of federal regulation of pension plans.
This evidence buttresses the conclusion that Congress never meant
the securities laws to apply to pension plans of this type, and
that the SEC until now had been of the same mind.

As this case

has been both thoroughly briefed and analyzed with some care by

2. Judge Tone wrote a concurring opinion expressing his
reservations about the decision.
" . . . I have found little comfort in the opinion
5-£.Cexpressed by the SEC, as am1cus curiae. Apparently
; .' . J~
for the first time ever, it now takes the position in ~'
its brief before us that the employee's interest or J~
expectancy in a plan such as this is subject to the ~
anti-fraud provisions of the securities laws. The
~
Commission has not been as candid as we mi ht have
hope a-1n acknowledging and explaining its change in
position. As late as 1971 in its Institutional
Investor Study submitted to Congress in connection
with the consideration of the ERISA legislation, the
Commission's view was that although a
non-contributing pension plan might well be an
investment contract, the element of sale was
lacking. Before that, not even the existence of a
security was acknowledged."

->I

561 F.2d at 1251 (footnote omitted}. Judge Tone
reluctantly agreed with the majority, however, on the
ground that Congress should have known that even if the
SEC believed a pension plan not to be a security, the
courts could take a different view.

''~~

J

a'~

~~

7.

several law review notes, for the most part I will organize and
summarize the arguments presented rather than make much of a
contribution of my own.
The Presence of An Investment Contract
Howey sets forth three elements of an investment

contract ~ nvestment ~ common enterprise;
of profits produced by the efforts of others.

.~

Rl

an~n expectat1on

I will discuss

each element in turn.
1.

Investment
In all of the previous decisions of the Court concerning

the definition of a security, it was clear that one party had
given up something in return for an interest in something else.
See Forman, supra;

Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389 U.S. 332 (1967);

SEC v. United Benefit Life Ins. Co., 387 U.S. 202 (1967);
Variable Annuity Life Ins. Co., 359
Howey Co., supra;
(1943).

u.s.

65 (1967);

SEC v.

SEC v. W.J.

SEC v. C.M. Joiner Leasing Corp., 320

u.s.

344

Here it is difficult to discern exactly what respondent

gave up as his "investment" in the pension plan.

In a

contributory plan, whether voluntary or compulsory, an employee
surrenders his contributions to the fund, but .,____...,
here there were no
contributions to make.

The court below instead found an

investment in the employer's contributions to the pension fund,
which it regarded as compensation which otherwise would have been
available to an employee to dispose of as he saw fit.

A closer

look suggests that this finding cannot stand up.
The linchpin of the court's analysis lay in the supposed
equivalence of employer pension fund contributions with other

8.

aspects of compensation.

Respondent emphasizes the compensatory

nature of pension contributions, going so far as to describe this
plan as a direct payout to the individual employee with the fund
acting as an intermediary only because of the tax laws.
characterization is misleading.

This

Although an employer's

contributions are part of his wage costs and may be considered
compensation with respect to the labor force as a whole, the
value realized by an individual employee is by no means
equivalent to the contribution paid into the fund on the basis of
his weeks worked.

Indeed, these contributions are not made to or

"on behalf" of that employee at all.

The use of man-weeks as the

unit for measuring employer contributions is completely
arbitrary--

in the coal industry, for example, contributions are

tied to coal produced.

The purpose of the contributions

~

~Te

not

--

in fact,
=contributions must be paid even if an employee performed no work
to compensate any individual for services rendered--

during the week in question--

but rather to ensure the fund

possesses sufficient assets to meet pre-set benefit obligations.
In addition, if an employee were giving up a portion of
his wages for an interest in a pension plan, one would expect him
to be receiving something in return.

Although in theory an

employee could be said to receive some value, measured by the
value of his chance of receiving a pension, the worth of this
interest both would vary widely among employee and have little
relation to services rendered.

A 25 year old teamster with a

family history of heart disease would be receiving a contingent
interest far less in value than a coworker of the same age

M/

~

whose ~~~

•,'

~.

~

'
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family included many octogenarians.

It

w~uld

be absurd to. assert

I

~

0

that each was setting aside the same sum 1n forgone wages 1n
return for their future pensions.
Further, from an employer's point of view contributions
to a pension fund would not necessarily be a substitute for
increased wages:

"Elimination of a pension plan would not necessarily
produce an increase in current employee compensation.
The vesting provisions generally present in pension
plans tend to promote personnel stability by providing
an incentive for employeees to remain with their
employer. As the Court said in Alabama Power [Co~ v.
Davis, 431 u.s. 581, 592 n.l6 (1977)], 'By rewarding
lengthy service, a plan may reduce employee turnover and
training costs and help an employer secure the benefits
of a stable work force.' One of the benefits of
personnel stability may be increased employee
productivity, and it is conceivable that the reduction
in training costs and higher productivity might actually
'pay' for some pension plans. Even if elimination of
pension plans would free some resources, it is not
-r1~
clear, especially in view of the tax advantages of
I
pension arrangements, that those resources would
necessarily be passed on to employees in the form of
increased wages."

I

Comment, Application of the Federal Securities Laws to
Noncontributory, Defined Benefit Pension Plans, 45 U. Chi. L.
Rev. 124, 142-43 (1977) (footnotes omitted).

In short, "[t] he

relationship between pension benefits and forgone wages is
tenuous at best."

Id. at 142.

As it did throughout its opinion, the court below in
finding an investment stressed an insignificant aspect of
Daniel's employment relationship at the expense of the economic
realities of the situation.
benefits Daniel
1

Whatever additional wages or fringe

~)~l return

for his participation in the

pension plan were too speculative to provide the basis for a

10.

finding of investment.

Consequently, an essential element of an

investment contract, or for that matter any other kind of
security, is absent here.
2.

Common Enterprise
The court below found a common enterprise in the

investment and money management activities of the pension fund.
In its view, the trustees did not serve merely as depositories
for employers' contributions, but rather invested the
contributions in a profitable manner.

Although this

characterization has a superficial plausibility, again it
overlooks the realities of the situation.

The value of an

employee's pension interest depends "on repeatedly negotiated
c:;

benefit levels, and not on the sucess
of investment efforts
1\
Note, The

~plication

of the Antifraud Provisions of the

Securities Laws to Compulsory, Noncontributory Pension Plans
After Daniel v. International Brotherhood of Teamsters, 64 Va. L.
Rev. 305, 315 (1978).

The growth of the Local 705 pension fund

-----------------------------------------~~
part ~ attributable to increased

over the years for the most

-----------------

employer contributions, not successful money management.

-----------------

Between

~~----~

1955 and 1977 employers' contribution per man-week increased from
$2.00 to $30.00.3

Only 8.6% of the actuarial value of a pension

3. During the same period a pensioner's monthly
benefits increased from $75.00 to $550.00. Although at
first blush it might appear that the employers'
contribution dollar bought less than half as much
benefits per pensioner in 1977 as it did in 1955, I
assume the ratio of pensioners to active workers
increased by a like proportion during this period.

·~·

·.

"
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received by an employee who retired in 1975 could be attributed

to investment income on contributions tied to his employment; ~~
the balance of the value came from increased contributions

and ; ~

proportional share of forfeited contributions and earnings

~

As a result, the role of the ~ ~

attributable to other employees.

trustees as passive depositories of employers' contributions

~

substantially outweighs their investment management function.
On a more fundamental level, a common enterprise does
not exist because the efforts of others play only a slight role
in determining whether an employee receives a pension.
.
.
h e must meet t h e
emp 1 oyee can rece1ve
a pens1on,

-

(f)

-

-

lA

Before an

-t.

v~ ng

~
;._
~

~

--

,
1

~

lA-'~~~·-•

requirements' : which means living to a certain age ~a working a r--'r''~-~

. "'1 /~

Whether a worker achieves these goals 1s - ~~
entirely outside the control of the trustees.
If he achieves ~
fixed number of years.

these goals, the only remaining contigency on which his
rests is the solvency of the pension fund.

pensio ~~

The record in this

~
~ ~

case indicates that the risk of not meeting the vesting
requirements ordinarily is substantial, while the risk of the
trustees driving the fund into bankruptcy generally is slight.
See Note, Interest in Pension Plans as Securities:

Daniel v.

International Brotherhood of Teamsters, 78 Colum. L. Rev. 184,

201 (1978).

Because an employee's success in realizing his

"investment" depends almost entirely on his

~

Jof~

efforts to stay ~
*~

alive and remain employed, one of the most basic attributes of a ~ l,.,
security is absent.

The employee does not surrender his capital

to others in hope they might use it more profitably;

rather he

~
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participates in a plan that rewards him for his own continued
service.

See Alabama Power Co. v. Davis, 431

u.s.

581, 594

(1977) .4
3.

Expectation of Profit
In Forman, supra, your opinion emphasized a purchaser's ~

motivation as a test for whether the interest purchased
constituted a security.

The expectation of profit, in the

of either capital appreciation or participation in earnings, was
seen as the hallmark of an investment contract.
Further, the expected return had to be material:

Id. at 853.
The hope of

"speculative and insubstantial" income did not convert a
commodity for consumption into an investment contract.
856.

Id. at

Applying this test here, it seems clear that the

expectation of profit had little to do with whether Daniel
participated in the Local 705 plan.

4. The amicus brief of the American Academy of
Actuaries indirectly supports this point. It emphasizes
the absurdity of the disclosure requirements suggested
by the court of appeals, in particular the requirement
that the trustees inform employees of the
likelihood they will receive a pension. ~e brief
points out that calculations of this sort are not made
for individual empl oyees in the normal course of
·
p repari ng a pl an, ana that in any event it defies reason
to require the trustees to inform an employee how long
he can exEect to rema1n at a par t 1cular i ob, ~ e
employee is in a better position than the trustees to
know what his plans for the future may be. The employee
is in a better position because in large part he is in
control of the factors that will determine whether he
will meet the vesting requirements, while the trustees
have no control at all over those events.

13.

"Significantly, neither the focus of the promotional
efforts involved nor the magnitude of profit actually
generated by the Local 705 plan suggests that employees
were induced to participate in the plan primarily by the
prospect of realizing an investment profit. The only
'promotional' materials for the Local 705 plan
considered by the Seventh Circuit, for example,
consisted of a brochure that did not stress either the
prospects of capital appreciation or the possibility of
sharing in earnings from the investment of funds.
Instead of promoting the plan as a superior investment
scheme, the brochure objectively and tersely described
the trustees' investment of employer contributions as a
necessary, albeit advantageous, aspect of the plan
without mentioning the magnitude of possible investment
return."
Note, 64 Va. L. Rev. 305, supra, at 312 (footnotes omitted).

As

indicated above, investment income played only a slight role in
determining whether an employee would receive a pension and how
large the pension would be.
Further, the degree expectation of profit entered into
an employee's decision to participate in the plan must be
determined in light of what he actually decided.

Because this

plan was compulsory, Daniel's choice was not between coverage and
some other fringe benefit, but between coverage and working
somewhere else.

Pretermitting whether either retention of

employment or a vote to affirm a wage-benefit package containing
a pension plan constitutes a "purchase" of an interest in the
pension plan, it seems clear that the prospect of profit through
the plan would have little influence on these decisions.5

What

5. Daniel alleged in an affidavit that if had known of
the stringent vesting requirements of the Local 705
plan, he would have sought other employment. While this
allegation may be true as to his final years on the job,
it stretches credulity to believe that from the start
Daniel based his decision to work entirely on the

..
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Daniel obtained for his services was an income consisting of cash
and various fringe benefits, one of the latter being a contingent
interest in a future fixed income.

The prospect that this one of

several fringe benefits might turn out better or worse than
expected could have played only an insignificant role in his
choice of jobs.
Further, it is difficult to see what distinguishes this
··---

~

particular kind of fringe benefit from other forms of

-------------

compensation.

If the reasoning of the court below were upheld, I

--.--~

can see no reason why any offer and acceptance of employment
would not be regarded as an investment contract.

Services would

constitute the investment, and the employer's business would be
the common enterprise.

The expectation of profit would come in

the belief that if business was good, wages would increase.
Presumably an employee could sue the employer if an expected wage
increase was withheld because of an unforeseen slump in sales.
This line of reasoning goes way beyond the pyramid sales cases or
anything else this or any other court has approved.
1I

l,-l

The Presence of a Sale
The determination of the court below that an interest in
a compulsory, noncontributory, defined-benefit pension fund
constitutes a security seems by far its most significant error;
the question of whether participation in a pension plan also

[5. cont.] prospects of receiving a pension. And as to
his final years, one wonders whether he could have found
another job that provided appreciable pension benefits
on the basis of a few years of service.

'.
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involves a "sale" as defined by the securities laws seems of
lesser importance.

_ _ _ ___

If...___
one were to accept the proposition that a

pension plan can be a security, the idea that an employee

-------...__....-..-.
-----------------------u~~~~ble. Of course,

j~f

purchases this interest by offering his services seems

~

it is hard to tell what portion of

~

the employee's services is offered for the interest, but this
problem is intrinsically no different than sorting out from other
kinds of compensation the interest received by the employee in
the form of possible propective pension benefits.

If one accepts

the idea that an employee receives something each time he gets
closer to fulfilling a plan's vesting requirements, it would seem
to follow that he gives up something in return.

Conversely, if

one believes that an employee does not acquire a substantial
separable interest when part of his wage-benefit package includes
a pension plan such as this one, then it seems illogical to try
to isolate a portion of the services tendered to his employer as
"value" for which this amorphous interest is disposed.
Two minor points are of some interest in considering
whether this transaction can be considered a "sale", however.
First, although the policy considerations expressed in Blue Chip
Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421

u.s.

723 (1975), should have

~~

given the court of appeals some hint that it was straying from ~~
the reservation, I do not believe that Blue Chip Stamps
controls this case.

directl~~

The International Union argues that Daniel's

ongoing retention of employment, which the court of appeals
believed to constitute the "purchase" here, is the same as

16.

Manor's ongoing retention of Blue Chip's stock, which was held
not to be a purchase in Blue Chip Stamps.

Although the analogy

seems attractive at first, the circumstances are different here.
Daniel was not retaining employment but giving up his services,
for which he purportedly received a continually growing interest
in the pension fund.

Unlike Blue Chip Stamps, there was an

exchange of one thing for something else.

Thus, although the

policy against strike suits expressed there certainly applies
5t!?C

here, the precise holding of that case does not control this one ~~
Second, to a great extent the position of the court
below rested on the idea that what constitutes a sale for

-~
~

w-~;fH-

purposes of the antifraud provisions of the securities acts need
not be the same as what constitutes a sale for purposes of

~'~

~

~~~
This concept has been of immense value to the SEC, ~~

registration.

as through it that agency has been able to interpret the

~~

antifraud provisions very broadly while avoiding the crushing
administrative burden an equally broad reading of the
registration requirements would bring.

Indeed, this case is a

perfect example of the SEC's practice.

The problem is that the

statutes do not support such a distinction:

Where Congress

~
a.c..h-.d2c

~~t-

~~
intended to except certain transactions from registration but not

the antifraud provisions, it said so.

This Court hinted that the

SEC practice might be acceptable, but did not expressly endorse
it, in SEC v. National Securities, Inc., 393 U.S. 453, 465-66
(1969):

·.

'.
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"But whatever may be the validity or effect of [former
SEC Rule 133, treating certain transact i ons as exempt
from registration]-- and we intimate absolutely no
opinion on these questions-- it certainly does not
determine the result here. The rule is specifically
made applicable only to cases involving § 5 of the 1933
Act;
this case arises under § lO(b) of the 1934 Act.
Although the interdependence of the various sections of
the securities laws is certainly a relevant factor in
any interpretation of the language Congress has chosen,
ordinary rules of construction still apply. The meaning
of particular phrases must be determined in context, SEC
v. C. M. Joiner Leasing Corp., 320 U.S. 344, 350-51
(1943). Congress itself has cautioned that the same
words may take on a different coloration in different
sections of the securities laws; both the 1933 and the
1934 Acts preface their list of general definitions with
the phrase 'unless the context otherwise requires.' .
We must therefore address ourselves to the meaning of the
words 'purchase or sale' in the context of§ lO(b).
Whatever these or similar words may mean in the numerous
other contexts in which they appear in the securities laws,
only this one narrow question is presented here."
(citation omitted).

As can be seen, the Court, although
~·

--- ·

expressing tacit support for the SEC's practice, left open the
question of the statute's meaning.

~

I would recommend reaching the question of whether a
sale for purposes of registration is the same as a sale for
purposes of fraud and hold that it is.

First, I think National

~

Securities is wrong in suggesting the "unless the context
otherwise requires" language refers to the regulatory context.
Subsequent decisions suggest that the reference is to the

~

~

~
~~~ji

-~-~~

s£c~

~

~
~~-1

economic context of the transaction, not the posture of the SEC
in attempting to supervise it.
848-50.

Cf. Forman, ~upra, 421

Second, experience since National Securities

u.s. at tl/ ~

indicates .~
~~

that the concept of separate meanings has undesirable
consequences, particularly in its effect on the SEC.

As this

~

~

~

18.

___

case illustrates, the
SEC has- taken
...._____
- - - the position that almost
every form of injustice that results from a failure to disclose

------·------ -

-··-.

------------------~

See

information violates§ lO(b) of the Securities Exchange Act.
Forman,

~upra,

421

u.s.

at 858 n.25.

That agency has been free

to do this in part because it has not enforced a concomitant
registration requirement, a burden that would both swamp the
agency and engender substantial political pressure to amend the
securities laws.

A determination that a sale means the same

thing for both registration and fraud might encourage the SEC to
take a more responsible position in these cases and to husband
its resources for those situations where the securities laws were
meant to apply.
Legislative and Administative Interpretation
I will summarize briefly the legislative and
administrative interpretation of the definitions of a security
and a sale, which is discussed extensively and for the most part
fairly in the petitioners' briefs.

I found the amicus brief of ~

the American Bankers Association most

helpful ~

in understanding

the 1970 amendment to§ 3(a) (2) of the Securities Act.
1.

1934 Amendment to§ 4(1) of Securities Act

/3~

~~

~~~

~

Congress in 1934 rejected the following amendment to the
Securities Act:
"As used in this paragraph, the term 'public offering'
shall not be deemed to include an offering made solely
to employees by an issuer or by its affiliates in
connection with a bona fide plan for the payment of
extra compensation or stock investment plan for the
exclusive benefit of such employees."

.. -
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The court below at the SEC's prompting inferred that the
rejection of this amendment showed that Congress understood both
that the Securities Act applied to pension plans and that it
should continue to apply.

Although this amendment probably would

have applied to voluntary, contributory plans, it does not follow
that Congress meant anything at all with respect to compulsory,
noncontributory plans.
2.

Investment Company Act of 1940
I agree with petitioners that the court below confused

an "employees' security company", which was covered by § 2 (a) (13)
of the Investment Company Act, with a pension fund, essentially
on the same grounds as it confused the meaning of the rejected
1934 amendment.
3.

1941 SEC Opinions and Testimony
In 1941 the SEC took the position that voluntary,

contributory pension

---·--- -

securities laws.

pla~s

fell within the scope of the

The SEC did not state one way or the other

whether compulsory, noncontributory plans were securities
(~~ary

........_________,

to the statement on p. 21 of the Solicitor General's

brief), but rather concluded that no sale could take place with
respect to these plans because there was no element of volition.
In testimony before Congress that year, SEC Commissioner
Purcell expressed the agency's position that voluntary,
contributory plans were securities.

Committee reaction to even

this assertion was hostile, and the matter was dropped.

\
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4.

SEC Practice After 1941
From 1941 until the present case, the SEC took the

position that a voluntary, contributory plan had to be registered
under the Securities Act only if it invested in the employer's
securities in an amount greater than the employer's
contributions.

The agency continued to maintain that the

securities laws (and not just the registration provisions) did
not reach the kind of plan involved here because no sale took
place.

Two SEC attorneys criticized the agency in an article

written in 1964 for not taking a more aggressive role in the
regulation of pension plans, including the application of the
antifraud provisions to them.

Mundheim & Henderson,

Applicability of the Federal Securities Laws to Pension and
Profit-Sharing Plans, 29 L. & Contemp. Prob. 795, 806-14.

In

testimony before Congress in connection with enactment of the

-

·- .......__..~-

-

Welfare and Pension Plans Disclosure Act of 1958 and ERISA and in
the __...
1971 Institutional Investor Study, the SEC held to the same
position:

voluntary, contributory plans involving the employer's

-------

securities were covered by the securities
contributory plans fell into a grey

area~

laws~

other voluntary,

and all other types of

pension plans were outside its jurisdiction.

At no time did the

agency suggest to Congress that the antifraud provisions did
apply to these plans.
5.

The 1970 Amendment to § 3 (a) (2) of the Securities Act
The court of appeals regarded the 1970 amendment, which

exempted certain kinds of bank-maintained trust funds from

21..

registration but not the antifraud provisions, as demonstrating a
clear Congressional understanding that bank-maintained trust
funds, including pension plans, generally were subject to the
securities laws.

The 1970 amendment was a mess, and the

International Union's discussion is not entirely helpful.

At

least according to the American Bankers Association brief, the
change in the amendment to include single as well as collective
trust funds was intended to reach certain kinds of pension plans,
although not the kind at issue here.
indicates:

( 1)

-

As I read the amendment, it

voluntary, contributory plans involving the

employer's securities are not exempt from registration;

~

(2) all

other voluntary, contributory plans are exempt from registration
but, one may infer, not exempt from other provisions of the
securities laws;

(3)

compulsory, noncontributory plans are not

mentioned because no one believed them to be covered by any part
of the securities laws.
6.

ERISA
Although ERISA contained express language indicating

that it was not preempting other federal legislation, cf. Malone
v. White Motor Corp., 98

s.

Ct. 1185, 1187 n.l (1978), one can

infer that Congress chose not to preempt the securities laws only

------------~ -----~--'-~~--~--------~-------------------~
The SEC certainly

because it believed it did not have to do so.

contributed to this impression during the time Congress
contemplated the legislation that became ERISA.
ERISA reinforces the inference.

The structure of

Congress chose to limit

disclosure to pension plan participants both by requiring only an
--------~---------------------~-

;q7 {)
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abbreviated summary of the plan's terms and by allowing delivery
of the summary well after participants had joined the plan.

In

contrast, Congress did choose to regulate the substantive terms

-------- -------------

of pension plans, including setting limits on vesting

requirements that would have prevented Daniel from losing his
pension.

Significantly, Congress chose not to make these vesting

limits retroactive, as it was aware of the disruptive and unfair
impact on existing plans such a move would have.

The decision of

---

the court below, if allowed to stand, would undermine this
feature of ERISA and almost certainly prompt immediate
legislative reaction.
I will be happy to do further work on the legislative
and administrative history and to explore the questions of an
implied damages remedy and retroactivity, but at this point it
seems to be the case can be decided squarely on the issue of
whether a pension plan constitutes a security.
additional points require comment.

Only two

First, for what it is worth I

am a bit offended, if not totally surprised, by the conduct of

the SEC in this case, and I note that at least some of

misleadin~

st~ements made by the SEC in the court below are perpetuated

the Solicitor General's brief.

in~

The latter seems to reflect a

compromise to some extent between the conflicting views of the
Department of Labor and the SEC.
Chris-Craft Indus., 430

u.s.

In light of Forman, Piper v.

1 (1977), and other past cases where

the SEC has taken unwarranted and unduly expansive positions on
the scope of the securities laws, some comment might be
appropriate.

23.

Second, it has occurred to me that summary reversal
might be appropriate in this case.

The court below seems clearly

wrong, and the briefs we already have received are thorough and
extensive.

As long as the decision below stands, a substantial

cloud lies over pension plans, and employers will be reluctant to
commit resources to them.

In addition, summary reversal would

convey a strong message, one which I think is appropriate in this
case.

Of course, it may be better to have oral argument and then

write a strong opinion, but I raise the matter for your
consideration.
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DRAFT .OPINION

1\
TO:

Mr. Justice Powell

FROM:
RE:

Paul
Int~rnational · Broth~rhood · of · T~amst~rs

753 and 77-754

Mr~ · Justic~ · Pow~ll

v.

Nos. 77-

Dani~l,

delivered the opinion of the Court.

This case presents the question whether a noncontributory, compulsory, defined-benefit pension plan with
substantial vesting requirements constitutes a "security"
within the meaning of the Securities Act of 1933 and the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (the "Securities Acts").
the unprecedented extension of these Acts to su
interests by the court be
I

-

In 1954 multiemployer collective bargaining between

"'
Local 705 of the International Brotherhood of Teamsters,
Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers of America and Chicago
trucking firms produced a pension plan for employees
represented by the Local.

Ut.L/. -

f-Th; ~ust

~-

-

agreement establishing

lan required the employers to contribute, starting in 1955,

I

to the Pension Trust Fund for each man-week of cove ed
employment. 1

Because employees made no contributions to the

lfp/ss

12/7/78

The plan was compulsory and noncontributory.
Employees had no choice as to participation in the
plan, and did not have the option of demanding that the
employers' contribution be paid directly to them as a
substitute for pension eligibility.2

The trust

agreemment establishing the plan initially required
employers to contribute, commencing in 1955, $2.00 a
week to the Pension Trust Fund for each man-week of
covered employment.

The Board of Trustees of the Fund,

a body composed of an equal number of employer and
union representatives, was given sole authority to set
the level of benefits3 but had no authority with
respect to the required contributions.

Initially the

Fund paid eligible employees $75.00 a month in
benefits.

Subsequent collective bargaining agreements

called for greater employer contributions, which in
turn led to higher benefit payments for retirees.

At

the time respondent brought suit, employers contributed
$21.50 per employee-man week and pension payments
ranged from $425 to $525 a month depending on age at
retirement.

2.
Paul:

The foregoing is merely a rearranging of several

of the sentences, including moving note 3 to the text.

2.

~

Fund, the plan was "non-contributory".

vere c;J ~ployees had

§

no choice about participating in the plan;

,

they could not, for

example, demand that the employers' contribution be paid
directly to them as a substitute for pension eligibility.
Because employees could

(

~~-k>~·4~

not~

out, the plan was

1\

"compulsory". 2

The board of trustees of the Fund, a body

composed of an equal number of employer and union
representatives, was given sole authority to set the level of

l bene~its ~ Because equal payments were made to each employee
who qualified for a pension, regardless of the amount of
employer contributions attributable to his period of service,
the plan provided a "defined benefit". 4

In order to receive a

pension, an employee was required to have twenty years of
continuous service, with work before 1955 counted toward this
total.

This substantial service prerequisite was the plan's

"vesting requirement."
The meaning of "continuous service" is at the center
of this dispute.

Respondent began working as a truck driver in

the Chicago area in 1950, and joined Local 705 the following
year.

When the plan first went into effect, respondent

automatically received 5 years credit toward the 20 year
service requirement because of his earlier work experience.
retired in 1973 and applied to the plan's administrator for a

He

3.

pension.

The administrator determined that respondent was

ineligible because of a break in service between December,
1960, and July, 1961. 5

Respondent appealed the decision to the

trustees, who affirmed. Respondent then asked the trustees to
waive the continuous service rule as it applied to him.

After

the trustees refused to waive the rule, respondent brought suit
in federal court against the International union (the
"Teamsters"), Local 705 (the "Local"), and Louis Peick, a
trustee of the Fund.

-r.

,.}(;::;~--

0 .....

Respondent's complaint alleged that the
the Local, and Peick misrepresented and omitted to state
material facts with respect to the value of a covered
employee's interest in the pension plan.

Count I of the

complaint charged that these misstatements and omissions
constituted a fraud in connection with the sale of a security
in violation of
15

u.s.c.

§

§

10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,

78j(b), and the Securities and Exchange

Commission's Rule 10b-5, 17 C.P.R. 240.10(b)-5.6

Count II

charged that the same conduct amounted to a violation of
17(a) of the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C.

§

77q. 7

§

Other

counts alleged violations of various labor and common law
duties. 8

Respondent sought to proceed on behalf of all

prospective beneficiaries of Teamsters pension plans and

4.

9
against all Teamsters pension funds.
The petitioners moved to dismiss the first two counts
of the complaint on the ground that respondent had no cause of
action under the Securities or Securities Exchange Acts.
District Court denied the motion.
1976).

410 F. Supp. 541

The

(ND Ill.

It held that respondent's interest in the Pension Fund

constituted a security within the meaning of§ 2(1) of the
Securities Act, 15

u.s.c.

§ 77b(1), and§ 3(a)(10) of the

Securities Exchange Act, 15

u.s.c.

§ 78c(a)(10), 10 because the

plan created an "investment contract" as that term had been
interpreted in SEC v. W;J;

· aow~y · co~,

328 U.S. 293 (1946).

It

also determined that there had been a "sale" of this interest
to respondent within the meaning of
Act, 15

u.s.c.

§

2(3) of the Securities

§ 77b(3), and§ 3(a)(14) of the Securities

Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C.

§

78c(a)(14). 11

It believed respondent

voluntarily gave value for his interest in the plan, because he
had voted on collective bargaining agreements that chose

~

employer contributions to the Fund instead of other

wages or benefits.
The motion to dismiss was certified for appeal
pursuant to 28

u.s.c.

§

1292(b), and the Court of Appeals for

the Seventh Circuit affirmed.

561 F.2d 1223 (1977).

Relying

on its perception of the economic realities of pension plans

5.

and various actions of Congress and the SEC with respect to
such plans, the Court ruled that respondent's interest in the
~'

I(

Pension Fund was a security.

According to the Court, a "sale"

took place either when respondent ratified a collective
bargaining agreement embodying the Fund or when he accepted or
retained covered employment instead of seeking other work. 12
The Court did not believe the subsequent enactment of the
Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 ("ERISA"), 29
U.S.C. §§ 1001

et · seq~,

affected the application of the

Securities Acts to oension plans, as the requirements and
purposes of ERISA were perceived to be different from those of
the Securities Acts. 13

We granted certiorari, 434

u.s.

1061

(1978), and now reverse.
II ·
~~!! r,1e -!\aye- obst:rved befo~ "The starting point in

every case involving the construction of a statute is the
language itself."

u.s.

Blue ·chtp · stamps v. Manor ·orug · stores, 421

723, 756 (1975)

(Powell, J., concurring);

Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425

u.s.

see Ernst · &

185, 197, 199 & n. 19 (1976).

Neither§ 2(1) of the Securities Act nor§ 3(a)(10) of the

)c&_l

~ ~ -1 ~ ~~~ ~.:,·4 ,.J.
Securities Exchange ActArefers to pension plans of any type.
Acknowledging this omission in the statutes, respondent

s

,.

~

contendQd that an employee's interest in a pension plan is an

6.

"investment contract," an instrument which is included in the
statutory definitions of a security. 14
To determine whether a particular financial
relationship constitutes an investment contract, "[t]he test is
whether the scheme involves an investment of money in a common
enterprise with profits to come solely from the efforts of
others."

Howey, supra, at 301.

light of "the substance--

This test is to be applied in

the economic realities of the

transaction-- rather than the names that may have been employed
by the parties."

united ·Housing

851-852 (1975);
(1967);
Ins~ · co~,

· corp~

v. Forman, 421

Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389

u.s.

u.s.

837,

332, 336

Howey, supra, at 298. Cf. SEC v. variable ·Annuity ·Life
359

u.s.

65, 80 (1959)

(Brennan, J., concurring)

("(O]ne must apply a test in terms of the purposes of the
Feder a 1 Acts • •

•" ) •

Looking separately at each element of

the Howey test, it is apparent that an employee's participation
in a non-contributory, involuntary, defined-benefit pension
plan with a substantial vesting requirement does not comport
with the commonly held understanding of an investment contract.
A~ ·

~)-

· rnvestment ·of ·Money

An employee who participates in a

/ $"

~~ (i,voluntar~!nsion ?lan
~,·AV
(
V\Y'. ~ Jl..~
~~pP~rr

the pension fund

.

•

non-contributoryr,~~

\../

by definition makes no ?ayment into

He only accepts employment, one of the

?)

7.

conditions of which is eligibility for a possible benefit on
retirement.

Daniel contends, however,

that he has "invested"

in the pension fund by permitting part of his compensation from
his employer to take the form of a deferred pension benefit.
By allowing his employer to pay money into the fund, and by
contributing his labor to his employer in return for these
payments, Daniel asserts he has made the kind of investment
which the Securities Acts were intended to regulate.
In every decision of this Court recognizing the
presence of a "security" under the Securities Acts, the person
found to have been an investor chose to give up something of
value in return for a separable financial interest
maRi£ee~ed

'

the characteristics of a security.

supra (money paid for bank capital stock);
Benefit · Life · rns;

· co~,

387

u.s.

202 (1967)

£vi::IL

~

~

l~

See Tcherpnin,

---

SEC v. United
(portion of premium

paid for variable component of mixed variable and fixed annuity
contract);

variable · Annuity · Life · rns;

for variable annuity contract);

· co~,

supra (premium paid

Howey, supra (money paid for

purchase, maintenance, and harvesting of orange grove);
C;M; ·Joiner · Leasing ·corp;, 320
land and oil exploration

u.s.

ser ~ees).

344 ( 1943)

SEC v.

(money paid for

Even in those cases where

the interest acquired had intermingled security and nonsecurity aspects, the interest obtained had "to a very

7

....-L
'
I R_,_._._/
--- _,1~

8.

substantial degree elements of investment contracts • . • • "
variable ·Annuity · Life · rns; ·co;, supra, at 91
concurring).

(Brennan, J.,

With a pension plan such as this one, by

contrast, the purported security interest is a relatively
insignificant part of an employee's total and indivisible
compensation package.

No portion of respondent's compensation

other than the potential pension benefits constituted an
~

investment in a security, yet these non-security interests werj
tied to the pension benefits.

Only in the most abstract sense

may it be said that respondent "exchanged" some portion of his
labor in return for these possible benefits. 15

Looking at the

economic realities, it seems clear that respondent was sellinq
his labor to obtain a livelihood, not making an investment for
the future.

~
Respondent argues that employer contributions on his
~

behalf constituted his investment into the fund.

But it is

inaccurate to describe these payments as having been "on
behalf" of any employee.

The trust agreement used employee man-

weeks as a convenient way to measure an employer's overall
obligation to the Fund, not as a means of measuring the
employer's obligation to any particular

employe~rrn other

dustries production figures, such as the amount of coal
~

ined, fulfill the same

purpose~man-weeks

serve here.

See,

9.

-----Robinson v.

~r.c4'J;~~t

/4)

~,

~~~..

435 F. Supp. 245 (D.D.C. 1977) ",{ 'ftri"'s

~~

obligation ~ ~o

AO~

fungible with other forms of

compensation, because tax benefits and other economic
considerations tend to make pension plan contributions more

---

16

desirable for an employer than straight wage payouts.

-

~,.;-~,
-~

F~rtRQ~, there was no fixed relationship between

contributions to the Fund and an employee' potential benefits.
A pension plan with "fixed benefits," such as the Local's, does
not tie a qualifying employee's benefits to the time he has
worked.

See note 5, supra.

~ne who has engaged in covered

employment for twenty years will receive the same benefits as a
person who has worked for forty, even though the latter has
worked twice as long and induced a
employer contribution. 17

substantia~ly

larger

Again, it ignores the economic

realities to equate employer contributions with an investment
by the employee.

The court below believed that the "trust fund
investing in the capital markets" constituted the common
enterprise in which respondent had an interest.
1233.

561 F.2d, at

Respondent was held to have an undivided interest in the

Fund and its assets.

Although superficially plausible, this

argument begs the question.

The Fund's trust agreement was

1 0.

explicit in stating "(n]o employee, or other person shall have
any vested interest or right in the Trust Fund or in any
payments from the Trust Fund • •

" until the employee met the

L.k
vesting requirements. 1 8 By ~ terms ~ the Fund
J
b
gave respondents no legally enforceable rights against it.
we

a~y

As

have indicated, respondent did not "invest" in the

pension fund in any realistic sense of the word, and therefore

""""'
~

did ot have any equitable claim for restitution.

In order for

respondent to have acquired an interest in the Fund, he must
have obtained it through some legal requirement independent of
the trust agreement itself.

Yet the only independent source

for his interest cited to the court below was the Securities
Acts, and the application of these laws to the Fund was the
very question to be decided.

Absent some kind of legally

binding relationship between respondent and the Fund, it cannot
be said that the Fund was a "common enterprise" in which Daniel
had an "interest".

As we observed in Forman, the "touchstone" of the
Howey test "is the presence of an investment in a common
venture premised on a reasonable expectation of profits to be
derived from the entrepeneurial or managerial efforts of
others."

421

u.s.,

at 852.

;f:tt~e..~believed

The 66 urt

/\

that

11•

Daniel's expectation of profit derived from the Fund's
successful management and investment of its assets.

To the

extent pension benefits exceeded employer contributions and

;_-r~~tJassets ~ they

depended on earnings from the
element.

contained a profit

The Fund's trustees provided the managerial efforts

which produced this profit element.
As in other parts of its analysis, the court below

~~----ffiffi•~a~n~a~g~e~Jn-~~ ·fi~pectat~on

of profit in the pension plan

""'
only by focusing on one of its less important aspects to the
exclusion of its more significant elements.

It

~flao ~ edl~

is

$

true that the Fund,

like~

holde~of

other

large assets,

depends to some extent~ ~ Aoeot. ~ on earnings from its
assets.

In the case of a pension fund, however, a far larger

portion of its income comes from employer contributions, which
a-~
~ Ain no way

dependent on the efforts of the fund's managers.

The Local 705 Fund, for example, earned a total of$ 31,000,000
through investment of its assets between February, 1955, and
January, 1977. During this same period employer contributions
totaled $ 153,000,000.19

dtAc,.c...

~

Not only e4d the rianLs share of a
~

1\

pension plan's income ordinarily come from new contributions,
but~

unlike most entrepeneurs who manage other people's money,

it"~· ·d.t

A can count on increased employer contributions Ae§otiaeee hy
20
~ilia~ed

M"ie~

to cover shortfalls

~€

1 2.

The importance

of asset earnings is diminished evoR ~

~·~k
further by the fact that where a plan has substantial vesting ,
-1

~ui~em&~t.,

the principal barrier to an individual employee's

realization of ?ension benefits is not the financial health of

"',;;/- ,...._
the

Fun~

~

O

rather his own ability to meet the Fund's
l
A

eligibility requirements.

Thus :he

~EEill~

cleat! tlolat., even if it

were proper to describe the benefits as a "profit" returned on
some hypothetical investment by the employee, this profit would
depend

J:rN-·~··4
mo~tly

on the employee's efforts to meet the vesting

requirements, rather than the Fund's investment success. 21

In

addition, the significance to the employee of this purported
"profit" must be assessed in light of the total wage and
benefit package he receives from his job, as these other forms
of compensation are an inseparable part of the employement
relationship on which the pension benefits depend.

When these

factors are taken into consideration, it becomes clear that for
an employee the possibility of participating in a plan's asset
earnings "is far too speculative and insubstantial to bring the
entire transaction within the Securities Acts."

Forman, supra,

at 856.
III
The court below believed that its construction of the
term "security" was compelled not only by the perceived

13

0

resemblance of a pension plan to an investment contract, but by
various actions of Congress and the SEC's
of the Securities Acts.

~

interpretation

In reaching this conclusion, the court

?

gave great weight to the SEC's explanation of these events, an
explanation which for the most part is repeated here.
....

Our own

--

1

review of the record leads us to believe that this reliance on

<:_~

the SEC's exegesis was not justified.

A; ·Actions ·of ·congress

~~:e... .t.J~~

The SEC in its ~~~ns refers to several
actions of Congress said to evidence an understanding that
pension plans were securities.

A close look at each instance,

however, reveals only that Congress might have believed certain
kinds of pension plans, radically different from the one at
~

issue here,
There is

......-K,
within

~

a~~be~

~

the 3eope of the Securities Acts •
. I\

no evidence that Congress at any time
d~~~~-bene~

plans

were subject to federal
regulation as securities.
The first

~~

iAoido~t

cited

to~

was the rejection by

Congress in 1934 of an amendment to the Securities Act that
would have exempted employee stock investment and stock option
•
•
•
22
p 1 ans f rom t h e Act 1 s reg1strat1on
requ1rements.

The

amendment passed the Senate but was eliminated in conference.

~
-!,)

1 4.

The defeated proposal,.... Ji:loweve~ dealt with plans under which
employees contributed their own funds to a segregated
~
investment account on which a return was realized.

Rep. No. 1838, 73d Cong., 2d Sess., 41 (1934):

See H.R.

Hearings Before

the House Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce on Proposed
Amendments to the Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934, 77th Cong., 1st Sess.,

(1941).

It

did not contemplate, and could not have been construed
reasonably to apply

to~

non-contributoryr

iAvol~n6a~y

plan.

employee would receive no
uirements were
The SEC also

~QJ.V

~~

giteGA

an 1970 amendment of the

Securities Act which extended§ 3(a)(2) 's exemption from
registration to include "any interest or participation in a
single or collective trust fund maintained by a bank • • •
which interest or participation is issued in connection with
(A) a stock bonus, pension, or profit-sharing plan which meets
the requirements for qualification under section 401 of title
2 6,

• • •

II

15

u.s.c.

§

77c(a) (2). 23

It argues that in

creating a registration exemption, the amendment manifested
Congress' understanding that the interests covered by the
amendment otherwise were subject to the Securities Acts.24

It

interprets "interest or participation in a single • • • trust

15.

fund • • • issued in connection with • • • a stock bonus,
pension, or profit-sharing plan" as referring to a prospective
beneficiary's interest in a pension fund.

But this

construction of the 1970 amendment ignores that measure's
central purpose, which was to relieve banks and insurance
companies of certain registration obligations.

The amendment

recognized only that a pension plan had "an interest or
participation" in the fund in which its assets were held, not
that prospective beneficiaries of a plan had any interest in
either the plan's bank-maintained assets or the plan itself. 25
B~

· ·sEc · rnterpretation

The court below believed, and it now is argued to us,
that almost from its inception the SEC has regarded pension
plans as falling within the scope of the Securities Acts.
~

are asked to defer to what is seen as a

We

eeRoioteAt ~

longstanding interpretation of these statutes by the agency
~higA

i~

responsible for their administration.

It is of course

a commonplace in our jurisprudence that an administrative
agency's

consistent~lQ~&taAaiA~

interpretation of the statute

under which it operates is entitled to considerable weight.

United ·states v. National ·Ass•n ·ot ·securities ·nealers, 422 u.s.
694, 719 (1975);
Investment · co~

Saxbe v. Bustos, 419 u.s. 65, 74 (1974);

· rnstitute v. camp, 401 u.s. 617, 626-627 (1971);

1 6.

Udall v. Tallman, 380

u.s.

1, 16 (1965).

product both of an awareness
an agency normally develops

~

wil l ingness to accord a

of the practical expertise which
~

t-Be

-e-et:Kse of_

1

its enca11nter wi.t,h

""'41' ~ ... ,,_z

ge~59€

of flexibility to such an agency

as it encounters new and unforeseen
problems over

This deference is a

tim~ ~~t

~anifestations

of these

becomes apparent that an

"'

I

aqency has shaped its interpretation of a statute solely to

~

determine the outcome of a particular case, without regard to
the ongoing problems of policy and purpose that underlie that
agency's regulatory function, this deference is forfeited.

~

Ad

hoc, unprincipled decisionmaking does not draw on developed
expertise and constitutes an abuse of accorded

flexibil ~ .

On a number of occasions in recent years this Court
has found it necessary to reject the SEC's
various provisions of the Securities

s

--

interpretation of

A~~I n those cases the

C either had shifted its position , had not previously

Qeveloped a position, or had developed its position without
onsideration of the statutory authorization under which it
See SEC v. Sloan, 436
Chris~craft · rndustries~ · rnc~,

u.s.
430

Ernst · &· Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425
Forman, supra, at 858 n.25;

103, 117-19 (1978);

u.s.
u.s.

Piper v.

1, 41 n.27 (1977);
185, 212-214 (1976);

Blue · chip · stamps v. Manor · orug

~~ ~~" ~

f _!__h

4-c.(..

~

~J A-~~~.(~~~~

~~h4~&<?~~~,~~~
a.,_ ~~~4(
~ ~

r

~~~ ~ .

~d!Jac7
~ ~

~~~~5::;l&:::r-x:.,

9-/-~~~k ~
A-(~ .&.~c.~~

~~~,lo~ .

17.

--------------------tor~s, 421

u.s.

723, 759 n.4 (1975)

(Powell, J., concurring); )

Reliance Electric ·co; v. Emerson ·Electric ·co;, 404 u.s. 418 )

______

-

425-427 (1972).
This case falls into the same category.
........_
........_

Our

review of the SEC's past actions convinces us that until the
instant litigation arose that agency never had considered the
Securities Acts applicable to non-contributory, involuntary
pension plans., and t.h.a& .it-& arg!J..U!ARLto 'ehe- conttar~ =+Hn;g

~

In 1941 the SEC articulated its position on pension
plans through two opinion letters of its Assistant General
Counsel and testimony of Commissioner Purcell before the House
Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce.

In the SEC's

view, voluntary, contributory pension plans did constitute
securities and, when employee contributions were used to
purchase the employer's securities, registration would be
required.

Non-contributory, compulsory plans, however, did not

involve a "sale" as defined in the Securities Acts and
therefore were not regulated by these laws.
Assistant General Counsel,
L. Rep. '

75,195 (1941);

Opinions of

[1941-1944 Transfer Binder] CCH Sec.
Hearings Before the House Comm. on

Interstate and Foreign Commerce on Proposed Amendments to the
Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,
77th Cong., 1st Sess., 895, 896-897 (1941).

At the same time

1 8.

the

SEC~~:~:~;~:~ion

that would ratify its position.

------- --

J\

Even thi ~ limited assertion of SEC jurisdiction over certain
pension plans met with strong opposition from at least one
member of the committee, who asserted that Congress never had
meant to reach such interests. 26

World War II intervened, and

Congress never acted on the proposed

legi~i~~hf~Ao

"'-- -.......
the SEC made no further efforts to regulate even contributory,
voluntary pension plans except where the employees'
contributions were invested in the employer's securities.

It

also continued to disavow any authority to regulate noncontributory, compulsory plans.

See Letter from Assistant

Director, Division of Corporate Finance, May 12, 1953, CCH Fed.
Sec. L. Rep. •

2105.51~

Letter from Chief Counsel, Division of

Corporate Finance, August 1, 1962, CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. •
2105.52~

Hearings Before the Senate Banking and Currency Comm.

on Mutual Fund Legislation of 1967, 90th Cong., 1st Sess., 1326
( 19 6 7 ) ~
1961)~ ·

1 L • Loss , Sec u r it i e s Reg u 1 at ion , 5 1 0- 5 1 1 ( 1 s t e d •
4

id~,

at 2553-2554 (2d ed.

1969)~

Hyde, Employee

Stock Plans and the Securities Act of 1933, 16 W. Res. L. Rev.
75, 86

(1964)~

Mundheim

&

Hen.d erson, Applicability of the

Federal Securities Laws to Pension and Profit-Sharing Plans, 29
L. & Contemp. Probs. 795, 809-811

(1964)~

Note, Pension Plans

as Securities, 96 u. Pa. L. Rev. 549, 549-551

(1948).

1 9.

The SEC now

argues, however, that its policy toward

pension plans always had entailed two additional positions.
First, it is contended, the 1941 opinions and testimony made
clear the SEC's belief that non-contributory, compulsory plans,
although not involving a "sale" under the Securities Acts, did
constitute "securities" for purposes of those Acts.

Second,

the concession that non-contributory, compulsory plans did not
involve a "sale" was meant to apply only to the registration
and reporting requirements of the Securities Acts:

~1-

LA-o

~ ~1~

these plans

I

did involve a "sale" for purposes of the antifraud provisions
/\_

of these Acts.

Our own review of the SEC's past statements,
)

however, leads us to conclude that
assertions

,.,

,

first of these

~~~~J -h, ~~·

is A ~ be~t~ dubi~~ second

is-de~~~bly

7L.- ~ ~-~d'.w~dr
~ J.C,; ~~ t '1 );./!, .... -t./,
As for the first assertion, neither the 1941 opinion

,

letters no /(:he testimony of Commissioner

)

91C:~sM::¥

Purcell~ ~

hat non-contributory, compulsory pension plans.

1\

~iel'!e

'

s~t.ie~sfarrure to · aavert to the question can be

I

explained not only by the

1

&B~e~i~

theoretical nature of the

problem, in light of the SEC's understanding of a "sale," but

I

also by the logical inconsistency of regarding participation

!a

compulsory plan as

~e

..:,::u'iva:::nt of an

investme~ As

Commissioner Purcell observed, "As a practical matter, people

~

20.

) do not decide, it seems to me, to take jobs because
'

dislike the company's investment plan."

th~
ike
A

or

Hearings Before the

House Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce on Proposed
Amendments to the Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities
Exc~ange

Act of 1934, 77th Cong., 1st Sess., 897 (1941).

Accordingly, it would have been highly unlikely for the SE

)

have concluded that a decision to accept a particular job wa

~

equivalent to an investment of time or money in a job-relate

-------------------

-

-------

J;Qr

~e~ether

~~~~·
~he-~~·

it is

t1

~ u~

t/1....-

~~

~I ~.an-.. ~ ~~
....
~ <1~~&£~~~1 "'\

possible~

transaction as constituting a sale under certain provisions of
the Securities Acts but not under others.

Neither the

Securities Act nor the Securities Exchange Act contains express

-;z.,;

..

support for such an anomalous construction ef

"~

ese

term

In any event, it is clear that the SEC never

intended this bifurcated definition to apply to pension plans.
Neither the 1941 opinions nor Commissioner Purcell's testimony
were limited to
and testimony

re~istration

discu~sed

the Acts as a whole.

requirements.

Both the opinions

the definition of a "sale" in terms of

See Opinion of Assistant General Counsel,

[1941-1944 Transfer Binder] CCH Sec. L. Rep. • 75,195, at
75,387 (1941);

Hearings Before the House Comm. on Interstate

,

21.

and Foreign Commerce on Proposed Amendments to the Securities
Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 77th
Cong., 1st Sess., 888, 896-897 (1941).

In subsequent

statements of its position, including communications to
Congress concerning legislation affecting pension plans, the
SEC repeated without qualification its belief that noncontributory, involuntary pension plans did not involve a
"sale" for the purposes of the Securities Acts.

See

Institutional Investor Study Report of the Securities and

qlExchange Commission, H.R. Doc. No.A64, 92d
f· 996 (1971)

Cen~.,

1~t

gess.,~

("[T)he Securities Act does not apply • • • ");

Report of Special Study of Securities Markets of the Securities
and Exchange Commission, Part II, H.R. Doc. No. 95, 88th Cong.,
1st Sess., 869 (1963);

Hearings Before A Subcommittee of

Senate Labor and Public Welfare Comm. on Welfare and Pension
Plans Investigation, 84th Cong., 1st Sess., 943-946 (1955).
Congress acted on this understanding when it proceeded to
develop the legislation that became ERISA.

See,

~~g~,

Interim

Reprot of Activities of the Private Welfare and Pension Plan
Study, S. Rep.

~~-

No.~634,

~2~ Con~.,

2d

("Pension and profit-sharing plans are

~

~ess~~96

(1972)

~x~mpt · from · co~~rag~

under the Securities Act of 1933 • • • unless the plan is a
voluntary contributory pension plan and invests in the

22.

securities of the employer company an amount greater than that

u.
paid into the plan by the employer.")

(emphasis added).

; Xt AG-

1\

~~~ this

period, or indeed at any time before this

1\

case arose, did the SEC intimate that the antifraud provisions
of the Securities Acts nevertheless applied to pension plans of
this type.2"

IV

~):~

If any further evidence were needed to prove that
,1'\

t::hl-'-~ ~

1/J

involved hereA~~ tfl~ meet~Gf the Securities Acts, the
enactment of ERISA in 1974 would put the matter to rest.
Unlike the

Securiti~s

with pension plans.

Acts, ERISA deals expressly and in detail
ERISA requires pension plans to disclose

specified information to employees in a specified manner, see
29

u.s.c.

§§

1021-1030, in contrast to the indefinite and

uncertain disclosure obligations imposed by the antifraud
provisions of the Securities Acts, see santa · Fe · Industries;
Inc~

v.

~~,

Inc~

v. Northway;

430

u.s~

· Inc~,

462, 474-477
426

u.s.

(1977)~

438 (1976).

Tsc · Industries;
Further, ERISA

regulates the substantive terms of pension plans, setting
standards for plan funding and limits on the eligibility
requirements an employee must meet.

For example, with

respec~o the underlying issue in this case--

whether

23.

respondent served long enough to receive a pension-of ERISA, § 29

u.s.c.

§

203(a)

1053(a), now sets the minimum level of

benefits an employee must receive after accruing specified

2.,
years of service,~ and§ 203(b), 29 U.S.C. § 1053(b), governs
'JO

continuous service requirements.~

Thus if Daniel had retired

after § 1053 took effect, the Fund would have been required to
pay him at least a partial pension.

The Securities Acts, on

the other hand, do not purport to set the substantive terms of
financial transactions.
The existence of this comprehensive legislation

444·~1144'

governing the use and terms of employee pension plans undercuts

w~~.Q.o.aJ e the~~::·~
~ng
-1

1
the Securities

Acts to non-contributory, compulsory pension plans.

~t,~ ~believed
t)JI"-

.,v

,.

vr~

~

Congress

that it was filling a regulatory void when

~'

~

it enacted ERISA, a belief which the SEC actively encouraged.
Not only is the extension of the Securities Acts by the court
below unsupported by the language and history of the those
Acts, but in light of ERISA it serves no purpose.
v. sanders, 430
Inc~

u.s.

99, 104-107 (1977).

v. Retail .Clerks · union, 398

u.s.

Cf.

See Califano

Boys · M~rket~

235, 250 (1970).

Whatever benefits employees might derive from the effect of the
Securities Acts are now provided in more definite form through
ERISA.

24.

v
n conclusion, we stress the

1m1ts o

1ng.

express no views on the applicability of the Securities Act
o pension plans unlike that at issue here.

Neither do we

intimate any opinion as to the merits of respondent's other
claims for relief.

We hold

~

that the Securities Acts do

not reach a non-contributory, compulsory,

pension pla;

Gef±ned~enefit

~~ reqyH;~.

Because

the first two counts of respondent's complaint do not provide
grounds for relief in federal court, the District Court should
have granted the motion to dismiss them.
therefore
R~v~rs~d

The judgment below is

I -a. I If

PBS-'1t1/13y78

Footnotes
1.

Contributions were tied to the number of employees

rather than the amount of work performed.
payments had to be made even for weeks where an employee was on
leave of absence, disabled, or working for only a fraction of
the week.

Conversely, employers did not have to increase their

contribution for weeks in which an employee worked overtime or
on a holiday.
2.

Trust Agreement, Art. 3, § 1, App. 63a.
For examples of other non-contributory, compulsory

pension plans, see Allied ·structural Steel Co. v. Spannaus,
u.s.

(1978);

I

497, 500-501 (1978);

Malone v. White
Alabama

Power · co~

Motor · corp~,

435 u.s.

v. Davis, 431 u.s. 581,

590 (1977).

3

~

See 29 u.s.c. § 1002(35);

Alabama · Power · co~

v.

Davis, supra, at 593 n.18.
5.

Daniel was laid off from December, 1960, until

April, 1961. In addition, no contributions were paid on his
behalf between April and July, 1961,
. his employer's bookkeeper.

bec~use

of embezzlement by

During this seven month period

respondent could have preseved his eligibility by making the
contributions himself, but he failed to do so.

2.

6.

Section 10(b) provides:

"It shall be unlawful for any person, directly
or indirectly, by the use of any means of
instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the
mails, or of any facility of any national
securities exchange--

"To use or employ, in connection with the
purchase or sale of any security registered on a
national securities exchange or any security not
so registered, any manipulative or deceptive
device or contrivance in contravention of such
rules and regulations as the Commission may
prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the
public interest or for the protection of
investors."
The Commission's Rule 10b-5 declares,

"It shall be unlawful for any person, directly
or indirectly, by the use of any means or
instrumentality of interestate commerce, or of
the mails, or of any facility of any national
securities exchange,
"(1)

to employ any device, scheme, or

artifice to defraud,
"(2)

to make any untrue statement of a

material fact or to omit to state a material fact
necessary in order to make the statements made,
in light of the circumstances under which they
were made, not misleading, or
"(3)

to engage in any act, practice, or

course of business which operates or would
operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in

3.

connection with the purchase or sale of any
security."
7.

Section 17(a) provides:
"It shall be unlawful for any person in the

offer or sale of any securities by the use of any
means or instruments of transportation or
communication in interstate commerce or by the
use of the mainls, directly or indirectly-"(1) to employ any device, scheme, or artifice
to defraud, or
"(2) to obtain money or property by means of
any untrue statement of a material fact or any
omission to state a material fact necessary in
order to make the statements made, in light of
the circumstances under which they were made, not
misleading, or
"(3) to engage in any transaction, practice,
or course of business which operates or would
operate as a fraud or deceit upon the purchaser."
8.

Count III charged the Teamsters and the Local with

violating their duty of fair representation under § 9(a) of the
National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 159(a), and Count V
(later amended as Count VI) charged the Teamsters, the Local,
Feick and all other Teamsters pension fund trustees with
violating their obligations under§ 302(c)(5) of the National
Labor Relations Act, 29

u.s.c.

§ 186(c)(5). Count IV accused

all defendants of common law fraud and deceit.
9.

As of the time of appeal to the Seventh Circuit

the District Court had not yet ruled on any class certification

4.

issues.
10.

Section 2(1) of the Securities Act defines a

"security" as

"any note, stock, treasury stock, bond,
debenture, evidence of indebtedness, certificate
of interest or participation in any profitsharing agreement, collateral-trust certificate,
preorganization certificate or subscription,
transferable share, investment contract, votingtrust certificate, certificate of deposit for a
security, fractional undivided interest in oil,
gas, or other mineral rights, or, in general, any
interest or instrument commonly known as a
'security,' or any certificate of interest or
participation in, temporary or interim
certificate for, receipt for, guarantee of, or
warrant or right to subscribe to or purchase, any
of the foregoing."
The definition of a "security" in§ 3(a)(10) of the Securities
Exchange Act is virtually identical and, for the purposes of
this case, the coverage of the two Acts may be regarded as the
same.

United Housing · Foundation,

837, 847 n.12 (1975):

· rnc~,

v. Forman, 421

Tcherepnin v Knight, 389

u.s.

u.s.

332, 342

( 1967).
11.

Section 2(3) of the Securities Act provides, in

pertinent part, that "[t]he term 'sale' or 'sell' shall include
every contract of sale or disposition of a security or interest

5.

in a security, for value."

Section 3(a)(14) of the Securities

Exchange Act states that "[t]he terms 'sale' and 'sell' each
include any contract to sell or otherwise dispose of."
Although the latter definition does not refer expressly to a
disposition for value, the court below did not decide whether
the Securities Exchange Act nevertheless impliedly incorporated
the Securities Act definition, cf. note 10, supra, as in its
view Daniel did give value for his interest in the pension
plan.

In light of our disposition of the question whether

respondent's interest was a "security," we need not decide
whether the meaning of "sale" under the Securities Exchange Act
is any different from its meaning under the Securities Act.
12.

The Court of Appeals and the District Court also

held that § 17(a) provides private parties with an implied
cause of action for damages.

In light of our disposition of

this case, we express no views on this issue.
13.

Respondent did not have any cause of action under

ERISA itself, as that Act took effect after he had retired.
14.

Daniel also argues that his interest constitutes

a "certificate of interest in or participation in a profitsharing agreement."

The court below did not consider this

claim, as Daniel had not seriously pressed the argument and the
disposition of the "investment contract" issue made it

6.

unnecessary to decide the question.
(1977).

561 F.2d 1223, 1230 n.15

Similarly, Daniel here does not seriously contend that

a "certificate of interest in • • • a profit-sharing agreement"
has any broader meaning under the Securities Acts than an
"investment contract."

In Fq;man, supra, we observed that the

Howey test, which has been used to determine the presence of an
investment contract, "embodies the essential attributes that
run through all of the Court's decisions defining a security."
421

u.s.,

at 852.
15.

We need not decide here whether a person's

"investment," in order to meet the definition of an investment
contract, must take the form of cash only rather than of goods
and services.
16.

See Forman, supra, at 852 n.16.
Under the terms of the Local's pension plan, for

example, Daniel received credit for the five years he worked
before the Fund was created, even though no employer
contributions had been made during that period.
17.

Article 13 of the original trust agreement

provided in full:

"No employee, or other person shall have any
vested interest or right in the Trust Fund or in
any payments from the Trust Fund; provided,
however, the rights of any person who has become
eligible for benefits hereunder by fully meeting

7.

the requirements of this Trust Agreement shall
not be affected, changed, or altered by an
amendment to this Trust Agreement, unless the
Trust Fund, in the opinion of the Trustees, is
inadequate to meet the payments due, in which
event the Trustees shall determine whether such
benefits shall be reduced or the Trust
terminated."

App. 63a.

This provision was carried over in subsequent amended trust
agreements.

Daniel concedes that under the terms of the Fund

he is not eligible for benefits.
18. In addition, the Fund received $ 7,500,000 from
smaller pension funds with which it merged over the years.
19.

See Note, The Application of the Antifraud

Provisions of the Securities Laws to Compulsory,
Noncontributory Pension Plans After Daniel

v~

· rnternational

Brotherhood of ·Teamsters, 64 va. L. Rev. 305, 315 (1978
20.
Securities:

See Note, Interest in Pension Plans as
Daniel · v~

International Brotherhood of · Teamsters,

7 8 Co 1 urn • L • Rev • 1 8 4 , 2 0 1 ( 1 9 7 8 ) •
21.

The amendment would have added the following

language to§ 4(1) of the Securities Act:

"As used in this paragraph, the term 'public
offering' shall not be deemed to include an
offering made solely to employees by an issuer or
by its affiliates in connection with a bona fide

8.

plan for the payment of extra compensation or
stock investment plan for the exclusive benefit
of such employees."
22.

78 Cong. Rec. 8708 (1934).

Section 17(c) of the Securities Act, 15 U.S.C. §

77q(c), and§ 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act, 15 u.s.c. §
78j(b)

(when read with§§ 3(a)(10) and (12) of that Act),

indicate that the antifraud provisions of the respective Acts
continue to applly to interests that come within the exemptions
created by§ 3(a)(2) of the Securities Act and§ 3(a}(12) of
the Securities Exchange Act.
23.

Sees. Rep. No. 91-184, p. 27 (1969);

Hearings

Before the Senate Banking and Currency Comm. on Mutual Fund
Legislation of 1967, 90th Cong., 1st Sess., 1341-1342 (1967);
Mundheim & Henderson, Applicability of the Federal Securities
Laws to Pension and Profit-Sharing Plans, 29 L. & Contemp.
Probs. 795, 819-837 (1964);

Saxon & Miller, Common Trust

Funds, 53 Geo. L.J. 994 (1965).

The SEC argues

the addition by the House of the language "single or" before
"common trust fund" indicated an intent to cover the underlying
plans that invested in bank-maintained funds.

The legislative

history, however, indicates that the change was meant only to

~

eliminate the negative inference suggested by the unrevised
language that banks would have to register the segregated
investment funds they administered for particular plans.

9.

Because the provision as a whole dealt only with the
relationship between a plan and its bank, the revision did not
affect the registration status of the underlying pension plan.
See 116 Cong. Rec. 33287 (1970).

This was consistent with the

SEC's intrepretation of the provision.
1326.

Hearings, supra, at

The subsequent addition of another provision excepting

from the exemption funds "under which an amount in excess of
~

the employer's contribution is allocated to the purchase of
securities • • • issued by the employer or by any company
directly or indirectly controlling, controlled by or under
common control with the employer"

~

se.c 's

appears to have been simply

o.......tlov\~ t: If~~

an additonal safeguard to confirmLsuch plans, and only such
plans, to register.

See H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 91-1631, p. 31

(1970).
24.

It is Gf r;;:ou;r;fiie a commonplace in our

jurisprudence that an administrative agency's consistent,
longstanding interpretation of the statute under which it
operates is entitled to considerable weight.

United States v.

National ·Ass•n ·of securities Dealers, 422 u.s. 694, 719 (1975);
Saxbe v. Bustos, 419 u.s. 65, 74 (1974);

rnvestment ·co.

Institute v. camp, 401 u.s. 617, 626-627 (1971); Udall v.
Tallmqn, 380 u.s.

1, 16 (1965).

both of an awareness

This deference is a product

of the practical expertise which an

10

0

agency normally develops, and of a willingness to accord some
measure of flexibility to such an agency as it encounters new
and unforeseen problems over time.

But this deference is

constrained by our obligation to honor the clear meaning of a
statute, as revealed by its language,

~
&tr~ctur~ and history.

On a number of occasions in recent years this Court has found
it necessary to reject the SEC's interpretation of various
provisions of the Securities Acts.

In those cases the SEC

either had shifted its position , had not previously developed

c£~«.

a position, or had developed its position

without~consideration

f the statutory authorization under which it acts.
Sloan, 436 u.s. 103, 117-19 (1978);

Piper v.

Industries, Inc., 430 u.s. 1, 41 n.27 (1977);
Hochfelder, 425 u.s. 185, 212-214 (1976);
858 n.25;

See SEC v.

Chris~craft

Ernst · & Ernst v.

Forman, supra, at

Blue ·chip · stamps v. Manor orug · stores, 421 u.s. 723,

759 n.4 (1975)
v. Emerson

(Powell, J., concurring);

Electric · co~,

Reliance Electric

Co~

404 u.s. 418, 425-427 (1972).
category.

25.

Subsequent to 1941, the SEC made no further

efforts to regulate even contributory, voluntary pension plans
except where the employees' contributions were invested in the
employer's securities.

Cf. note 23 supra.

It also continued

to disavow any authority to regulate non-contributory,

11 •

compulsory plans.

See Letter from Assistant Director, Division

of Corporate Finance, May 12, 1953, CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. •
2105.51;

Letter from Chief Counsel, Division of Corporate

Finance, August 1, 1962, CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep.

~I

2105.52;

Hearings Before the Senate Banking and Currency Comm. on Mutual
Fund Legislation of 1967, 90th Cong., 1st Sess., 1326 (1967);
1 L. Loss, Securities Regulation, 510-511
id., at 2553-2554 (2d ed. 1969);

(1st ed. 1961);

4

Hyde, Employee Stock Plans

and the Securities Act of 1933, 16 W. Res. L. Rev. 75, 86
(1964);

Mundheim & Henderson, Applicability of the Federal

Securities Laws to Pension and Profit-Sharing Plans, 29 L. &
Contemp. Probs. 795, 809-811 (1964);

Note, Pension Plans as

Securities, 96 U. Pa. L. Rev. 549, 549-551 (1948).
26.

We doubt as a general matter whether the

definitions of the Securities Acts may be read to permit a
single transaction to constitute a "sale" for one purpose of
the Securities Act but not others.
contended that because

§

On occasion the SEC has

2 of the Securities Act and

§

3 of the

Securities Exchange Act apply the qualifying phrase "unless the
context otherwise requires" to the Acts' general definitions,
it is permissible to regard a particular transactions as
involving a sale or not depending on the form of regulation
involved.

See Schillner v.

H~

· vaughn -clark · &

Co~,

134 F.2d

1 2.

875, 878 (2d Cir. 1943);

1 L. Loss, Securities Regulation 524~uS"

528 (1st ed. 1961);

4 id~ 2562-2565 (2d ed. 1969).t('~he SEC

has not always taken this position:

In 1943 it submitted an

amicus brief in the Ninth Circuit arguing to the contrary, and
it did not begin to rely on its "regulatory context" theory
until 1951.

1 L. Loss, supra, at 524 n. 211;

Cohen, Rule 133

of the Securities Exchange Commission, 14 Record of N.Y.C.B.A.
162, 164-165 (1959).

This Court noted the doctrine but

~t

~"eeree

expressly chose not to

it in SEC v. National

7
Securities; · rnc~, 393

u.s.

:A:ct~jt

the -Bectltities

453, 465-466 (1969).

""-oCJf

seems more likely that the "context"

referred to in the Acts' definitional sectio~ is the economic
context of a particular transaction, not the form of regulation
that might be applied to that transaction.
Foundation,

Inc~

v. Forman, 421

u.s.

Cf. United Housing

838, 848-850 (1975).

See

"l.'L

also note M& supra.

We note that with respect to statutory

mergers, the area where the SEC originally developed its theory
about the bifurcated definition of a sale, the SEC since has
abandoned its position and now treats such transactions as
entailing a "sale" for all purposes of the Securities Act.
17 CFR 230.145.
27.

Judge Tone, in an opinion concurring in

See

1 3.

e ult of the court below, observed that "[t]he SEC has not
been as candid as we might have hoped in acknowledging and
F • 2d , at 1 2 5 1 •

-~~

4

~~
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SECOND . DRAFT .OPINION
TO:
FROM:
RE:

Mr. Justice Powell
Paul
International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. Daniel, Nos. 77-

753 and 77-754

Mr~

Justice ·Powell delivered the opinion of the Court.

This case presents the question whether a noncontributory, compulsory ( aefiAQd-beRefie) pension plan

w4t~

•St:ie&tantial vo&tiREJ reqaire-meRe:s constitutes a "security"
within the meaning of the Securities Act of 1933 and the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (the "Securities Acts").
I

In 1954 multiemployer collective bargaining between
Local 705 of the International Brotherhood of Teamsters,
Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers of America and Chicago
trucking firms produced a pension plan for employees
represented by the Local.
contributory.

The plan was compulsory and non-

Employees had no choice as to participation in

the plan, and did not have the o~n of demanding that the
employer's contribution be paid directly to them as a
substitute for pension eligibility.2

The collective bargaining

agreement initially set employer contributions to the Pension

2.
~

Trust Fund at $ 2.00 a week for each
employment.

t

man-~

of covered

The Board of Trustees of the Fund, a body composed

of an equal number of employer and union representatives, was
given sole authority to set the level of benefits but had no
control over the amount of required employer contributions.
Initially eligible employees received upon retirement $ 75.00 a
month in benefits.

Subsequent collective bargaining agreements

called for greater employer contributions, which in turn led to
higher benefit payments for retirees.

At the time respondent

brought suit, employers contributed$ 21.50 per employee-man
week and pension payments ranged from $ 425 to $ 525 a month

-t.

.

depending on age at re1rement.
A

Because the Fund made equal

payments to each employee who qualified for a pension,
regardless of the amount of empioyer contributions attributable
to his period of service, the plan provided a "defined

benefit".~

In order to receive a pension, an employee was

required to have twenty years of continuous service, with work
before 1955 counted toward this total.
The meaning of "continuous service" is at the center
of this dispute.

Respondent began working as a truck driver in

the Chicago area in 1950, and joined Local 705 the following
year.

When the plan first went into effect, respondent

automatically received 5 years credit toward the 20 year

3.

service requirement because of his earlier work experience.

He

retired in 1973 and applied to the plan's administrator for a
pension.

The administrator determined that respondent was

ineligible because of a break in service between December,
~

1960, and July, 1961.1

Respondent appealed the decision to the

trustees, who affirmed. Respondent then asked the trustees to
waive the continuous service rule as it applied to him.

After

the trustees refused to waive the rule, respondent brought suit
in federal court against the International union (the
"Teamsters"), Local 705 (the "Local"), and Louis Feick, a
trustee of the Fund.
Respondent's complaint alleged that the Teamsters, the
Local, and Feick misrepresented and omitted to state material
facts with respect to the value of a covered employee's
interest in the pension plan.

Count I of the complaint charged

that these misstatements and omissions constituted a fraud in
connection with the sale of a security in violation of

§

10(b)

of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b), and
the Securities and Exchange Commission's Rule 10b-5, 17 C.P.R.

s
240.10(b)-5.6

Count II charged that the same conduct amounted

to a violation of § 17(a) of the Securities Act of 1933, 15

~

u.s.c.

§

77q.J

Other counts alleged violations of various

i
labor and common law duties.$

Respondent sought to proceed on

4.

behalf of all prospective beneficiaries of Teamsters pension

g
plans and against all Teamsters pension funds.•
The petitioners moved to dismiss the first two counts
of the complaint on the ground that respondent had no cause of
action under the Securities or Securities Exchange Acts.
District Court denied the motion.
1976).

The

410 F. Supp. 541 (ND Ill.

It held that respondent's interest in the Pension Fund

constituted a security within the meaning of§ 2(1) of the
Securities Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77b(1), and§ 3(a)(10) of the
q
Securities Exchange Act, 15

u.s.c.

§ 78c(a)(10), 1D because the

plan created an "investment contract" as that term had been
interpreted in SEC v.

W.J~

Howey Co.,

328

u.s.

293 (1946).

It

also determined that there had been a "sale" of this interest
to respondent within the meaning of § 2(3) of the Securities
Act, 15

u.s.c.

§ 77b(3), and§ 3(a) (14) of the Securities
10

Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(14) . . .

It believed respondent

voluntarily gave value for his interest in the plan, because he
had voted on collective bargaining agreements that chose
employer contributions to the Fund instead of other wages or
benefits.
The motion to dismiss was certified for appeal
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b), and the Court of Appeals for
the Seventh Circuit affirmed.

561 F.2d 1223 (1977).

Relying

5.

on its perception of the economic realities of pension plans
and various actions of Congress and the SEC with respect to
such plans, the ;Court ruled that respondent's interest in the
Pension Fund was a "security."

According to thejourt, a

"sale" took place either when respondent ratified a collective
bargaining agreement embodying the Fund or when he accepted or
l!at /I

retained covered employment instead of seeking other work.
The fourt did not believe the subsequent enactment of the
Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 ("ERISA"), 2"9

u.s.c.

§§ 1001 et seq., affected the application of the

Securities Acts to pension plans, as the requirements and
purposes of ERISA were perceived to be different from those of
IZ.

the Securities Acts.~

We granted certiorari, 434 U.S. 1061

(1978), and now reverse.
II
"The starting point in every case involving the
construction of a statute is the language itself."
Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421

J., concurring);

u.s.

Blue · chip

723, 756 (1975)

see Ernst · &· Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425

185, 197, 199 & n. 19 (1976).

In spite of the

(Powell,

u.s.

~

substantial use of employee pension plans at the time they were
enacted, neither§ 2(1) of the Securities Act nor§ 3(a)(10) of
the Securities Exchange Act, which define the term "security"

6.

in considerable detail and with numerous examples, refers to
pension plans of any type.

Acknowledging this omission in the

statutes, respondent contends that an employee's interest in a
pension plan is an "investment contract," an instrument which

.....13
is included in the statutory definitions of a

sec~rity.

To determine whether a particular financial
relationship constitutes an investment contract, "[t]he test is
whether the scheme involves an investment of money in a common
enterprise with profits to come solely from the efforts of
others."

Howey, supra, at 301.

light of "the substance--

This test is to be applied in

the economic realities of the

transaction-- rather than the names that may have been employed
by the parties."
851-852 (1975);
(1967);
Ins~

united · Housing · corp~

v. Forman, 421 u.s. 837,

Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389 u.s. 332, 336

Howey, supra, at 298. Cf. SEC v. variable ·Annuity Life

·co., 359 u.s. 65, 80 (1959)

(Brennan, J., concurring)

("[O]ne must apply a test in terms of the purposes of the
Federal Acts • •

." ) .

Looking separately at each element of

the Howey test, it is apparent that an employee's participation

~equire~

plan W::i..U1:..

does not comport

with the commonly held understanding of an investment contract.
A~ ·

· Investment of ·Money

7.

~..J,d
An employee who participates in a non-contributory, ~,;
payment into the pension
He only accepts employment, one of the conditions of
which is eligibility for a possible benefit on retirement.
that he has "invested" in the

Daniel contends, however,

pension fund by permitting part of his compensation from his
employer to take the form of a deferred pension benefit.

By

allowing his employer to pay money into the fund, and by
contributing his labor to his employer in return for these
payments, Daniel asserts he has made the kind of investment
which the Securities Acts were intended to regulate.
In every decision of this Court recognizing the
presence of a "security" under the Securities Acts, the person
found to have been an investor chose to qive up something of
value in return for a separable financial interest with the
characteristics of a security.
paid for bank capital stock);
Co~,

387

u.s.

202 (1967)

See Tcherpnin, supra (money
SEC v. United ·Benefit · Life · Ins.

(portion of premium paid for variable

component of mixed variable and fixed annuity contract);
variable ·Annuity Life Ins.
variable annuity contract);

Co~,

supra (premium paid for

Howey, supra (money paid for

purchase, maintenance, and harvesting of orange grove);
C~M~

Joiner · Leasing

Corp~,

320

u.s.

344 (1943)

SEC v.

(money paid for

8.

land and oil exploration).

Even in those cases where the

interest acquired had intermingled security and non-security
aspects, the interest obtained had "to a very substantial
degree elements of investment contracts • • •
Annuity · Life · rns.

· co~,

supra, at 91

II

variable

(Brennan, J., concurring).

With a pension plan such as this one, by contrast, the

purported~urity intere~ is

a relatively insignificant part

of an employee's total and indivisible compensation package.
No portion of respondent's compensation other than the

?

potential pension benefits constituted an investment in a
security, yet these non-security interests were tied to the
pension benefits.

Only in the most abstract sense may it be

said that respondent "exchanged" some portion of his labor in

l'f
R~ .... ~J

return for these possible benefits . . .

Looking at the economic

'7.

,P-~
;,.,~ t·fo(Jr/
.;IS

;

realities, it seems clear that respondent was selling his labor

1

mve.s/nt~.,J--.1'

to obtain a livelihood, not makinq an investment for the
future.
Respondent also ·argues that employer contributions on
his behalf constituted his investment into the fund.

But it is

inaccurate to describe these payments as having been "on
behalf" of any employee.

The trust agreement used employee man-

weeks as a convenient way to measure an employer's overall
obligation to the Fund, not as a means of measuring the

9.

employer's obligation to any particular employee. Indeed, there
was no fixed relationship between contributions to the Fund and
an employee• potential benefits.

A pension plan with "fixed

benefits," such as the Local's, does not tie a qualifying
employee's benefits to the time he has worked.
supra.

See note 5,

One who has engaged in covered employment for twenty

years will receive the same benefits as a person who has worked
for forty, even though the latter has worked twice as long and
15"

induced a substantially larger employer contribution.~

Again,

it ignores the economic realities to equate employer
contributions with an investment by the employee.
·common ·Enterprise

B~

The court below believed that the "trust fund
investing in the capital markets" constituted the common
enterprise in which respondent had an interest.
1233.

561 F.2d, at

Respondent was held to have an undivided interest in the

Fund and its assets.

Although superficially plausible, this

argument begs the question.

The Fund's trust agreement was

explicit in stating "[n]o employee, or other person shall have
any vested interest or right in the Trust Fund or in any
payments from the Trust Fund • • • " until the employee met the
tb

vesting requirements.tJ-By its terms, the Fund gave respondents
no legally enforceable rights against it.

As we have

1 0.

indicated, respondent did not "invest" in the pension fund in

n

any realistic sense of the word, and therefore didAot have any
equitable claim for restitution.

In order for respondent to

have acquired an interest in the Fund, he must have obtained it
through some legal requirement independent of the trust
agreement itself.

Yet the only independent source for his

interest cited to the court below was the Securities Acts, and
the application of these laws to the Fund was the very question
to be decided.

Absent some kind of legally binding

relationship between respondent and the Fund, it cannot be said
that the Fund was a "common enterprise" in which Daniel had an
"interest".
C~

Expectation ·of Profits From the Efforts of Others
As we observed in Forman, the "touchstone" of the

Howey test "is the presence of an investment in a common
venture premised on a reasonable expectation of profits to be
derived from the entrepeneurial or managerial efforts of
others."

421

u.s.,

at 852.

The Court of Appeals believed that

Daniel's expectation of profit derived from the Fund's
successful management and investment of its assets.

To the

extent pension benefits exceeded employer contributions and
depended on earnings from the assets, it was thought they
contained a profit element.

The Fund's trustees provided the

11.

managerial efforts which produced this profit element.
As in other parts of its analysis, the court below
found an expectation of profit in the pension plan only by
focusing on one of its less important aspects to the exclusion
of its more significant elements.

It is true that the Fund,

like other holders of large assets, depends to some extent on
earnings from its assets.

In the case of a pension fund,

however, a far larger portion of its income comes from employer
contributions, a source in no way dependent on the efforts of
the fund's managers.

The Local 705 Fund, for example, earned a

total of$ 31,000,000 through investment of its assets between
February, 1955, and January, 1977. During this same period
I

employer contributions totaled $ 153,000,000.

7

~

tMl'1
NotLdoes

~

the greater share of a pension plan's income ordinarily come
from new contributions, but unlike most entrepeneurs who manage

1d

!'1""·

r
other people's money,

8

usufally can count on increased

employer contributions to cover shortfalls in earnings.
The importance

~·~

of asset earnings is diminished

further by the fact that where a plan has substantial preconditions to vesting, the principal barrier to an individual
employee's realization of pension benefits is not the financial
health of the Fund.

Rather, it is his own ability to meet the

Fund's eligibility requirements.

Thus, even if it were proper

1 2.

to describe the benefits as a "profit" returned on some
hypothetical investment by the employee, this profit would
depend primarily on the employee's efforts to meet the vesting
~

requirements, rather than the Fund's investment success.~

In

addition, the significance to the employee of this purported

1

"profit" must be assessed in light of the total wage and
benefit package he receives from his job, as these other forms
of compensation are an inseparable part of the employement

j

relationship on which the pension benefits depend.

When these

factors are taken into consideration, it becomes clear that for
an employee the possibility of participating in a plan's asset
earnings "is far too speculative and insubstantial to bring the
entire transaction within the Securities Acts."

Forman, supra,

at 856.
III
The court below believed that its construction of the
term "security" was compelled not only by the perceived
resemblance of a pension plan to an investment contract, but by
various actions of Congress and the SEC's interpretation of the
Securities Acts.

In reaching this conclusion, the court gave

great weight to the SEC's explanation of these events, an

~15
explanation which for the most part is repeated here.

d/)N1/t?, .? ,.;-;. $

Our own

review of the record leads us to believe that this reliance on

C"ov,..r.?

The SEC in its amicus · curiae brief refers to several
actions of Congress said to evidence an understanding that

a.r-e..
pension plans

~

securities.

A close look at each instance,

however, reveals only that Congress might have believed certain
kinds of pension plans, radically different from the one at
issue here, came within the coverage of the Securities Acts.
There is no evidence that Congress at any time thought noncontributory plans similar to the one before us were subject to
federal regulation as securities.
The first action cited was the rejection by Congress
in 1934 of an amendment to the Securities Act that would have
exempted employee stock investment and stock option plans from

11
the Act's registration requirements.~

The amendment passed

the Senate but was eliminated in conference.

The defeated

proposal dealt with plans under which employees contributed
their own funds to a segregated investment account on which a
return was realized.
Sess., 41

(1934);

See H.R. Rep. No. 1838, 73d Cong., 2d

Hearings Before the House Comm. on

Interstate and Foreign Commerce on Proposed Amendments to the
Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,
77th Cong., 1st

Sess., ~

(1941).

It did not contemplate, and

14.

could not have been construed reasonably to apply to a noncontributory plan.
The SEC also relies on an 1970 amendment of the
Securities Act which extended§ 3(a)(2) 's exemption from
registration to include "any interest or participation in a
single or collective trust fund maintained by a bank • • •
which interest or participation is issued in connection with
(A) a stock bonus, pension, or profit-sharing plan which meets
the requirements for qualification under section 401 of title

26, • • •

II

15

u.s.c.

§ 77c(a)(2).

It argues that in

creating a registration exemption, the amendment manifested
Congress' understanding that the interests covered by the

zo
amendment otherwise were subject to the Securities Acts.~

It

interprets "interest or participation in a single • • • trust
fund • • • issued in connection with • • • a stock bonus,
pension, or profit-sharing plan" as referring to a prospective
beneficiary's interest in a pension fund.

But this

construction of the 1970 amendment ignores that measure's
central purpose, which was to relieve banks and insurance
companies of certain registration obligations.

The amendment

recognized only that a pension plan had "an interest or
participation" in the fund in which its assets were held, not
that prospective beneficiaries of a plan had any interest in

/.A.J~A a?{ iii~

~/L.~~ ..,w~:-.25~
~ . . .~ rtu.-~~0 4~
either the plan's bank-maintained assets or the plan itself.
B~

1

~~

SEC Interpretation

~~

The court below believed, and it now is argued to us,
that almost from its inception the SEC has regarded pension
plans as falling within the scope of the Securities Acts.

We

are asked to defer to what is seen as a longstanding
interpretation of these statutes by the agency responsible for
their administration.
language,

~

~nd

how far an

But there are limits, grounded

-/.MJ
~

the

history of the particular statute,

agenc~
1\

~

in its interpretative role.

Although these limits are not always easy to discern, it is

xce~s

clear here that the SEC's position

tb8ffi.1{As we have

demonstrated above, the type of pension plan at issue in
case bears no resemblance to the kind of financial interests
~ \-----the Securities Acts were designed to regulate. ~v

Further, the SEC's position
contradicted by its past actions.

Q.e~e-I:M5

is flatly

Until the instant litigation

arose, the SEC never had considered the Securities Acts
applicable to non-contributory pension plans.

In 1941, the SEC

first articulated the position that voluntary, contributory

~

plans had invested characteristics that rendered them
II.

"securities" under the Acts.
SEC

~at

"

~~

At the same time, however, the

non-contributory plans were not covered by

1 6.

the Securities Acts because such plans did not involve a "sale"
within the meaning of the statutes.
General Counsel,
75,195 (1941);

Opinions of Assistant

[1941-1944 Transfer Binder] CCH Sec. L. Rep.

~I

Hearings Before the House Comm. on Interstate

and Foreign Commerce on Proposed Amendments to the Securities
Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 77th
l;S

1-3>

Cong., 1st Sess., 895, 896-897 (1941).
In an attempt to reconcile these interpretations of
the Securities Acts with is present stand, the SEC now augments
its past position with two additional propositions.

First, it
"'T";fo~? ''

is argued, non-contributory plans are "securities" even

.

"sale" is not involved.

G~~ a

~~
Second, theJconcession that non-

contributory plans do not involve a "sale" was meant to apply
only to the registration and reporting requirements of the
Securities Acts;

for purposes of the antifraud provisions, a

"sale" !§. involved.

As for the first proposition, we observe

that none of the SEC opinions, reports, or testimony cited to
'

~ ~~~~~~~~~

us address the question.

h.eat.o;;-e
~
~

the contrary.

then, the SEC

As for the second,

~'l

~red

~

Both in its 1941 statements and
that its "no sale" position

applied to the Securities Acts as a whole.
Assistant General Counsel,
L. Rep.

~I

See Opinion of

[1941-1944 Transfer Binder] CCH Sec.

75,195, at 75,387 (1941);

Hearings Before the House

r~- ~

~~"ir-:--

e

~~1 ..9 ~ ~~17.
c.i.,fz-~ ·& fi;V .£-t_~ ~ ~ .,.,..,
~--~ "' . . . . ., ~ ~ I )k. ~~ ~1.>1. 4 f Jt:.t.(_ $"C c -=t,..
Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce on Proposed Amendments ·~
.t.f.l-<-

to the Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act

~.t

·~

I"'H4-~

of 1934, 77th Cong., 1st Sess., 888, 896-897

~~

(1941)~

~~

Institutional Investor Study Report of the Securities and
Exchange Commission, H.R. Doc. No. 92-64, p. 996 (1971)
Securities Act does not apply • • • ")~

y..~~

("[T]he

Report of Special Study

of Securities Markets of the Securities and Exchange
Commission, Part II, H.R. Doc. No. 95, 88th Cong., 1st Sess.,
869

(1963)~

Hearings Before A Subcommittee of Senate Labor and

Public Welfare Comm. on Welfare and Pension Plans
Investigation, 84th Cong., 1st Sess., 943-946 (1955).

Congress

( acted on this understanding when it proceeded to develop the

1

legislation that became ERISA.

See, e.g., Interim Rep!Pt of

Activities of the Private Welfare and Pension Plan Study, S.
Rep. No. 92-634, p. 96 (1972)

("Pension and profit-sharing

plans are exempt from coverage under the Securities Act of 1933
unless the plan is a voluntary contributory pension plan
and invests in the securities of the employer company an amount
greater than that paid into the plan by the employer.")
(emphasis added).

As far as we are aware, at no time before

this case arose did the SEC intimate that the antifraud
provisions of the Securities Acts nevertheless applied to noncontributory pension

plans.~

1 8.

IV
If any further evidence were needed to demonstrate
that pension plans of the type involved are not subject to the
Securities Acts, the enactment of ERISA in 1974 would put the
matter to rest.

Unlike the Securities Acts, ERISA deals

expressly and in detail with pension plans.

ERISA requires

pension plans to disclose specified information to employees in
a specified manner, see 29

u.s.c.

§§ 1021-1030, in contrast to

the indefinite and uncertain disclosure obligations imposed by
the antifraud provisions of the Securities Acts, see Santa Fe

u.s.

Industries~

Inc. v. Green, 430

Industries~

Inc. v. Northway~ · Inc~, 426

462, 474-477 (1977):

u.s.

TSC

438 (1976).

Further, ERISA regulates the substantive terms of pension
plans, setting standards for plan funding and limits on the
eligibility requirements an employee must meet.

For example,

with respect to the underlying issue in this case-respondent served long enough to receive a pension--

whether
§ 203(a)

of ERISA, § 29 U.S.C. 1053(a), now sets the minimum level of
benefits an employee must receive after accruing specified

u.s.c.

years of service, and§ 203(b), 29
continuous service requirements.

§ 1053(b), governs

Thus if Daniel had retired

after § 1053 took effect, the Fund would have been required to
pay him at least a partial pension.

The Securities Acts, on

19.

the other hand, do not purport to set the substantive terms of
financial transactions.
The existence of this comprehensive legislation
governing the use and terms of employee pension plans severely
undercuts all arguments for extending the Securities Acts to
non-contributory, compulsory pension plans.

Congress believed

that it was filling a regulatory void when it enacted ERISA, a
belief which the SEC actively encouraged.

Not only is the

extension of the Securities Acts by the court below unsupported
by the language and history of the those Acts, but in light of
ERISA it serves no purpose.
99, 104-107 (1977).

Cf.

See Califano v. sanders, 430 u.s.

Boys Markets; · Inc. v. Retail -clerks

Union, 398 u.s. 235, 250 (1970).

Whatever benefits employees

might derive from the effect of the Securities Acts are now
provided in more definite form through ERISA.

We hold
contributory, compulsory pension plan.

Because the first two

counts of respondent's complaint do not provide grounds for
relief in federal court, the District Court should have granted
the motion to dismiss them.

The judgment below is therefore
Reversed

PBS- l 1/13/78 ...
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Footnotes
1.

Contributions were tied to the number of employees

rather than the amount of work performed.

pa~nls

For example,

had to be made even for weeks where an employee was on

leave of absence, disabled, or working for only a fraction of
the week.
I

Conversely, employers did not have to increase their

contribution for weeks in which an employee worked overtime or
on a holiday.
2.

Trust Agreement, Art. 3,

1, App. 63a.

For examples of other non-contributory, compulsory

pension plans, see

Allied · structural · steel · co~

(1978);

u.s.

§

497,500-501 (1978);

Malone v.

v. Spannaus,

White · Motor · corp~,

Alabama · Power · co~

435 u.s.

v. Davis, 431 u.s. 581,

590 (1977).
3. Initially the Fund paid eligible employees $ 75 a
month in benefits.

Subsequent collective bargaining agreements

called for greater employer contributions, which in turn led to
higher benefit payments for retirees.

At the time respondent

brought suit, employers contributed$ 21.50 per employee manweek, and pension payments ranged $ 425 to $ 525 a month,
depending on age at retirement.
4.

See 29 u.s.c.

§

1002(35);

Alabama Power ·c 0 ; v.

2.

Davis, supra, at 593 n.18.
5.

Daniel was laid off from December, 1960, until

April, 1961. In addition, no contributions were paid on his
behalf between April and July, 1961, because of embezzlement by
his employer's bookkeeper.

During this seven month period

respondent could have preseved his eligibility by making the
but he failed to do so.
6.

Section 10(b) provides:

"It shall be unlawful for any person, directly
or indirectly, by the use of any means of
instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the
mails, or of any facility of any national
securities exchange--

"To use or employ, in connection with the
purchase or sale of any security registered on a
national securities exchange or any security not
so registered, any manipulative or deceptive
device or contrivance in contravention of such
rules and regulations as the Commission may
prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the
public interest or for the protection of
investors."
The Commission's Rule 10b-5 declares,

"It shall be unlawful for any person, directly
or indirectly, by the use of any means or
instrumentality of interestate commerce, or of
the mails, or of any facility of any national

3.

securities exchange,
"(1)

to employ any device, scheme, or

artifice to defraud,
"(2)

to make any untrue statement of a

material fact or to omit to state a material fact
necessary in order to make the statements made,
in light of the circumstances under which they
were made, not misleading, or
"(3)

to engage in any act, practice, or

course of business which operates or would
operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person,

1

"in connection with the purchase or sale of any
security."
7.

Section 17(a) provides:
"It shall be unlawful for any person in the

offer or sale of any securities by the use of any
means or instruments of transportation or
communication in interstate commerce or by the
use of the mainls, directly or indirectly-"(1) to employ any device, scheme, or artifice
to defraud, or
"(2) to obtain money or property by means of
any untrue statement of a material fact or any
omission to state a material fact necessary in
order to make the statements made, in light of
the circumstances under which they were made, not
misleading, or
"(3) to engage in any transaction, practice,
or course of business which operates or would
operate as a fraud or deceit upon the purchaser."
8.

Count III charged the Teamsters and the Local with

violating their duty of fair representation under § 9(a) of the

4.

National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 159(a), and Count V
(later amended as Count VI) charged the Teamsters, the Local,
Peick and all other Teamsters pension fund trustees with
violating their obligations under§ 302(c)(5) of the National
Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 186(c) (5). Count IV accused
all defendants of common law fraud and deceit.
9.

As of the time of appeal to the Seventh Circuit

the District Court had not yet ruled on any class certification
issues.
10.

Section 2(1) of the Securities Act defines a

"security" as

"any note, stock, treasury stock, bond,
debenture, evidence of indebtedness, certificate
of interest or participation in any profitsharing agreement, collateral-trust certificate,
preorganization certificate or subscription,
transferable share, investment contract, votingtrust certificate, certificate of deposit for a
security, fractional undivided interest in oil,
gas, or other mineral rights, or, in general, any
interest or instrument commonly known as a
'security,' or any certificate of interest or
participation in, temporary or interim
certificate for, receipt for, guarantee of, or
warrant or right to subscribe to or purchase, any
of the foregoing."
The definition of a "security" in§ 3(a) (10) of the Securities

5.

Exchange Act is virtually identical and, for the purposes of
this case, the coverage of the two Acts may be regarded as the
same.

united ·Housing · Foundation;

837, 847 n.12 (1975):

- ~,

v. Forman, 421

Tcherepnin v Knight, 389

u.s.

u.s.

332, 342

(1967).
11.

Section 2(3) of the Securities Act provides, in

pertinent part,

~hat

"[t]he term 'sale' or 'sell' shall include

every contract of sale or disposition of a security or interest
in a security, for value."

Section 3(a) (14) of the Securities

Exchange Act states that "[t]he terms 'sale' and 'sell' each
include any contract to sell or otherwise dispose of."
Although the latter definition does not refer expressly to a
disposition for · value, the court below did not decide whether
the Securities Exchange Act nevertheless impliedly incorporated
the Securities Act definition, cf. note 10, supra, as in its
view Daniel did give value for his interest in the pension
plan.

In light of our disposition of the question whether

respondent's interest was a "security," we need not decide
whether the meaning of "sale" under the Securities Exchange Act
is any different from its meaning under the Securities Act.
12.

The Court of Ap?eals and the District Court also

held that § 17(a) provides private parties with an implied
cause of action for damages.

In light of our disposition of

6.

this case, we express no views on this issue.
13.

Respondent did not have any cause of action under

ERISA itself, as that Act took effect after he had retired.
14.

-

Daniel also argues that his interest constitutes

a "certificate of interest in or participation in a profitsharing agreement."

The court below did not consider this

claim, as Daniel had not seriously pressed the argument and the
disposition of the "investment contract" issue made it
unnecessary to decide the question.
(1977).

561 F.2d 1223, 1230 n.15

Similarly, Daniel here does not seriously contend that

a "certificate of interest in • • • a profit-sharing agreement"
has any broader meaning under the Securities Acts than an
"investment contract."

In Forman,

~upra,

we observed that the

Howey test, which has been used to determine the presence of an
investment contract, "embodies the essential attributes that
run through all of the Court's decisions defining a security."
421

u.s.,

at 852.
15.

We need not decide here whether a;/ person's

"investment," in order to meet the definition of an investment
contract, must take the form of cash only rather than of goods
and services.
16.

See Forman, supra, at 852 n.16.
As one commentator has noted,

"Elimination of a pension plan would not

7.

necessarily produce an increase in current
employee compensation.

The vesting provisions

generally present in pension plans tend to
promote personnel stability by providing an
incentive for employees to remain with their
employer.
[supra],

As the Court said in Alabama ·Power,
'By rewarding lengthy service, a plan

may reduce employee turnover and training costs
and help an employer secure the benefits of a
stable work force.'

One of the benefits of

personnel stability may be increased employee
productivity, and it is conceivable that the
reduction in training costs and higher
productivity might actually 'pay' for some
pension plans.

Even if elimination of pension

plans would free some resources, it is not clear,
especially in view of the tax advantages of
pension arrangements, that those resources would
necessarily be passed on to employees in the form
of increased wages."

Comment, Application of the

Federal Securities Laws to Noncontributory,
Defined Benefit Pension Plans, 45
124, 142-143 (1977)
17.

u.

Chi. L. Rev.

(footnotes omitted).

Under the terms of the Local's pension plan, for

example, Daniel received credit for the five years he worked
before the Fund was created, even though no employer
contributions had been made during that period.
18.

Article 13 of the original trust agreement

provided in full:

"No employee, or other person shall have any

8.

vested interest or right in the Trust Fund or in
any payments from the Trust Fund; provided,
however, the rights of any person who has become
eligible for benefits hereunder by fully meeting
the requirements of this Trust Agreement shall
not be affected, changed, or altered by an
amendment to this Trust Agreement, unless the
Trust Fund, in the opinion of the Trustees, is
inadequate to meet the payments due, in which
event the Trustees shall determine whether such
benefits shall be reduced or the Trust
terminated."

App. 63a.

This provision was carried over in subsequent amended trust
agreements.

Daniel &eee-

~

ne~---<Hepl:l&e
.

"

that under the terms of

the Fund ~ he is not eligible for benefit ~e ~Rerefor ~

&=

+ack.s eP¥ r.~ats ~er i=Ais e:rt:icle.

19. In addition, the Fund received$ 7,500,000 from
smaller pension funds with which it merged over the years •
.2D .J..e-:

See Note, The Application of the Antifraud

Provisions of the Securities Laws to Compulsory,
Noncontributory Pension Plans After

Daniel · v~

· International

Brotherhccd ·cf ·Teamsters, 64 va. L. Rev. 305, 315 (1978
21.
Securities:

See Note, Interest in Pension Plans as
Daniel · v~

· rnternaticnal ·Brctherhccd ·cf ·Teamsters,

78 Colum. L. Rev. 184, 201
22.

(1978).

The amendment would have added the following

language to§ 4(1) of the Securities Act:

9.

"As used in this paragraph, the term •public
offering• shall not be deemed to include an
offering made solely to employees by an issuer or
by its affiliates in connection with a bona fide
plan for the payment of extra compensation or
stock investment plan for the
of such employees."
23.

exclusiv~

benefit

78 Cong. Rec. 8708 (1934).

The exemption, in full, provides:

"Except as hereinafter expressly provided, the
provisions of this subchapter shall not apply to
any of the following classes of securities:

any interest or participation in a single or
collective trust fund maintained by a bank or in
a a separate account maintained by an insurance
company which interest or participation is issued
in connection with (A) a stock bonus, pension, or
profit-sharing plan which meets the requirements
for qualification under section 401 of title 26,
or (B) an annuity plan which meets the
requirements for the deduction of the empoyer•s
contribution under section 404(a)(2) of title 26,
other than any plan described in clause (A) or
(B) of this para·graph ( i) the contributions under
which are held in a single trust fund maintained
by a bank or in a separate account maintained by
an insurance company for a single employer and
under which an amount in excess of the employer's
contribution is allocated to the purchase of
securities (other than interests or
participations in the trust or separate account
itself) issued by the employer or by any company

1 0.

directly or indirectly controling, controlled by
or under common control with the employer or (ii)
which covers employees some or all of whom are
employees within the meaning of section 401(c)(1)
of title 26."
The 1970 act similarly amended§ 3(a)(12) of the Securities
Exchange Act, 15

u.s.c.

§ 78c(a) (12).

The differences between

the two exemptions as amended are not significant for our
purposes.
24.

Section 17(c) of the Securities Act, 15

77q(c), and§ 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act, 15
78j(b)

u.s.c.

~

u.s.c.

§

(when read with§§ 3(a)(10) and (12) of that Act),

indicate that the antifraud provisions of the respective Acts
continue to apply to interests that come within the exemptions
created by§ 3(a)(2) of the Securities Act and§ 3(a)(12) of
the Securities Exchange Act.
25.

The version of this amendment that passed the

Senate referred only to a "collective trust fund", and, the SEC
concedes, was directed only at certain bank-maintained
commingled investment funds that were developed to achieve
economies of scale for individual holders of certain investment
accounts.

561 F.2d 1222, 1240

S. Rep. No. 91-184,

~1st

Cor,..,.,

&

n. 37.
1st

Sess

(7th Cir. 1977).

p.

A 27

(1969)

~

See

Hearings

Before the Senate Banking and Currency Comm. on Mutual Fund

11•

Legislation of 1967, 90th Cong., 1st Sess., 1341-1342 (1967).
See generally Mundheim & Henderson, Applicability of the
Federal Securities Laws to Pension and Profit-Sharing Plans, 29
L. & Contemp. Probs. 795, 819-837 (1964);

Saxon & Miller,

Common Trust Funds, 53 Geo. L.J. 994 (1965).

The SEC argues,

however, that the addition by the House of Representatives of a
reference to single funds in the final version abruptly changed
the focus of the amendment to cover the underlying plans that
invested in bank-maintained funds.
The legislative history to the 1970 amendment of §
3(a)(2) is not a model of clarity.

The most explicit

congressional explanation of the change in the amendment,
however, cuts strongly against the interpretation advanced.
During floor debate in the House, a colloquy between
Congressman Moss, the chairman of the subcommittee responsible
for the amendment, and Congressman Springer, the ranking
minority member of the subcommittee, indicated that the change
would not limit the continued authority of the SEC to require
registration of voluntary, contributory pension or investment
plans that purchased the employer's stock with the employees'
contribution.
supra, at 1326.

116 Cong. Rec. 33287 (1970).

Cf. Hearings,

The addition of "single or" defeated the

negative inference possibly suggested by the unrevised language

1 2.

that banks would have to register the segregated investment
funds they administered for particular pension plans, but
because the provision as a whole dealt only with the
relationship between a plan and its bank the revision did not
affect the registration status of the underlying pension plan.
Another portion of the same amendment qave the SEC authority to
exempt any pension plan qualifying under the Internal Revenue
Code from registering under the Securities Act:

the House

Report makes clear that Congress thought this measure, as the
1970 amendment as a whole, dealt only with the relationship
between a bank or insurance company and its customer.
1t•
Rep. No. ~382, Q1s'e

H.R.

f>•
Cou~.,

:2tJ .Seee.:J 44 (1970).

The subsequent

addition of another provision excepting from the exemption
funds "under which an amount in excess of the employer's
contribution is allocated to the purchase of securities . • •
issued by the employer or by any company directly or indirectly
controlling, controlled by or under common control with the
employer" appears to have been simply an additional safeguard
to confirm the SEC's authority to compell such plans, and only
ql·

such plans, to register.

See H.R. Conf. Rep.

No.~

631,

~1~L ~

p.
~e.g,

2tJ Sess • .,t'\31

(1970).

The court below believed that coverage of employees'
securities companies by§ 2(a)(13) of the Investment Company

Act of 1940, 15
this coverage

u.s.c.

§

80a-2(a) (13), and the exemption from

provided by§ 3(c)(11) of that Act, 15 U.S.C.

§80a-3(c)(11), for pension plans, revealed Congress'
understanding that pension plans were a kind of employees'
security company.

561 F.2d, at 1238.

But§~

2(a)(13) and

3(c)(11) reveal only that Congress might have believed certain
kinds of pension plans, where an employee owned directly an
interest in the assets of the plan, could be considered
securities companies.

See 1 L. Loss, Securities Regulation 506

n.145 (1st ed. 1961).

Nothing in the Act suggest that all

pension plans, including non-contributory, compulsory, definedbenefit plans, came within§ 2(a)(13).

The SEC has abandoned

this argument in its amicus brief filed before us.

See Brief

for the SEC as Amicqs curipe 62-63.

~b

2i.

Responding to Commissioner Purcell's testimony,

Congressman Wolverton, a member of the House Committee that
helped draft the Securities Act, stated,

"All I can say is that I happened t _o be a
member of this committee when the original
legislation was enacted • • • • I have to rely on
my own recollection of what took place, and I say
to you, in all sincerity, I cannot remember
anything that was said or done or written into
the bill that ever intended, by interpretation or
otherwise, to carry the implications of
jurisdiction that you have just stated that now

2.

exists in the mind of the Securities and Exchange
Commission.
"We were seeking to protect the public against
the issuing of improper securities;

to give it

all of the information that would enable it to
know whether it was getting something good or
something bad;

but the question of pensions and

their funds, or the investment of the funds, was
never even a subject of discussion before the
committee.

I am inclined to think that if the

Securities and Exchange Commission has taken the
view that you state that they have taken, • • •
that then the Commission has strained the
language that appears in the act.

In my opinion,

it was never so intended when this committee
reported the bill to Congress.
"If jurisdiction over employee pension and
welfare funds is important-

and I am not

disputing that question at the moment- it does
not seem to me that the Securities and Exchange
Commission is the one to have the jurisdiction
over such matters."

Hearings Before the House

Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce on
Proposed Amendments to the Securities Act of 1933
and to the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 77th
Cong., 1st Sess., 878 (1941).
27.

On occasion the SEC has contended that because §

2 of the Securities Act and § 3 of the Securities Exchange Act
apply the qualifying phrase "unless the context otherwise
requires" to the Acts' general definitions, it is permissible
to regard a particular transaction as involving a sale or not

3.

depending on the form of regulation involved.
H~

vauqhn · clark · & · co~,

See Schillner v.

134 F.2d 875, 878 (2d Cir. 1943):

Loss, Securities Regulation 524-528 (1st ed. 1961):
2565 (2d ed. 1969).
position:

4

1 L.

id~

2562-

The SEC has not always taken this

In 1943 it submitted an amicus brief in the Ninth

Circuit arguing to the contrary, and it did not begin to rely
on its "regulatory context" theory until 1951.
supra, at 524 n. 211.

1 L. Loss,

This Court noted the doctrine but

expressly chose not to endorse it in SEC v. National
Securities~ · Inc~,

393

u.s.

453, 465-466 (1969).

In light of the language, structure, and purpose of
the Securities Acts, it seems more likely that the "context"
referred to in the Acts• definitional sections is the economic
context of a particular transaction, not the form of regulation
that might be applied to that transaction.

Foundation; Inc; v. Forman, 421

u.s.

Cf. United Housing

838, 848-850 (1975)._; When

Congress wished to exempt certain transactions from the
registration provisions of the Securities Act but not from the
antifraud provisions it did so with explicit language in §§ 4
and 17(c) of that Act.

Similarly, Congress in§ 3(a)(12) of

the Securities Exchange Act gave the SEC express rulemaking
authority to exempt certain securities from such portions of
that Act as the Commission chose, authority which has not been

4.

'?
e ercised with respect to pension plans.

The existence of

t ese provisions strongly suggests that except where the

Itatute

--

states otherwise, a transaction is or is not a "sale"

"security" for all purposes of the Securities Acts.

We

{ ote that with respect to statutory mergers, the area where the
SEC originally developed its theory about the bifurcated
definition of a sale, the SEC has since abandoned its position
and now treats such transactions as entailing a "sale" for all
purposes of the Securities Act.
28.

See 17 CFR 230.145.

Judge Tone, in an opinion concurring in the

observed that "[t]he SEC has not been as candid as we might
have hoped in acknowledging and explaining its change in

position."

561 F.2d, at 12j

The

di<;~~t1!ftiA<J

----"\

failure of the

SEC to deal forthrightly with the variance between its past
interpretations of the Securities Acts and its position in

(

this~

case both displays a lack of respect for this Court and
I

undermines whatever assistance the Commission might provide us
as we attempt to interpret the complex legislation governing
the securities field.
29.

Under§ 203(a), a pension plan must vest in an

employee at least 50% of prospective benefits after 10 years of

1
(}

service, with an additional 10% up to the maximum to be

5.

provided for each year thereafter.
30.

Under§ 203(b), all years served after the

enactment of ERISA ordinarily must be credited regardless of
any break in service, unless the break extends over a year and
the employee either does not complete a year of service upon
returning to the job or the length of the break exceeds the
number of years of service before the break.

Section

203(b)(1)(F) allows plans to apply their preexisting rules to
breaks in service occurring before the effective date of ERISA.

-

-
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77~753 and 77~754
Int~l Brotherhoo

of Teamsters, etc.

v. Daniel

Dear Lewis:
Please show me as not participating in these
cases.
Respectfully,
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Mr. Justice Powell
Copies to the Conference
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Mr. Justice Powell
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Court in this case.
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Mr. Justice Powell
Copies to the Conference
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Dear Lewis,
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the subject matter covered by footnote
22, but otherwise I join your opinion.
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"stylistic suggestion" which I meant to add to your copy of
the join letter, but which I overlooked. On page 5 of the
first draft, it seems to me it would be more accurate in terms
of the statutes and rules governing federal practice to say
"The order denying the motion to dismiss was certified" than
to say "The motion to dismiss was certified". Needless to
say, my "join" is not conditioned upon your agreeing to this
rather nit-picking change.
Sincerely,

Mr. Justice Powell
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22.

On occasion the SEC has contended that

because S 2 of the Securities Act and

§

3 of the Securities

Exchange Act apply the qualifying phrase "unless the

contex~

otherwise requires" to the Acts' general definitions, it i3
permissible to reqard a oarticular transaction as involviTJq
a sale or not dependinq on the form of. rPgulation involvefl.
See 1 Ih · Loss, Secur.ities

R~gulation

4 id., at 2562-2565 (2d ed. 1969).

524-528 (1st ed. 1961);

The Court noted the

contention in SEC v. National Securities, Inc., 393
453, 465-466 (1969).

On

~'1\...vlo\-~.;.
stlt•~t

u.s.

occasions the SEC apper\rs to

have taken a different position:

In 1943 it submitted an

amicus brief in the Ninth Circuit arguing that a transaction
must be a sale for all purpose of the Securities Act or for
none, and it did not begin to rely on its "regulatory
context" theory until 1951.

See Brief for the SEC in

National Supply Co. v. Leland Stanford Junior University,
No. 1022 (9th Cir).

1 L. Loss, supra, at 524 n. 211: Cohen,

Rule 133 of the Securities Exchange Commission, 14 Record of
N.Y.C.B.A. 162, 164-165 (1959).

We also note that with

respect to statutory mergers, the area in which

the SEC

originally developed its theory as to the bifurcated
definition of a sale, the SEC since has abandoned its

2.

position and findg the presence of a "sale" for all purposes
in the case of such mer.qers.

See 17 rFR

§

230.145.

In view

of our. disposition of this case, we express no opinion as to
the cor.rect resolution of the rliverqent views on this issue •

.
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22.

On occasion the SEC has contended that

because § 2 of the Securities Act and § 3 of the Securities
Exchange Act apply the qualifying phrase "unless the context
otherwise requires" to the Acts' general definitions, it is
permissible to regard a particular transaction as involving
a sale or not depending on the form of regulation involved.
See 1 L. Loss, Securities Regulation 524-528 (1st ed. 1961):
4 id., at 2562-2565 (2d ed. 1969).

The Court noted the

contention in SEC v. National Securities, Inc., 393
453, 465-466 (1969).

u.s.

On other occasions the SEC appears to

have taken a different position:

In 1943 it submitted an

amicus brief in the Ninth Circuit arguing that a transaction
must be a sale for all purpose of the Securities Act or for
none, and it did not begin to rely on its "regulatory
context" theory until 1951.

See Brief for the SEC in

National SuEply Co. v. Leland Stanford Junior University,
No. 1022 (9th Cir).

L. Loss, supra, at 524 n. 211; Cohen,

Rule 133 of the Securities Exchange Commission, 14 Record of
N.Y.C.B.A. 162, 164-165 (1959).

We also note that with

respect to statutory mergers, the area in which

the SEC

originally developed its theory as to the bifurcated
definition of a sale, the SEC since has abandoned its

.

.

.

,.

..
2.

position and finds the presence of a "sale" for all purposes
in the case of such mergers.

See 17 CFR § 230.145.

In view

of our disposition of this case, we express no opinion as to
the correct resolution of the divergent views on this issue.

'·.

CHAMBERS DRAFT

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STAm
Nos. 77-753

AND

77-754

International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen
and Helpers of America,
Petitioner,
77-753
v.
On Writs of Certiorari
John Daniel.
to the United States
Local 705, International Brotherhood
Court of Appeals for
of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warethe Seventh Circuit.
housemen and Helpers of
America, et al.,
Petitioners,
77-754
v.
John Daniel.
[January -, 1979]
MR. JusTICE PowELL delivered the ppinion of the Court.
This case presents the question whether a noncontributory,
compulsory pension plan constitutes a "security" within the
meaning of the Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 (the "Securities Acts").
I

In 1954 multiemployer collective bargaining between Local
705 of the International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Wa.rehousemen, and Helpers of America and Chicago
trucking firms produced a pension plan for employees represented by the Local. The plan was compulsory and noncontributory. Employees had no choice as to participation
in the plan, and did not have the option of demanding that

77-753 & 77-754-0PINION

TEAl\ISTER.c::; v . DANIEL

2

the employer's contribution he paid directly to them as a
substitute for pension cligibility. 1 The collective-bargaining
agreement initially set employrr contributions to the Pension
Trust Fund at $2 a week for each man-week of covered
employment. 2 The Board of Truste-es of the Fund, a body
composed of an equal numbrr of employer and union representatives. was given solC' authority to Ret the l<'vel of ben0fits
but had no control over the amount of required employer
contributions. Tnitially eligible employees received upon
retirement $75 a month in benefits. Subsequent colkctivebargai.ning agreements called for greater employer contributions, which in turn kcl to higher benefit payments for retirees.
At the time respondent brought suit, Nnployers contributed
$21.50 per employee-man week and pension payments ranged
from $425 to $52!5 a month dC'pending on age at retirement.
Because the Fund made equnl payments to each employee
who qualified for a pension, regarclleRs of the amount. of
employer contributions attributahlc to his period of service,
the plan provid<'cl a "defined benefit." 3 in order to receive
a pension an employee was required to ha.v e 20 years of continuous service, with work before 1955 counted toward this
total.
The meaning of "continuous service" is at the center of
this dispute. Respondent began working as a truck driver
i For exnmplrs of other noncontributory, compulsory pen:;;ion plans,
U. S. - , (1978);
see Allied Structural St eel Co. v. Spannaus. Malon e v. White Motor Corp., 435 U. S. 497, 500-501 (1978); Alabama

Power Co v. Davis, 431 U. S. 581, 590 (1977).
Contribution!' were t.i rd to 1he number of rmplo~'N'S rnther than the
amount of worl.;: performed. For rxnmple, pa~·mcnts hnd to be made even
for weeks where nn emplo~·ec was on l~:wo of [lbsencr, di:;;nblcd, or working for only a frnction of t.hc week. Conversrly, rmplo~·rrs did not h::we
to inrren e thrir contribution for weekR in whieh an employee worked
overtime or on a holiday. Trust A~~:rrcment , Art. 3, § 1, App. 63a..
8 See 29 U. S. C. § 1002 (35); Alabama Power Co. v. Davis, supra, a.t
2

593 n. 18.
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in the Chicago area in 1950, and joined Local 705 the following year. When the plan first went into effect, respondent
automatically received 5 years credit toward the 20-year
service requirement because of his earlier work experience.
He retired in 1973 and applied to the plan's administrator for
a pension. The administrator determined that respondent
was ineligible beca.use of a break in service between December
1960, and July 1961.4 Respondent appealed the decision to
the trustees, who affirmed. Respondent then asked the
trustees to waive the continuous service rule as it applied to
him. After the trustees refused to waive the rule, respondent.
brought suit in federal court against the International union
(the "Teamtsers"), Local 705 (the "Local''), and Louis Peick,
a trustee of the fund.
Respondent's complaint alleged that the Teamsters, the
Local, and Peick misrepresented and omitted to state material
facts with respect to the value of a covered employee's interest
in the pension plan. Count I of the complaint charged that
these misstatements and omissions constituted a fraud in connection with the sale of a security in violation of § 10 (b) of
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U. S. C. § 78j (b),
and the Securities and Exchange Commission's Rule 10b-5,
17 CFR § 240.10 (b)-5. 5 Count II charged that the same
4 Danirl was laid off from Decembrr 1960, until April 1961.
In addit.ion, no contributions were paid on hiR behalf between April and July
1961, brcause of embezzlrment by his ('mployer's bookkeeper. During
this Reven-month period re~pondent could have preserved his eligibility
by making the contributions himself, but he failed to do so.
5 Section 10 (b) provides:
"It Rhall be unlawful for a.ny prrson, dirrctly or indirectly, by thr use
of :my mrnns of instrumentality of interstMe commerce or of the mails,
or of any facility of any na,tional securities exchang'e-

"To use or employ, in connection with thr purchMe or sale of any
security rrgistered on a national srcurities ·exchangr or any security not
so registered, any manipul11tive or deceptjve device or contrivance in
contravention of such rules and regulations as the CoiDlni sian may pre-
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conduct amounted to a violation of § 17 (a) of the Securities
Act of 1933, 15 U. St C. § 77q. 6 Other counts alleged violations of various labo?~1d common-law duties. 7 Respondent
sought to proceed on b ehalf of all prospective beneficiaries of
Teamsters pension plans and against all Teamsters pension
funds. 8
scribe as necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of investors."
The Commission's Rule 10b-5 declares,
"It shall be unlawful for any prrson, directly or indirectly, by the use
of any means or instrumrntality of interstate commerce, or of the ma.ils,
or of any facility of any national securities exchange,
"(1) to employ nny device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
"(2) to make fillY untrur statement of a material fact or to omit to
state a material fact neoessary in order to makr the statements made,
in light of the circumstances under which they were made, not mi~leading,
or
"(3) to engag'c in any act., practice, or coursr of bm(iness which operates
or would operate as a frnud or deceit upon any person, in connection with
the purchase or sale of any security."
6 Section 17 (a) provides:
"It shall be unlawful for nny person in the offer or salr of any securit'ies by the usc of any means or inl'truments of transportation or communication in interstate commerce or by the use of the mails, directly
or indirectly"(1) to emp'oy any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud, or
"(2) to obtain money or property by means of any untrue statement
of a material fact or any omif'sion to "tate a materia] fact necessary in
order to make the statements madr, in light of the circumstances under
-wbich they were made, not misleading, or
"(3) to engage in any transaction, practice, or coun:e of business which
operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon the purchaser."
7 Count III charged the Teamsters nnd the Local with violating their
duty of fair representation undrr § 9 (a) of the National La,bor Relations
Act, 29 U. S. C. § 159 (a), and Count V (later amended as Count VI)
charged the TcamsterR, the Local, Peick and all other Teamsters pension
fund t.ruste<:'s with violating thrir obligations under § 302 (c) (5) of the
National Labor Relations Act, 29 U. S. C. § 186 (c) (5). Count IV
accused all defendants of common-law fraud and deceit.
8 As of the time of appPnl to the Srvpnth Circuit the District Court had
not yet ruled on any class certificatjon issues.
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The petitioners moved to dismiss the first two counts of the
.complaint on the ground that respondent had no cause of
action under the Securities or Securities Exchange Acts. The
District Court denied the motion. 410 F. Supp. 541 (ND Ill.
1976). It held that respondent's interest in the Pension Fund
constituted a security within the meaning of § 2 (1) of the
Securities Act, 15 U. S. C. § 77b (1), and § 3 (a)(10) of the
Securities Exchange Act, 15 U. S. C. § 78c (a) (10), 9 because
the plan created an "investment contract" as that term had
been interpreted in SEC v. W. J. Howey Co., 328 U. S. 293
( 1946). It also determined that there had been a "sale" of
this interest to respondent within the meaning of § 2 (3) of
the Securities Act, 15 U. S. C. § 77b (3), and § 3 (a)(14) of
the Securities Exchange Act, 15 U. S. C. § 78c (a) (14). 10 It
Section 2 (1) of the Securitios Act define;: a "security" as
"any note, stock, treasury stock, bond, debenture, evidence of indebtedness,
certificate of interest or participaijon in any profit-sharing agreement,
collateral-trust certificate, preorganizaiion certificate or subscription, transfemble share, investment contract, voting-trust certificate, certificate of
deposit for a security, fractional nndivided interest in oil, gas, or other
mineral rightR, or, in general, any interest or instrument commonly known
as a 'security,' or any certificate of interest or participation in, temporary
or interim certificate for, receipt for, guarantee of, or warrant or right to
subscribe to or purchase, any of the foregoing."
The definition of a "security" in § 3 (a) (10) of the Securities Exchange
Act is virtually identical and, for the purposes of this case, ihe coverage
of the two Acts may be regarded as the same. United Housing Foundation, Inc. v. Form.an, 421 U. S. 837, 847 n. 12 (1975); Tcherepnin v.
Knight, 389 U. S. 332, 342 (1967).
10 Section 2 (3) of the Secmities Act provides, in pertinent pa.r t, that
"[t]he term 'sa.lo' or 'sell' shall include every cont.ract of sale or disposition
of a security or interest in a ~ecurity, for value." Section 3 (a) (14) of
the Securities Exchange Art states that "[t]he terms 'sale' and 'Bell' each
include any contract to sell or otJH'nrise diRpose of." Althongh the latter
definition docs not rrfer rxpresf'ly to a disposition for value. the court
below did not decide whrther the Srcurities Exchange Act nevertheless
impliedly incorporated the Securities Art definit.ion, cf. n. 9, supra, as in
its view Daniel did give value for his interest in the pension plan. In
9
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believed respondent voluntarily gave va.Jue for his interest in
the plan, because he had voted on collective-bargaining agTeements that chose employer contributions to the Fund instead
of other wages or benefits.
The motion to dismiss was certified for appeal pursuant to
28 U. S. C. § 1292 (b), and the Court of Appeals for the
Seventh Circuit affirmed. 561 F. 2d 1223 (1977). Relying
on its perception of the f'Conomic rf'alities of pension plans
and various actions of CongTess and the SEC with respect to
such plans, the court ruled that respondent's interest in the
Pension Fund was a "security." According to the court, a
"sale" took place either when respondent mtified a collectivebargaining agreement embodying the Fund or when he
accepted or retained covered employment instead of seeking
other work. 11 The Court did not believe the subsequent
enactment of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act
of 1974 ("ERISA"), 29 U. S. C. § 1001 et seq., affected the
application of the Securities Acts to pension plans, as the
requirements and purposes of ERISA were perceived to be
different from those of the Securities Acts. 12 We granted certiorari, 434 U.S. 1061 (1978), and now reverse.

II
"The starting point in every case involving the construction of a statute is the language itself." Blue Chip Stamps v.
Manor Drug Stores, 421 U. S. 723, 756 (1975) (PowELL, J.,
concurring); see Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U. S. 185,
light of our dispol'ition of the question whether respondent's interest was
a "security," we need not decide whether the mraning of "sale" under the
Securities Exchn.nge Act is any different from its meaning under the
Securities Act.
11 The Court of Appeals and thr DiRtrirt Court also held that § 17 (a)
provides private parties with an implird cause of action for damages. In
light of our disposition of this case, we express no views on this issue.
12 Respondent did not. have an~· cau~c of action under ERISA itself, as
that Act took effect after he had retired.
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197, 199, and n. 19 ( 1976). In spite of the substantial use
of employee pension plans at the time they were enacted,
neither § 2 (1) of the Securities Act nor § 3 (a) (10) of the
Securities Exchange Act, which define the term "security" in
considerable detail and with numerous examples, refers to
pension plans of any type. Acknowledging this omission in
the statutes, respondent contends that an employee's interest
in a pension plan is an "investment contract," an instrument
which is included in the statutory definitions of a security. 13
To determine whether a particular financial relationship
constitutes an investment contract, "[t]he test is whether the
scheme involves an investment of money in a common enterprise with profits to come solely from the efforts of others."
Howey, supra, at 301. This test is to be applied in light of
"the substance-the economic realities of the transactionrather than the names that may have been employed by the
parties." United Housing Corp. v. Forman, 421 U. S. 837,
851-852 (1975); 'Pcherepnin v. Knight, 389 U. S. 332, 336
(1967); Howey, supra, at 298. Cf. SEC v. Variable Annuity
Life Ins. Co., 359 U. S. 65, 80 (1959) (BRENNAN, J., concurring) ("[O]ne must apply a test in terms of the purposes of
the Federal Acts ... "). Looking separately at each element
of the Howey test, it is apparent that an employee's participation in a noncontributory, compulsory pension plan does
13 Daniel also argues that his interest constitutes a "certificate of interest
in or participation in a profit- baring agreement." The court below did
not consider this claim, as Daniel had not seriously prrssed the argument
and the disposition of the "investment contract" issue made it unnecessary
to decide the question. 561 F. 2d 1223, 1230 n. 15 (1977). Similarly,
Daniel here docs not se riou s~y cont.end that a "err! ificatr of interest
in ... a profit-sharing agreemrnt" has any broader mraning nuder the
Securities Acts than an " invC'sl ment. contract." In Forman, supra, we
obserwd that the H oweu test, which has beE'n nscd to drtermine the
presence of an investment contract, "embodies the essential attributes
that run through all of the Court's decisions defining a security." 421
U. S., at 852.
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not comport with the commonly held understanding of an
investment contract.
A. Investment of Money

An employee who participates in a noncontributory, compulsory pension plan by definition makes no payment into the
pension fund. He only accepts employment, one of the conditions of which is eligibility for a possible benefit on retirement. Daniel contends, however, that he has "invested" in
the Pt>nsion Fund by permitting part of his compensation
from his employer to take the form of a deferred pension
benefit. By allowing his employer to pay money into the
Fund, and by contributing his labor to his employer in return
for these payments, Daniel asserts he has made the kind of
investment which the Securities Acts were intended to
regulate.
In order to determine whether respondent invested in the
Fund by accepting and remaining in covered employment, it
is necessary to look at the entire transaction through which
he obtained a chance to receive pension benefits. In every
decision of this Court recognizing the presence of a "security"
under the Securities Acts, the person found to have been an
investor chose to give up something of value in return for a
separable financial interest with the characteristics of a
security. Sec Tcherpnin, supra (money paid for bank capital
stock); SEC v. United Benefit Life Ins. Co., 387 U. S. 202
(1967) (portion of premium paid for variable component of
mixed variable and fixed annuity contract); Variable Annuity
Life Ins. Co., supra (premium paid for variable annuity contract); Howey, supra (money paid for purchase, maintenance,
and harvesting of orange grove); SEC v. C. M. Joiner Leasing
Corp., 320 U. S. 344 ( 1943) (money paid for land and oil
exploration). Even in those cases where the interest acquired had intermingled security and nonsecurity aspects, the
interest obtained had "to a very substantial degree elements
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of investment contracts . . . ." Variable Annuity Life Ins.
Co., supra, at 91 (BRENNAN, J ., concurring).
In a pension plan such as this one, by contrast, the pUr·
ported investment is a relatively insignificant part of an
employee's total and indivisible compensation package. No
portion of respondent's compensation other than the potential
pension benefits had any of the characteristics of a security,
yet these noninvestment interests could not be segregated
from the possible pension benefits. Only in the most abstract
sense may it be said that respondent "exchanged" some portion of his labor in return for these possible benefits. 14 He
surrendered his labor as a whole, and in return received a
compensation package that was substantially devoid of
aspects resembling a security. His decision to accept and
retain covered employment must have had only an extremely
attenuated relationship, if any, to perceived investment possibilities of a future pension. Looking at the economic realities, it seems clear that respondent was selling his labor to
obtain a livelihood, not making an investment for the future.
Respondent also argues that employer constributions on
his behalf constituted hiR investment into the Fund. But it
is inaccurate to describe these payments as having been "on
behalf" of any employee. The trust agreement used employee man-weeks as a convenient way to measure an employer's overall obligation to the Fund, not as a means of measuring the employer's obligation to any particular employee.
Indeed, there was no fixed relationship between contributions
to the Fund and an employee's potential benefits. A pension
plan with "fixed benefits," such as the Local's. does not tie a
qualifying employee's benefits to the time he has worked.
Sec n. 4, supra. One who has engaged in covered employment for 20 years will receive the same benefits as a person
14

We need not. decide here whether a person's "inYestment," in order to
meet the definition of an invef'tment contract, must take the fonn of cash
only rather than of goods and services. See Forman, supra, at 852 n. 16.
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who has worked for 40, even though the latter has worked
twice as long and induced a substantially la.rger employer
contribution. 1 5 Again, it ignores the economic realities to
equate employer contributions with an investment by the
employee.
B. Expectation of Profits From A Common Enterprise

As we observed in Forman, the "touchstone" of the Howey
test "is the presence of an investment in a common venture
premised on a reasonable expectation of profits to be derived
from the entrepeneurial or managerial efforts of others." 421
U. S., at 852. The Court of Appeals believed that Daniel's
expectation of profit derived from the Fund's successful management and investment of its assets. To the extent pension
benefits exceeded employer contributions and depended on
earnings from the assets. it was thought they contained a
profit element. The Fund's trustees provided the managerial
efforts which produced this profit element.
As in other parts of its analysis, the court below found an
expectation of profit in the pension plan only by focusing on
one of its less important aspects to the exclusion of its more
significant elements. It is true that the Fund, like other
holders of large assets, depends to some extent on earnings
from its assets. In the case of a pension fund, however, a
far larger portion of its income comes from employer contributions, a source in no way dependent on the efforts of the
Fund's managers. ·The ·Local 705 Fund, for example. earned
a total of $31 million through investment of its assets between
February 1955, and January 1977. During this same period
employer contributions totaled $153 million. 16 Not only does
15

Under the trrms of the Locnl'" prnsion plan , for example, Daniel
received credit. for t.he five ~·rnr;;; lw workrcl bPfon• the Fund wns created,
even though no ·employer contributions had been made during that
period.
1 6 In addition , the Fnnd 1weiwd $7,500,000 from smnller pension funds
w'ith which it merged over the y•ea.rs.
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the greater share of a pension plan's income ordinarily come
from new contributions, but unlike most entrepeneurs who
manage other people's money, a plan usually can count on
increased employer contributions, over which the plan itself
has no control, to cover shortfalls in earnings.17
The importance of asset earnings in relation to the other
benefits received from employment is diminished further by
the fact that where a plan has substantial preconditions to
vesting, the principal barrier to an individual employee's
realization of pension benefits is not the financial health of
the Fund. Rather, it is his own ability to meet the Fund's
eligibility requirements. Thus, even if it were proper to
describe the benefits as a "profit" returned on some hypothetical investment by the employee, this profit would depend
primarily on the employee's efforts to meet the vesting
requirements, rather than the Fund's investment success.' 8
When viewed in light of the total compensation package an
employee must receive in order to be eligible for pension benefits, it becomes clear that the possibility of participating in a
plan's asset earnings "is far too speculative and insubstantial
to bring the entire transaction within the Securities Acts,"
Forman, supra, at 856.

III
The court below believed that its construction of the term
"security" was compelled not only by the perceived resemblance of a pension plan to an investment contract, but by
various actions of Congress and the SEC's inte-rpretation of
the Securities Acts. In reaching this conclusion. the court
gave great weight to the SEC's explanation of these events,

X

17 See Note, The Applirntion of the Antifraud Provi iom; of the
Srrurit.ics Laws to Compu!Ror~', Non rant ribut.or)' PenRion PlanR After
Daniel v. International Brotherhood of T eamsters, 54 Va. L. Rev. 305, 315
(1978
(Missing Copy)
18 See Note, Interest in Prn ~ ion PlnnR n.~ Securitie~: Daniel v. International Brotherhood of T eamsters, 78 Colum. L. Rev . 184, 201 (1978).

77-753 & 77-754-0PINION
12

TEAMSTERS v. DANIEL

an explanation which for the most part the SEC repeats here.
Our own review of the record leads us to believe that this
reliance on the SEC's interpretation of these legislative and
administrative actions was not justified.
A. Actions of Congress

The SEC in its amicus curiae brief refers to several actions
of Congress said to evidence an understanding that pension
plans are securities. A close look at each instance, however,
reveals only that Congress might have believed certain kinds
of pension plans, radically different from the one at issue here,
came within the coverage of the Securities Acts. There is no
evidence that Congress at any time thought noncontributory
plans similar to the one before us were subject to federal regu·lation as securities.
The first action cited was the rejection ·by Congress in f934
of an amendment to the Securities Act that would have
exempted employee stock investment and stock option plans
from the Act's registration requiremcnts. 19 'The amendment
passed the Senate but was eliminated in conference. The
defeated proposal dealt with plans under which employees
contributed their own funds to a segregated investment
account on which a return was realized. See H. R. Rep.
No. 1838, 73d Cong., 2d Sess., 41 (1934); Hearings before the
House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce on
Proposed Amendments to the Securities Act of 1933 and the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 77th Cong .. 1st Sess., (1941). It did not contemplate, and could not have been
construed reasonably to apply to a noncontributory plan.
19 The am('ndment would have added the following language to § 4 (1)
of the Secttritjes Act:
"As used in this paral!raph, the term 'public offering' shall not be
·deemed to include an offering mndr solely to employees by an issuer or by
· its affllintes ·in connection with a bonrt fide plan for the payment of extra
compensation or stock investment plan for the exclusive benefit of such
employees.'' 78 Cong. Rec. 8708 (1934).
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The SEC also relies on an 1970 amendment of the Securities Act which extended § 3 (a) (2)'s exemption from registra•
tion to include "any interest or participation in a single o't
collective trust fund maintained by a bank , . , which interest
or participation is issued in connection with (A) a stock
bonus, pension, or profit-sharing plan which meets the requirements for qualification under section 401 of title 26, ... ,,,
15 U. S. C. § 77c (a) (2). It argues that in creating a registration exemption, the amendment manifested Congress'
understanding that the interests covered by the amendment
otherwise were subject to the Securities Acts. 20 It interprets
"interest or participation in a single ... trust fund ... issued
in connection with . . . a stock bonus, pension, or profit•
sharing plan" as referring to a prospective beneficiary's interest in a pension fund. But this construction of the 1970
amendment ignores that measure's central purpose, which waa
to relieve banks and insurance companies of certain registratration obligations. The amendment recognized only that a
pension plan had "an interest or participation" in the fund in
which its assets were held, not that prospective beneficiaries
of a plan had any interest in either the plan's bankmaintained assets or the plan itself.21
20 Section 17 (c) of the Securities Act, 15 U.S. C.§ 71q (c), and§ 10 (b)
of the Securities Exchange Act, 15 U. S. C. § 78j (b) (when read with
§§ 3 (a) (10) and (12) of that Art), indica.te that the antifraud provisions
of the respective Acts continue to apply to intrrests that come within the
exemptions created by § 3 (a,) (2) of the Securities Act and § 3 (a) (12) of
tho Securities Exchange Act.
21 See S. Rep. No. 91-184, p. 27 (1969); Hearings before the Senate
Banking and Curn.'nC~' Committee on Mutual Fund Lrgislation of 1967,
90th Cong., 1st Sess., 1341-1342 (1967); Mundhrim & Hrnderson, Applicability of the Federal Seeurit ies L1.ws to Pension and Profit-Sharing
Plans, 29 L. & Contemp. Probs. 705, 819-837 (1964); Saxon & Miller,
Common Trust Funds, 53 Goo. L. J. 994 (1965). The SEC argues that
the addition by the House of the language "single or" before "common
trust fund" indicated an intent to cover the underlying plans tha-t inve ted

77-753 & 77-754-0PINION

14

TEAMSTERS v. DANIEL

B. SEC Interpretation
The court below believed, and it now is argued to us, that
almost from its inception the SEC has regarded pension plans
as falling within the scope of the Securities Acts. We are
asked to defer to what is seen as a longstanding interpretation of these statutes by the agency responsible for their
administration. But there are limits, grounded in the language, purposel\and history of the particular statute, on how
far an agency properly may go in its interpretative role.
Although these limits are not always easy to discern, it is
clear here that tho SEC's position is neither longstanding nor
"even arguably within the outer limits of its authority to inter·pret these Acts. 22
in bank-maintained funds. The lrgif'!ntive . l1i~ory, howevrr, indicates that
· the change was mem1t only to rliminate the negative· infcrrnce suggested
by the unrevisrd language that banks would have to register the scgrega.ted
investment funds they rtdminist.ered for partirubr plans. Bec.'luse the
provision as a whole. dealt only with the relation'ship between a plnn and
its bank, the revision did not affect the regiRtrat ion status of the lmderlying pension plnn. See 116 Cong. Rer. '33287 (1070). · This was consist,.
ent with the SEC's interpretation of the proviRion. · Hearings, supra, at
' 1326. The subsequrnt rtddition of another provi,.ion except.ing from the
exemption funds "under which an amount in rxr.css of the employer's
contribution is allocated to the purchaRo of securities ... issued by the
employer or by any company directly or indirectly controlling, controlled
by or under common control with the emplo)·er" appe::trR to have been.
simply an additional safeguard to confirm tho SEC's nuthority to require
such plans, and only such plans, to register. Soc H. R. Conf. Rep. No.
91-1631, p. 31 (1970).
22 It is a commonplace in our jurisprudence that an administrative
·agency's consistent, longstanding interpretation of the statute under which
· it operates is entitled to conP-iderable weight. United States v. National
Assn. of Securities D ealers, 422 U. S. 694, 719 (1975); Saxbe v. Bustos,
419 U. S. 65, 74 (1974); Investment Co. Institute v. Camp, 401 U. S.
617, 626-627 (1971); Udall v. Tallman, 380 U. S. 1, 16 (1965). This
deference is a product both of an awareness of the practical expertise
which an agency normally develops, and of a willingness to accord some
measure of flexibility to such an agency as it encounters new and unfore-

,:-
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As we have demonstrated above, the type of pension plan
at iEsue in this case bears no resemblance to the kind of financial interests the Securities Acts were designed to regulate.
Further, the SEC's present position is flatly contradicted by
its past actions. Until the instant litigation arose, the public
record reveals no evidence that the SEC had ever considered
the Securities Acts to be applicable to noncontributory pension plans. In 1941, the SEC first articulated the position
that voluntary, contributory plans had investment characteristics that rendered them "securities" under the Acts. At the
same time, however, the SEC recognized that noncontributory
plans were not covered by the Securities Acts because such
plans did not involve a "sale" within the meaning of the
statutes. Opinions of Assistant General Counsel, [1941-1944
Transfer Binder] CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. 1T 75,195 (1941);
Hearings before the House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce on Proposed Amendments to the Securities
Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 77th
Cong., 1st Sess., 895, 896-897 (1941). 28
seen problems over time. But this deference is constrained by our ob'igation to honor the clear meaning of a statute, as revealed by its language,
·purpose and history. On a number of occasions in recent years this Court
has found it necessary to reject t.he SEC's interpretation of various provisions of the Securities Acts. See SEC v. Sloan, 436 U. S. 103, 117-119
(1978); Piper v. Chris-Craft Industries, Inc., 430 U. S. 1, 41 n. 27 (1977);
Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U. S. 185, 212-214 (1976); Forman,
supra, a.t 858 n. 25; Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S.
723, 759 n. 4 (1975) (PowELL, J., concurring); Reliance Electric Co. v.
Emerson Electric Co., 404 U.S. 418,425--427 (1972).
23 Subsequent to 1941, the SEC made no further efforts to regulate even
contributory, voluntary pension plans except. where the employees' contributions were invested in the employer's securities. Cf. n. 21, supra. It
also continued to disavow any authority to regulate noncontributory,
compulsory plans. See Letter from Assistant Director, Division of Corporate Finance, May 12, 1953, CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. ,[ 2105.51; Letter
from Chief Counsel, Division of Corporate Finance, August 1, 1962, CCH
Fed. Sec. L. Rep. ~ 2105.52; Hearings before the Senate Banking and
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In an attempt to reconcile these interpretations of the
SecurWes Acts with is present stand, the SEC now augments
its past position with two additional propositions. First, it
is argm'd. noncontributory plans arc "~ecurities" even though
a "sale" is not involved. Second. the previous ronccssion that
noncontributory plans do not involve a "sale" was meant to
apply only to the registration and rPporting requirements of
the Serurities Acts: for purposE's of the antifraud provisions,
a "sale" is involved. As for the first proposition. we observe
that none of the SEC opinions, reports, or wstimony cited to
us address the question . As for the second, the record is
·unambiguously to the contrary. 24 Both in its 1941 statements
Currency Committee on Mutual Fund Lrgishtion of Hl67 , 90th Cong., 1st
Sess., 1326 (HJ67} ; 1 L. Loss, Recnritirs Rrgula.tion , 510-511 (1st. ed.
1961) ; 4 id .. nt 2553-2554 (2d Pd. 1969) ; JI~rcle . EmployN' Stock Plans
and the Securities Act of 1933, 16 W. Rrs. L . Rev. 75, 86 (1964);
Mundhcim & Hender~on. Applirnbilit? of the FrdC'rnl Rrruritirs Ln.ws to
Pension and Profit-Rhnring Plnns, 29 L. & Contrm1). Prohs. 795, 809-811
(1964); Note, Pension Plans ns Securities, 96 U. Pa. L. Rev. 540, '549-551
(1948).
24 We doubt as A. genernl mntter whrthrr the definitions of the Securities
Acts may be read to permit a single trnnE:nrtion to conRtitiltr a "sale" for
one purpose of tho Sermities Act but not. othrrs. On occasion the SEC
has contrndcd that becnusc § 2 of the Securities Art nnd § 3 of the
Securities Exchnnge Act npply the qualifying j)lmtl'e "unless the context
otherwise requirr " to the Arts' grnrml definitions, it is permir::.<:ible to
rega.r d a part.i rular trnnsnct.ions ns inYolving a ~ale or not dej)rndinp; on
the form of rrguhtion involved . See Schillner v. H. Va1tghn Clark & Co.,
134 F. 2d 875, 878 (CA2 1943) ; 1 L. Loss, Securities Regulation 524-528
(1st ed. 1961) ; 4 id., 2562-2565 (2d ed. Hl69). But the SEC has not
always tn ken this position: In 1943 it ·ubmittrd an amicus brief in the
Ninth Circtut arguing to the contrnry, and it did not begin to rely on its
· "regulatory context" theory until Hl51. 1 L. Loss, supra, at 524 n . 211;
Cohen, Rule 133 of the Securities Exchange Commission, 14 Record of
N. Y. C. B. A. 162, 154-165 (1959}. This Court. notecl the doctrine but
expressly chose not to ndopt. it in SEC v. National Se('urities, Inc ., 393
U. S. 453, 465-466 (1969) . It seems more likely that the "context"
referred to in the Acts' definitional sections is the economic context of a

'
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and repeatedly since then, the SEC has declared that its "no
sale" position applied to the Securities Acts as a whole. See
Opinion of Assistant General Counsel, [1941-1944 Transfer
Binder] CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. ~ 75,195, at 75,387 (1941);
Hearings before the House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce on Proposed Amendments to the Securities Act
of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 77th Cong.,
1st Sess., 888, 896-897 (1941); Institutional Investor Study
Report of the Securities and Exchange Commission, H. R.
Doc. No. 92-64, p. 996 (1971) ("[T]he Securities Act does not
apply ... "); Report of Special Study of Securities Markets
of the Securities and Exchange Commission, Part II, H. R.
Doc. No. 95, 88th Cong., 1st Sess., 869 (1963); Hearings
before A Subcommittee of Senate Labor and Public Welfare
Committee on Welfare and Pension Plans Investigation, 84th
Cong., 1st Sess., 943-946 (1955). Congress acted on this
understanding when it proceeded to develop the legislation
that became ERISA. See, e. g., Interim Report of Activities
of the Private Welfare and Pension Plan Study, S. Rep.
No. 92-634, p. 96 ( 1972) ("Pension a.nd profit-sharing plans
are exempt from coverage under the Securities Act of
1933 ... unless the plan is a voluntary contributory pension
plan and invests in the securities of the employer company
an amount greater than that paid into the plan by the
employer.") (emphasis added). As far as we a.re aware, at
no time before this case arose did the SEC intimate that the
antifraud provisions of the Securities Acts nevertheless
applied to noncontributory pension plans.
particuhr tranRartion, not the form of regulation that might be applied
to that transaction. Cf. United Ilousing Foundation, Inc. v. Forman, 421
U. S. 838, 848-850 (1975). See also n. 20, supra. We note that with
respect to statutory mergers, the area where the SEC originally developed
its theory about the bifurratcd definition of a sale, the SEC since has
abandoned its position nnd now treats such transactions as entailing a
"sale" for all purposes of the Securities Act. See 17 CFR § 230.145.

77-753 & 77- 754-0PINION
18

TEAMSTERS v. DANIEL

IV
If any further evidence were needed to demonstrate that
pension plans of the type involved are not subject to the
Securities Acts, the enactment of ERISA in 1974 would put
the matter to rest. Unlike the Securities Acts, ERISA deals
expressly and in detail with pension plans. ERISA requires
pension plans to disclose specified information to employees
in a specified manner, see 29 U. S. C. §§ 1021-1030, in contrast to the indefinite and uncertain disclosure obligations
imposed by the antifraud provisions of the Securities Acts,
see Santa Fe Industries, Inc. v. Green, 430 U. S. 462, 474-477
(1977); TSC Industries, Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U. S.
438 (1976). Further, ERISA regulates the substantive terms
of pension plans, setting standards for plan funding and limits
on the eligibility requirements an employee must meet. For
example, with respect to the underlying issue in this casewhether respondent served long enough to receive a pension§ 203 (a) of ERISA, 29 U.S. C. § 1053 (a) , now sets the minimum level of benefits an employee must receive after accruing
specified years of service, and § 203 (b) , 29 U. S. C. § 1053
(b), governs continuous service requirements. Thus if Daniel
had retired after § 1053 took effect, the Fund would have been
required to pay him at least a partial pension. The Securities Acts, on the other hand, do not purport to set the substantive terms of financial transactions.
The existence of this comprehensive legislation governing
the use and terms of empioyee pension pians severely undercuts all arguments for extending the Securities Acts to noncontributory, compulsory pension plans. Congress believed
that it was filling a regulatory void when it enacted ERISA , a
belief which the SEC actively encouraged. Not only is the
extension of the Securities Acts by the court below unsupported by the language and history of those Acts, but in light
of ERISA it serves no gen eral purpose. See Califano v.
Sanders, 430 U. S. 99, 104-107 (1977). Cf. Boys Markets,
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Inc. v. Retail Clerks Union, 398 U.S. 235, 250 (1970). "Whatever benefits employees might derive from the effect of the
Securities Acts are now provided in more definite form
through ERISA.

v

We hold that the Securities Acts do not apply to a noncontributory, compulsory pension plan. Because the first two
counts of respondent's complaint do not provide grounds for
relief in federal court, the District Court should have granted
~he motion to dismiss the~. The judgment below is therefore
~eversed.
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This case presents the question whether a noncontributory.,
compulsory pension plan constitutes a "security" within the
meaning of the Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 (Securities Acts) .

I
In 1954 multiemployer collective bargaining between Local
705 of the International Brotherhood of Tean1sters, Chauffeurs , Warehousemen , and Helpers of America and Chicago
trucking firms produced a pension plan for employees represented by the Local. The plan was compulsory and noncontributory. Employees had no choice as to particjpation
in the pian, and did not have the option of demanding that

.
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tl1e employer's contribution be paid directly to them as a
substitute for pension eligibility. The employees paid nothing
to the plan themselvE'S. 1
The collective-bargaining a.greeme11t initially set employer
contributions to the Pension Trust Fund at $2 a week for each
man-week of covered employment. 2 The Board of Trustees
of the Fund. a body composed of an equal number of employer
and unio11 representatives, was given sole authority to set the
level of benefits but had no control over the amount of
requirrd employer contributions. Initially, eligible employees
received $75 a month in benefits upon retirement. Subsequent collective-bargaining agrrements called for' greate•·
employer contributions. which iu tum led to higher benefit
payments for retirers. At the time respondent brought suit,
employers pontributed $21.50 per employee mau-week and
pension payments ranged from $425 to $525 a month depending on age at retirement. 3 In order to receive a pension an
employee was required to have 20 yea.rs of contilluous service,
including time worked before the start of the plan.
The meaning of "continuous sel'vice" is at the center of
this dispute. Respondent began working as a truck driver
'-For examplP~ of other noneonf rihutory, compnlsor~· pC'n~ion plans,
see Allied Struct·u1'al Bteel f'o . v. Spannaus, 438 U. S. - , (1978);
Malone v. White Motor Corp., -K~5 U. S. -!n7, 500-.501 (19711) ; Alabama
Power f'o v. Davis. 4:H U . S. 51\1, 590 ( Hl'77) .
2 Coni ribution:,; werP t,i ed to the nnmlwr of C'mplo~·pes ratlwr than the
mnount oJ work performed. For exampl<', pa.ymrnts had to hP made even
for week~ wlwre an rrnployee was on kavo of ahsC'ncr>, di,;abled, or working for rmly a fra.etion of t.Jw wef'k. Conver~ely, employers did not ha.ve
to increa;;e t lwir contribution for Wf>Pb in which a.n <'tnplo~·('p worked
overtime or on a. holida~·. Tru:,;t AgreemPnt, Art. 3, § 1, A pp. 6:3a,.
3 HPcanse t.hP Fund made thfl samf' pa.yments to Pach <'mpluy<'e who
qualified for a. pen~ion and rPtin•d at the same age, ratlwr than establishing nn inchv1dual account for each employee t.wd to the amount of
employM contribution:,; attributable to hiH JWriod of servirC', the plan
prov1dr>d a. "defined bPnefit." See 20 U . S, C. § 1002 (35); Ala.bamq
Po'tt.'r·r ( 'o v. Dav·is, stttJra., a.t 593 n . 18.

,.
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in the Chieago area in 1950, and joined Local 705 the following year. When the plan first went into effect, respondent
automatically received 5 years credit toward the 20-year
service requirement because of his earlier work experience.
He retired in 1973 and applied to the plan's administrator for
a pension. The administrator determined that respondent
was ineligible because of a brea.k in service between December
1960, and July 1961.4 Respondent appealed the decision to
the trustees, who affirmed. Respondent then asked the
trustees to waive the continuous servicP rule as it applied to
him. After the trustees refused to waive the rule, respondent
brought suit in federal court against the International union
(Teamsters), Local 705 (Local), and Louis Feick, a trustee of
the fulld .
Respondent's complaint alleged that the Teamsters, the
Local, and Peick misrepresented and omitted to state matet·ial
facts with respect to the value of a covered employee's interest
in the pension plan. Count I of the complaint charged that
these misstatements and omissions constituted a fraud in connection with the sale of a security in violation of § 10 (b) of
the Securities E}!:change Act of 1934, 48 Stat. 891, 15 U. S. C.
§ 78j (b). and the Securities and Exchange Commission's Rule
10b-5, 17 CFR § 240.10b-5. Count II charged that the same
conduct amounted to a violation of § 17 (a) of the Securities
Act of 1933, 48 Stat. 84. 15 U. S. C. § 77q. Other counts
alleged violations of various labor law and common-law duties.''
4 Daniel was lnid off from Dr.cember 1960, until April 1901.
In addition, no contributions were paid 011 hi,; behalf between April and .Tuly
1961, brcau::;e of embezzlrment by his ('lllployc;r's bookkePper. During
this ~:;even-month period respondmt could have pn-servPd his eligibility
by ma.king thr. contributions him~elf, but. he failed to do so.
5 Count III charged tlw TPam::;ter~ and the Local with violating their
duty of fair representation undPr § 9 (a.) of the N a.tiona.L L1bor Relations
Act, 29 U . S. C. § 159 (a), and Count V (later amended as Count VI)
charged the Teamsters, the Local, Peick and all othrr TPam::;ters pension
t,md t rustee::> with vio!Ming the.ir obligations under § 302 (c) (5) (()f t1le

,,
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Respondent sought to proceed on behalf of all prospective
beneficiaries of Teamsters pE>nsion plans and against all Teamsters pension funds."
The petitioners moved to dismiss the first two counts of the
complaint on the ground that respondent had no cause of
action under the Securities or Securities Exchange Acts. The
District Court denied the motion. 410 F. Supp. 541 (ND Ill.
1976). It held that respondent's iuterest in the Pension Fund
constituted a security within the meaning of § 2 ( 1) of the
Securities Act, 15 U.S. C. §77b(1), and §3(a.)(l0) of the
Securities Exchange Act, 15 U. S. C. § 78c (a)(l0), 7 because
the plan created an "investment contract" as that term had
been interpreted in SEC v. W. J. Howey Co., 328 U. S. 293
(1946). It also determined that there had been a "sale" of
this interest to respondent within the meaning of § 2 (3) of
the Securities Act, 15 U. S. C. § 77b (3), and § 3 (a) (14) of
the Securities Exchange Act, 15 U. S. C. § 78c (a) (14).R It
National Labor Relations Ac1 , 29 U. S. G. § 186 (c)(5) . Count IV
accused all defendants of common-htw fraud and deceit.
6 As of the time of appeal to fhe Seventh Circuit the District Court had
not yet ruled on any class c·ertification i::;sues.
7 See;t.ion 2 (1) of the Securities Act defines a "security" as
" any note, stock, tre.a smy st.ock, bond, debt>nture, rvidence of indebtedness,
certificate of interr~t or pa.rtieipation in any profit-sharing ngreement,
collateral-trust. certificate, prrorganization certificate or subscription, transferable sharP, investment contract, voting-trust certificate, certificate of
deposit for a I!Pcurity, fractional undivided interetit in oil , gas, or other
mineral rights, or, in general, any interest or instrument commonly known
as :=t 'security,' or any certificate of interest or participa.tion iu, temporary
or interim certificate for, rect>ipt for, gua.rantee of, or warrant or right to
~ubscribt> to or purchase, any of the foregoing."
The defiuit10n of a "security" in § 3 (a) (10) of the Securitirs Exchange
Act is virw:dly idrntical and, for the Jmrpc;;es of this case, the coverage
vf 1hr two Acts ma.y be regarded Hti the same. United Hou8i11(J Founda:tum. inc . v. /lorman, 421 U. S. 837, 847 n. 12 ( 1975); 'l'chetepnin v.
Rnight. :389 lJ. S. a:~2, 342 (1967).
8 Section 2 (3) of the Securitit>s Act providr.s, in pertinrnt part , tha.t
·" Lt]he term 'sale' or 'st>ll' shall inch1d~ E'very con.t.ruct of sale or dispo::~ition
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believed respondent voluntarily gave value for his interest in
the plan, because he had voted on collective-bargaining agreements that chose employer contributions to the Fund i11stead
of other wages or benefits.
The motion to dismiss was certified for appeal pursuant to
28 U. S. C. § 1292 (b), and the Court of Appeals for the
Seventh Circuit affirmed. 561 F. 2d 1223 (1977). Relying
on its perception of the economic realities of pension plans
and various actions of Congress and the SEC with respect to
such plans. the court ruled that respondent's interest in the
Pension Fuud was a "security." According to the court. a
"sale" took place either when respondent ratified a collectiveba.rgaining agreement embodying the Fund or when he
accepted or retaiued covered employment instead of seekiug
other work. 0 The Court did not believe the subsequent
rnactment of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act
of 1974 (ERISA), 88 Stat. 832. 29 U. S. C. § 1001 et seq.,
affected the application of the Securities Acts to pension plans,
as the requirements and purposes of ERISA were perceived to
be different from those of the Securities Acts. 10 We granted
certiorari, 434 U.S. 1061 (1978), and now reverse.
of a securit~· or iuteretit in a secunty, for value." Section :1 (a) (14) o(
the Sccurit.ies Exchange Act stateH that "Lt]lw terms 'sale' and 'sell' each
include any contract to sell or ot.hrrwitic disposr of." Although the latter
definition dors not rrfrr rxpm.,;,sly to a dispotiition for val·ue. the court
below did not decide whet her the Sfcurities Excha.nge Act nevertheless
impliedly incorporated the Securities Act drfinit.ion, cf. n. 9, S'U1Jra, as irr
its view Daniel did givH v:-due for his interest in the pen~ion plan. In
light of om disposition of the qur~tion whether respondent's interest wasa "security," we need not decide whether the meaning of "sale" under the
Securitie:; Exrhange Act is any different from its meaning under the
Securities A<'l
9 The Court of Appeals and the District Court also held that § 17 (a.)
provides private parties with an implied cause of action for damages. In
light of our dispm;ition of this case, we express no viPws on this issue.
10
H(:'spondent. did not have any cause of action undrr EHISA itself, m:;;
tha1t Aet t,ook efl.f:>ct; after he had retired,

'.
'•
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II
"The starting point in every cas<' involving the constl'uction of a statute is the lauguage itself." Blue (:hip Stamps v.
Manor Drug Stores, 421 U. R. 723, 756 (1975) (Pow~~LL, J.,
concurring); see Ernst & Ernst v. H ochfelder, 425 U. S. 185,
197, 199, and n. H) (1976). In spite of the substantial use
of employee pension plans at the time they were enacted,
neither § 2 (1) of the Securities Act nor § 3 (a) (10) of the
Securities Exchange Act, which define the term "security" in
considemble detail and with numerous examples, refers to
peusiou plans of any type. Acknowledging this omission in
the statutes, responde11t contends that an employee's interest
in a pension plan is an "investment contract," an instrument
which is included in the statutory definitions of a secmity.ll
To determine whether a particular financial relationship
constitutes an investment contract, " [ t Jhe test is whether the
scheme involves an investment of money in a common enterprise with profits to come solely from the efforts of others."
Howey, supra, at 301. This test is to be applied in light of
"the substance-the economic realities of the transactionrather than the names that may have been employed by the
parties." United Housing Corp. v. Forman, 421 U. S. 837,
851-852 (1975). Accord, 'I'cherepnin v. Knight, 389 U. S.
332, 336 (1967); Howey, supra, at 298. Cf. SEC v. Va.riable
11

Daniel also argm>s that his int('I'Pi-it con:stitntrs a "cPrtificai.o of interest

in or participation in a profit-sha.riug agreemPHL" Tlw court below did
not comnder thi::; c.lnim, a;; Daniel had not :seriou~ly prrl:lsed the argument
and the dispositjon of the " invrsiment eoutraet" is~nr mad<' i1 mweccssa.ry
to decirl<' t.be que<;tion. 561 F . 2d 122;{, 12:~0 n. 15 (Hl77). Similarly,
Daniel here does not Sl•rious!y contend that a "certificate of interest
in . . . a profit-sharing agreemeut." has any broader meaning under the
Securitie::; Aets than an "inve~tnwnt; contract." In For-man. supra, we
ob~rrved that the Howey tPst, which has lwen tli:led to determine the
presence of an inve~tment contract, "rmbodie:; ·the f'Ssential att.ributes
that mn through all oJ the Court's deci:;io.ul" dd1ning a security." 421
11 •. s ' "~ 852,.,
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Annuity Life Ins. Co., 359 U. S. 65, 80 (1959) (BRENNAN, J.,
concurring) ("[O]ne must apply a test in terms of the
purposes of the Federal Acts ... ',). Looking separately at
each element of the Howey test, it is apparent that an
employee's participation in a noncontributory, compulsory
pension plan such as the Teamsters' does not comport with
the commonly held understanding of an investment contract.
A. Investment of Money

An emplvyee who participates in a noncontributory, compulsory pension plan by definition makes no payme11t into the
pensio11 fund. He only accepts employment, one of the con~
ditions of which is eligibility for a possible benefit on retiremeut. Daniel contends. however, that he has "in vested" in
the Pension Fund by permitting part of his compensation
from his employer to takf. the form of a deferred pension
benefit. By a.llowing his employer to pay mone,y into the
Fund, and by contributing his labor to his employer· in return
for these payments, Daniel asserts he has made the kind of
investment which the Securities Acts were intended to
regulate.
In order to determine whether respondent invested in the
Fund by accepting and remaining in covered employment, it
is necessary to look at the entire transaction through which
he obtained a chance t6 receive pension benefits. In every
decision of this Court recognizi11g the presence of a "security"
under the Securities Acts, the person found to have been an
investor chose to give up a specific consideration i11 return for
a separable financial interest with the characteristics of a
security. See 1'cherpnin, supra (money paid for bank capital
stock); SE'C v. United Benefit Life Ins. Co., 387 U. S. 202
(1\Jo7) (portiou of premium paid for variable component of
mixed variable and fixed annuity 'contract); Variable An.nuity
Life Ins. Co., supra (premium paid for variable annuity con~
tract) ~ Ho11!1e:rJ, wpra (money paid for purchase, maih1.teuance,
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and harvesting of orange grove); SEC v. C. M. Joiner Leasing
Co1·p., 320 U. S. 344 (1943) (mo11ey paid for Janel and oil
exploration). Even in those cases where the interest acquired had intermingled security aud nonsecurity aspects, the
interest obtained had "to a very substantial degree elements
of investment co11tracts . . . ." 11ariable A.nnuity Life Ins.
Co., supra, at 91 (BRENNAN, J., concurring). In every case
the purchaser gave up somr tangible and definable consideration in returu for an interest that had substantially the
characteristics of a 'Security.
In a pension plan such as this one, by contrast. the pmported
investment is a relatively insignificant part of an pmployee's
total and indivisible compensation package. No portion of
an employee's compensa,tio11 other than the potentia] pension
benefits has any of the characteristics of a security. yet these
noninvestment interests cannot be segregated from the possiblE:' pension benefits. Only in the most abstract sensf' may
it be said that an employee "exchanges" some portion of his
labor in retmn for these possible benefits. ~ He surrenders
his labor as a whole. and in return receives a compensation
package that is substantially devoid of aspects resembling a
security. His decision to accept and retain covered employment must have only all extremely attenuated relationship, if
any, to perceived investment possibilities of a future pension.
Looking at the economic realities, it seems clear that an
employee is selling his labor to obtain a livelihood, not making
a.n investment for the future.
Respondent also argues that employer constributions on
his behalf constituted his investment into the Fund. But it
is iuaccuratr to describe these payments as having been "on
behalf'' of a11y employee. The trust agreemeiJt used employee man-weeks as a convenient way to measure an employ1

.,~

'W<' need not. decide herr whetlJPr a.

person'~

·'inver;tment," in order to

mrrt. tlw <irfinition of an illn'stmcnt cont.raet., muHt f<tkc the form of cash

only rnther than of goods and

.

'

Hordcr~.

Seo Forznun , snpra, nt 852 n. 16•
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er's owrall obligation to the FumL not as a means of measurillg the employer's obligation to any particular employee.
Indeed, therr was no fixed relationship bE:' tween contributions
to the Fund and an emploype's potPntial benefits. A pension
plan with "fixed benefits," such as tlw Local's, does not tie a
qualifying employee's benefits to the time he has worked.
See n. 3, supra. One who has engaged in covered employment for 20 yc>ars will receiv<' the same benefits as a person
who has worked for 40. even though the latter has worked
twice as long and induced a substa.11tially largN employer
contributio11.t'1 Agaill, it ignorrs the economic realities to
equate employer contributions with an j n VC'stmcnt by the
employee.

B. Expectat'ion of Profits From A Commo11 Euterpr·ise
As we observed in Forman, tlH' cctouchstone" of the Howey
test "is the prE'seiJCC of an investment in a common venture
premised on a reasonable expectation of profits to be deriveJ
from the entrE>peneurial or managerial efforts of others." 421
U. S., at 852. The Court of Appeals believed that Daniel's
rxpectatio11 of profit derived from the Fund's successful management and investment of its assets. To thr extent pension
benefits exceeded employer contributions and depended on
rarnings from the assets. it was thought th('y contained a
profit <>h•mf'nt. The Fund's trustees provided the mauagerial
efforts which produced this profit elemeut.
As in otlwr parts of its analysis, the court below found an
expectation of profit in the pension plan only by focusing on
one of its lPss impm·taut aspects to the exclusion of its more
sig11ificant clem<:'nts. It is true that the Fund, like other
holders of large assets, depends to some extent on earniugs

-

---

1( i

la tTndf\r flu> f<•rms of th0 TJorn l '~ pension plan, for l'Xumplr, ~
recPI.vf'd <·Jwlit l'or t.lw fi\'l' ~·par,; h<· worked lwfon' the Fund was erca.ted,
even thou~h no cmployPr <'Ontrih!lt ions had been made during tl1at
period.

""r
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from its assets. In the case of a pension fund, however, a
far larger portion of its income comes from t>mployer contributions, a source in no way dependent on the efforts of the
Fund's managers. The Local 705 Fund, for example, earned
a total of $31 million through investment of its assets between
February 1955, and January 1977. Duri11g this same period
employer contributions totaled $153 million. 14 Not only does
the greater share of a pension plan's income ordinarily come
from new contributions. but unlike nwst entrepeneurs who
manage other people's mo11ey, a plan usually can count on
increased employer contributions. over which the plan itself
has no control. to cover shortfalls iu earnings. 1r'
The importance of asset earuings in relation to the other
benefits received from employment is diminished further by
the fact that where a pla.n has substantial preconditions to
vesting, the principal barrier to an individual employee's
realization of pension benefits is not thP financial health of
the Fund. Rather. it is his ow11 ability to meet the Fund's
eligibility requiremeuts. Thus. even if it were proper to
describe the benefits as a "profit" returned ou some hypothetical investment by the employee, this profit would depend
primarily on the employee's efforts to meet the vestiug
requiremeuts. rather thau tbe Fund's investment success. 1 n
When viewed in light of the total compensation package an
employee must receive in order to be eligible for pension benefits, it becomes clear that the possibility of participating in a
plan's asset earnings "is far too speculative and insubstantia1
to bring the entire transactiou within the Securities Acts,"
F'omuw, supm, at 856.
11
In acldnton , the Fund I'(•rciVPd $7,500,000 from smallrr p<'n8ion funds
with whieh it ml·rp;f>ll over thr ~'('ar:;.
15 S('t> :\otr. Tht> Application of thE> Antifraud Provision~ of the Secmities
Lnw~:~ to Compulsory, '\' ontontributury Prn!;iou Plan,; Aftrr Daniel v.
Tntl'rnational Brotherhood of 'J'eam~ters, 64 Va. L. R<•v. :~05, :n5 (197R).
11
' See Note, Inten'st. in Pen::<iun Plans as Securitirs: Daniel v. Intl'ma.
rf..ional Brotherhood of 'l'eam.~ters, 78 Cohun. L. Rev . 184, 201 (1978) .

'17-153 & 'T'i'-754-0PINION
'rEAMSTEHS v. DANIEL

1l

III
The court helow l>elieved that its construction of the tet·m
was compelled not only by the perceived resemblance of a pe11sion plan to an investme11t contract. but by
various actions of Congress and the SEC's intf'rprt>tation of
the Recurities Acts. In rf'aching this conclusion. the court
gave great weight to thr REC's f'xpla.natioll of these events,
an explanatiou which for the most part the REC repeats here.
Our own review of the recor<.l leads us to believe that this
reliance 011 the REC's interpretation of these legislative and
administrative actions was not justified.
1'secul'ity"

A. Actions of Congress
The SEC' in its amicus curiae brief refers to sevPm1 actions
of Congress said to evidence an understanding that pension
plans are securities. A close look at each installer, however,
rewals only that Congress might havP beliewd cC'rtain kinds
of pension plans. radically cliffrt·ent from the one at issue here,
came within the coverage of the Securities Acts. There is no
evidence that Congress at any time thought ttoncontrihutory
plans similar to the 011e before us were suhject to federal regulation as securities.
The first action cited was the rejection by Congress in 1934
of an amendment to the Securities Act that would have
exempted employee stock investmrnt and stock option plans
from the Act's registration requireme11ts. 1 ; The amendment
passed thr Senate but was rlimiqatecl in cottferencC'. The
legislative history of the defC'atecl proposal indicates it was
1 7 Tlw iunmdnwnt would hn\'C :~dd<·d the following langna~~:r to § 4 (1)
·of t hr fk<'llrlt I<'~ .\t•t :
" AH ll::<l'd m rhi,.( paragra-ph, 1lw I rnn ' puiJiie offrring' ~ha II not be

dP<'lllPd to inelndr au offrring mad<• ~olt·l~· to rmplo~ ·P<~~ b.'· :111 i:<.~IIPI' or by
ih· aflill:ttr~ m <·onn<•<·tion with a bona fidt> plan for tiH' p:t~ · uwnt of rxtra
compPu ~ation or Htoek inw~fllH'lJt, plan for thr PX<"in::<ivP hmefii of such
<:•mployt'('' ·" 7 Cong. Rcc . R708 (1934) .
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intended to cover plans under which employees contributed
their own funds to a segregated investment account on which
a return was realized. See H. R. Rep. No. 1838, 73d Cong.,
2d Sess., 41 (1934); Hearings before the House Committee on
Interstate aud Foreign Commerce on Proposed Anwndments
to the Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act
of 1934, 77th Cong., 1st Sess., 895-896 (1941). In rejecting the
amendment, Congress revPaled a concem that certain interests
havittg thE> characteristics of a security not be excluded from
Securities t\ct protectiou simply because investors realized
their return in the form of retirement benefits. At no time,
however. did Collgress indicate that pension benefits in and
of themselves gave a transaction the characteristics of a
security.
The SEC also relies on a 1970 ame\1dment of the Securities
Act which extended § 3's exernption from registration to
include "any interest or participation in a single or collective
trust fund maintained by a bank ... which interest or participation is issued in connection with (A) a stock bonus,
pension, or profit-sharing pla11 which meets the requirements
for qualification under section 401 of title 26. . . . ." § 3 (a)
(2) of the Securities Act. as amended, 84 Stat. 1434, 1498,
15 U. S. C. § 77c (a) (2). It argues that in creating a registration exemption, the amendment ma11ifested Congress'
understanding that the interests covered by the amendment
otherwise were subject to the Recurities Acts. 18 It interprets
"interest or participation in a single ... trust fuud ... issued
in cmmection with .. . a stock bonus, pensiou, or profitsharing plan" as referring to a prospective beneficiary's inter1
~ &c·tion 17 ((') of the Sermiti<'8 Art, 15 U.S. C. § 77q (c) , nnd § 10 (b)
of the S<>cnrities Exehang<> Act, 15 U. S. C. § i~.i (b) (when read with
§§:) (<t)(lO) and (12) of that. Act), indic<Lte that the antifraud provisions
of the f<':-ip<·rtive Act,; rontinu(' to apply to intPm-.i.-s that come within the
exemption>l crea,t<>d by § 3 (n) (2) of tho Scruritie~ Act and § 3 (Ll) (12) of
t.hll Re<·qritie.s Exchange Act.
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-est in a pension fund. But this construction of the 1970
amendm.e nt ignores that measure's central purpose, which was
to relieve bauks and insurance companies of certain registratration obligations. The amendment rE>cognized only that a
pension plan had ccan interest or participation" ill the fund in
which its assets were held. not that prospective beneficiaries
of a plan had any interest in either the plan's bankmaintained assets or the plan itself.tu
B. SEC Interpretat·ion
rrhr court below believed. and it now is argued to us, that
almost from its inception the SEC has regarded pension plans
as falling within the scope of the Securities Acts. We are
asked to defer to what is seen as a. longstanding interpreta.19 Srfl S. Rep. No. 91-184, p. 27 (1969): Hrming;:; brforf' tllf' Smato
Banking ttnd Cunen<"y CommittPP on 1\lnt.ual Fund Legislation of 1907,
'90th Cong., 1st. Srsfl., pt. III, at 1:141-1842 (1967); Mundlwim & Hender"on,
Applicability of the Federal Secmiti<'8 Law~ to PPnsion and l'rofit-Sba.ring
Plaus, 29 L. & Contemp. Probs. 7H5, ~19-8:fi (Hl64): Saxon & Miller,
Common Tm.;t. Fund:;, 53 Geo. L. J. 094 ( 19()5). The SEC a.rgues that
the addition b~· the Hems~' of the language '·sing1e or" brfore "common
tru~t fund" imlicatecl an intent to <'over the uutkrlying plan~ that invested
in bank-maintnined fund:-~. The legi~httivc hi:storr, howrver, indieatrs tl1a:t
the cha.ng<· was mPa.nt only to eliminc~te the nr~ative inferenre sugge:;ted
by the unrevi~ed lan~1tage tha.t bank~ would have to l'Pgi::;t('r the segregated
inv<·~tnwnL funds they aclmini:;tered for partielllilr pla.n:s. Ber·ause the
provi:;ion a,; n whole dealt. only with 1he rela.t ionship bPtween a plan and
its bank, the revision did not affPc1 t.he regi:;tmtion status of the underlying ]Wnsion piau. See 116 Coug. H<-w. :~;32R7 ( H170). This WHH consist,..
ent with Uw SEC'~ interpretation of Hw provisi011. Hearing;;, supra, at
l32G. Tho snb:sefJuent :tcldit.ion of :motlu:w provi~ion exrept.ing from the
exemptiou funds " nnc!Pr whir.h an amount. in exoe,;;~ of the rmployer's
contribution iK allocilt,cd to the pmcha.-:e of secnritir,; . . . issued by the
rmplo~'I'T or h~ · an~r rompa.ny di1wt !~· or indirertl~r eOJ1t.rolling, eon trolled
h~r or nnder common control with t.Jw employ~·r" appear~ to luwe been
~imply :1.11 additionaJ ~aJeguarcl to ronfinn the SEC'" authority to require
~ ueh plu.11,;, a.ncl only :such p!n.n:s, 1o regi~ter. See H. R. C'ou r. Re,p. No.

m-w:n, p.

31 {1970).
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tion of these statutes by the agency responsiblf' for their
administration. But there are limits. grounded in tlw language, pmpose aud history of tlw particular statute, on how
far au agency properly may go in its interpretative role.
Although these limits are not always easy to discern, it is
clear hPre that the SEC''s position is neither longstandiug nor
even ar12:uably within the outer limits of its authority to illterpret these Acts.~ 0
As we have demonstrated above. the type of pension plan
at issue in this case bears no resemblance to thr kind of financial interests the Securities Aets were design(•d to regulate.
Further, the SEC''s present position is flatly con tradictcd by
its past actions. r ntil the instant litigation arose, the public
record t'<'veals no evidmiCe that the SEC had ever considered
the St>curities Acts to be applicable to noncontributory pPllsion plans. Jn 1941, the SEC first articulated the position
that voluntary, contributory plans had investment characteristics that rendered them "securities" under the Acts. At the
~u It. ts a commonplarP in onr .imi~prudenee that nn administrative
agency's eon~istrnt ., loug~tanding int(•rpretation of th<' :sta.tutt• undt•r which
it operntt'l:! is t•ntit led to cou:sidC'rahle weight. United State:s v. National
Assn. of 8ecunties Dealers. -t22 P. R. n94-, 719 (1975); Saxbt• v. Bustos,
419 F. s . n5, 74 (HJ74); l11Vt:'l$tiiii!Jtt eo. ]m;titute \'. C'Oirlfl, 401 U. s.
617, 620-627 (1971); ( 'doll , .. Tallman. :180 1' . S. 1. Hi (Hln5). This
defer<>uce iR a product hot h of an a wareup,.:s of t hr pmd-iea.l rxpertise
which an ageney normal!~· dPvrlops, and of a williugnt>,.:s to :wrord some
mPasur!' of flexibility to such an ageney as 1t C'n<•otmter,.: new and unforeseen problems over tinw. But thi,; dPfNC'Ilr<' I~< eonstrainP<l b~· om obligation to honor the clt•ar mpauing of a ,.:latutP, a::: rrvP:tlc•(t' hy it;; lnngua.ge,
purpo.;;e and lnstor~·. On a munber of occ.1.sion,; in n·cent ~·rar::: thi:-< Court
ha:i found tt 111'CPs~trr to rejeet t.he SEC'~ int~'rpretation of variou;; provisiOn,; of the S<•euntie>< Art,.:. Sc·e :::)E(' \'. 8loan . .Jo:{() { T. 8. 10:~, 117-119
(1H7:--); P1per ''· ('hris-Craft lndu~>trit>s, Inc ., 4:10 r. 8. 1, 41 n. 27 (Hl77);
Enl8t l~· /l,'mst v. llochfelder, 4:25 ll. S. li\5, 212-:214 (197fl): Forman,
1$Upra. at H5~ 11 . 25; Blue Chip Staw ps v . .'Han or Druu 8tores. -!:21 U. S.
723, 75\l u. 4 (1975) (Pow~~LL, .1., <·onemring): Reliance Rfectric Co. v.
Emerson E'l~.:ctric Co. , 40-1- F . S. ·:1:18, 425-427 (197.2)..
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same time, however, the SEC recognized that noncontributory
plans were lJOt covered by the Securities Acts because such
plans did not involve a "sale" withjn the meaning of the
statutes. Opinions of Assistant General Counsel, [1941-1944
Transfer Binder] CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. ,-[ 75,195 (1941);
Hearings before the House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Com~nerce on Proposed Amendments to the Securities
Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 77th
Cong., 1st Sess., 895, 896-897 (1941) (testimony of Connnissioner Purcell). 21
In an attempt to recqncile these interpretations of the
Securities Acts with its present stand, the SEC now augments
its past position with two additional propositions. First, it
is argued. noncontributory plans are "securities" even where
a "sale" is uot involved. Second, the previous concession that
noncontributory plans do not involve a "sale" was meant to
apply only to the registration and reporting requirements of
the Securities Acts; for purposes of the antifraud provisions,
a "sale" is involved. As for the first proposition, we observe
that none of the SEC opinicms, reports, or testimony cited to
us address the question. As for the second, the record is
SubsequE>ut lo 1941, the SEC made no fmther efforts to regulate E>ven
contributory, volunta.~· penl'1ion plans except wlwre the employees' contributions were inve::;ted in thP emplo~7 er's ;,;eruritie.s. Cf. 11 . 21, supra. It
also continued to dio:<wow any authority to regulate noncontributory,
eompnl;;ory plan;,:. See Letter from A:,;:;istant Din•etor, Divi~:>ion of Corpomto .Finance, May 12, 195:~, CCH FE>d . SE>c. L. Rep. 2105.51; Letter
from Chif'f Counsel, Division of Corporate Finanee, Augu;;t 1, 1962, CCH
Fed. Sec. L. Rep. 2105.52; Hectrings before thf) Senate Banking and
CurrPncy Conunittee on Mutual Fund Legisla.tion of 1967, 90th Cong., 1st
Sess., 13:26 (Hl(17) ; 1 L. Lo::;::~, Srcurities Regula.tion, 510-511 (1st ed.
1961) ; 4 id .. at. 2553-2554 (2d f'd. 195!1); Hyde, Employ•fe Stock Plans
a.nd tlH' St'curitw:-; Act. of 1933, 15 W. Res. L. Hev. 75, 85 (1954);
Mundheim & H(•ndPrson, Applicability of the Federal Securitiei:l Laws to
Pension nud Profit-Sharing .Plan:;, 2H L. & Contemp. Prob~. 795, 809-811
(1904) ; Not.e, Pension Plans a:> Securitie:.;, 96 U. J>a. L. Rev . 549, 549-551
fl948).
21

,r

,r
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unambiguously to the contrary.~~ Both i11 its 1041 statements
and n'peateclly sinee then. tlw SEC has drclared that. its "no
sale" positio11 applied to the Securities Acts as a "·holt~. See
Opinio11 of .\ssistant Ge11eral Counsel, [ 1941-1044 Transfer
Binder 1 CCH Fed. f-icc. L. Rt>p. 1T 75,105, at 75.387 ( 1041);
Heariugs before the House Committee on Interstate ami Foreign Commerce on Proposed Amendments to the Securities Act
of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1034. 77th C'_,ong ..
1st Sess .. 888, 806-897 (HJ41); Institutional lnvf'stor , Study
Report of tlw Securities and Exchm1ge Commission. H. R.
Doc. ~o. 02-64, p. 096 (Hl71) ("fT]he Securities Act does not
apply ... "); Hearings on Wt'lfa.re and Pension PlallS Investigatiotl before the Subcommittc'e on Welfare and Pension
·~ 2

Wr doubt a,., a g('Jl<'l'almattPI' wlwth<'l' ilw d<'finition~ of the• Sc·curities
Acis mn~· be n·ad to p<'nnit a ;.cinglt· t l'a,n~:wt .ion to ron:;titnf(' :1 "sale" for
one Jllii'J)08Cn of the S<'('llriti(•s Aet b11! 11ot. othPr~. On occasion the SEC
Ita.~ rontl'nded 1ha.t bt•(·m•,;<• § 2 of the SreuritiPf' Aet ami § 3 of the
SPcurilit•,; Exrlwng;c Art. appl~· tlw qu:dif\in~J: phra,;t• "unlr:-<;; thn context
otherwi><(' r·equin·~" to the Arts' g<•urral dPfinitionH, it i~-: pPrmi;;.,;ihle .to
rrgn.rrl a p<lt'!.ieiJlar transaction,: a,; iuvolviu~ n o:alr or· not d('J>Pnding on
tho form of rr~J;uhtion iuvolv<'<1. Sel' Schill ner v. If. Vnuolm C'la.rk (~· Co.,
la4 F. :2d ~7.rs, 87R (CA2 19·4:~); l L. Lo~H, S<'euritie~ Hrgulntim1 524-528
(1st. <·d. 19111); 4 id .. at, 2562-2565 (2d rd. Hlf\~l). Hut tJw SEC has not
r.Jwa~· K t.nk('ll f.lus pmii1ion: lu Hl.J.a if ,;uhmit.trd an amicus IH'id in the
Nin1h Circuit arguing to tlw ('Ontrar~· , a.nd it dul not hrgin to r·ely on its
· " rC'gulafor~ · euntPxt.'' tlwory mrt.il 1951. 1 L. Loss, supra, nf, 524 n. 211;
Colwn, Hulo 1:3:3 of f lw SrcuritiPH Excha.ng<' Commi,;sion, l.J. Hecord of
N . Y. C'. B. A. 1G2, W-!-Hl5 (1959). Thi:.; Court noted tlw doc·trino but
exprr:s,;ly (·ho,;n not. to adopt. it in ,'l,fi}(' ,., N(f.tionul 8ec·uritil:'8. Inc .. 393
U. S. 45:~, +H5-.J.G(i (HIH9) . H :-<('('111H mon• lik(•ly tlmt the ·'eontext"
referred Lo in t.hP Art"' dcfini1mn;1.1 :<r('I,Jons is the ceonomi(· context of a
partirula.r trr\.ll~aetioll, .not the form of rrgulation Om! might be applied
to t ha1, t mn::;artion. Cf. Forrna:n. S'Upra. a.t 84R-R50. Src also n. 20,
xupm . We nato that with l'f';;j)Prt to ~tatu1ory ITH'rgrrs, 1lw arPa whrrc
thn SEC ongiually drvrloprd i1.~ throry ahout. the bifun·afPd dt>finition of
a ~alt> , ilw SEC :<im•p has nbandmwd ih position ami now trra.i,; ~urh
· rnn~netions w; entailing a "::;ale'' for all pnrpone::; of the S(•curitiPs Act.
81:<' 17 C FR § 230.145,
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·Funds of th<• Rf'nat<• Lahor and Puhli<' Wc•lfarP CornmittN•,
R4th ('oug., 1st Ress .. !l4:{-!J4H (1\lf>,)). Cor1gn•ss aetf'd on this
understanding wlwr1 it proec•ecled to develop tlw l<"gislation
that bc•eanw F~Rl~A. f-1<><', e. if., Interim HPport of Activities
of the• Private• \\'elfare and Prnsiou Plan Study, S. Hep.
No. 92-6:~4. p. ~)6 (1!J72) ("Peni",ion and profit-sharing pla.ns
t:trr rnn11pt frolll ('OVCnLU< ' undt•r the SPeuritic>s Act of
193:~ ... unh·ss the plan is a voluntary contributory pellsion
plan and irlvPsts in the securities of the employ<•r company
an amouut greah•r than that paid into tlw plan by the
('mployc•r.") (Pmphasis rulded). As far a::-: m' an• aware, at
no time bdorP this casr arost> did thP SEC intimate that the
antifraud provisiom; of the· S<•curities Aets llPvertlwl<~s!'l
applied to noneontributory pension plans.

IV
If any further evitlf'llCP ·wrr<' rH•t-dPd to d(•mom;trat<' that.
pension pla11s of thP type• involwd an• not sub,jpct to the
Re<'uritics Acts. the enactnwnt of ERISA in HJ74 would put
the matter to r·est. PtJiike the Se<'urities Acts. EHl~A deals
exprpssly and in ddail ·with JH'Ilf'ion plans. ERlSA requit·es
JWllsion plan1' to rliselosc• spPC'ifird information to (•mployeeB
in a speeified manrwr. SPP :2!1 C. S. C. ~~ 10:21-1000. in contrast to the iudefinite and uncertain disclosure obligations
iruposeu by the antifraud provisions of the Securities Acts,
HI'C Snnln Fe Industries, l/1('. v. Grceu, 430 'F.,'. 40:2. 474-477
(1977); 'Ff::JC Industries, Inc. v. Nurtl11my, f11c., 42(i U. S.
438 (HJ7f>). Furtht-r. EH1S.-\ n~gulates tlw substantive terms
of p('llsion plans. S<'tt.iug starHlards for plan funding and limit:;;
011 tlw Pligibility requiremenb.; an employPe must rueet.
For·
t•xampk. \nth 1'<-'SJH"d to tlw IIIH!l'l'lying issue in this case" hPtlwr n•spouderJt st•rved long puough to I'I'CPi V<' a pension~ 203 (a) of EH ISA. 2H l-. R. C. ~ 1053 (a). now sds tlw mininruut h.•vp] of bPuefits an employ<'<' must recPiV<' aftPr accruing
·sp<>eifkd years of s<'rri<'e, arHI ~ :w:~ (b). 2\J 1'. H. C. 105'3

s
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(L). governs continuous servic<' requirements. Thus if Daniel
had rf'tired after ~ 10.53 took rft"cct. tlw Fund would have been
requin'd to pay him at least a partial ppusion. Thc :;;ecurities Acts, on the other hand. do not purport to Sf't the substantive term.s of financial transactions.
Tlw existPnC<' of this comprehensive legislation govrrning
tiw use and terms of employee pension plans sev<'rely uHdercuts all argunwnts for extending the RecuritiPs Acts to noncontributory, compulsory pension plans. Congn"ss beJiPvecl
that it was filling a regulatory void when it enactPd ERISA. a
bPlit-f which tlw SEC .a ctively eucouragecl. ~ot only is the
extension of the Securities Acts by thr court bPlow unsupported by thP language and history of those Acts. but in light
of 'ERISA it serves no getwral put'pose. Rt-e Coiifnno v.
Sanders, 430 U. R. ~)9, 104-107 ( 1977). Cf. Boys .lictrkels,
Inc. Y. Retail Clerks Fwio'll, 398 F. S. 23f5. 250 (HJ70). \Yhatever benefits employees might derive from the pffect of the
Securities Acts are now provided in more dcfiu.i te form
through ERISA.

v

We hold that the Securities Acts do not apply to a noncontributory, compulsory pE'ttsion plan. Beeause thf' first two
counts of responde11t's complaint do not provide grounds for·
relief in federal eourt., the District Court should havP granted
the motion to dismiss them. The judgmPnt below is therpfore

Reversed.

·,
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unamlJiguously to the contrary.~~ Both i1\ its 1041 stat{'nwnts
and rcpcakdly since tlwn , tlw SEC has drrlarccl that its "no
sale" }Jositio'' nppli<'d to the St'turitirs Acts as a \\·hole. See
Opinion of .\ssist:wt General Counsel, l Hl41-1044 Transfer
Binder] CCH Feel. :t;t>c. L. R!'p. 'if75,Hl5, at 75,387 (Hl41);
Hearings before the House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce on Proposed Anwndmcnts to th<' Securities Act
of 1!1:13 and the Srcurities Exchange Act of 1034_. 77th C'ong.,
1st Sess .. 888. SDG--8!)7 (1041); Institutional Im·rstor Study
Report of the Scemitirs and Exchange Commission. H. R.
Doc. Xo. 92--64, p. !lOG (Hl71) ("[T]hc Securities Act does not
apply . . . "); Hrarings Oll "-elfarr anrl Pension Plans Investigation before the Subc-ommitt.c'c 011 \\'elfarc and Pension
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:.J-¥."!1~ . 4,,)<-.t.l lh i.- pu.,it 1.,n: 1n J! q:~ it .-nhmitt<"d :tn rn11icu;:; hrid in the
J\inth Circ·uit :trp;uinl! t
. . .. ·, . lj did nut lH ·I!ill tu n•ly on its
"rc·gu ;dor~· tOiltl'xt.' tlwory 11111il 1951. 1 L . Lo,;s, supra. :n i)~-l n. :211;
Coh<•n , Huh• 1:3;:; of t lw SPt'tlrit il'o-: Ex<·h:1 n~t· Commi ..;_.-ioJ!, H R<·rmd of
N'. Y. C. B. A. 1111, ](i.J- JG5 (1\l.'i ~ l). Thi,.; ('o11rt notrd tlw doctrino but.
.
'!l!'t to :tdopt it in :i8C ,._ ll"otir,llal St•cu ritiN;. l11c., 393
lJ. 8. ~5:), -lti5- -lli(i (J!IIi9). It. -.(•t· m~ nwn• likt·!~ · th:t1 the " ('ontrxt"
refcrrctl to in tl1<' .-\1'1~ ' d..f1nit ional ~ <Ttion~ j,; tlw c<·unolni!' t·tmtt·xt. of a
pa rticular tran ~:t l' tiun, nut. tl w fom1 of n·)!;tll:ttion th:t.1 Jliil!ltt he [!pplied
to that. 1r:tll"ICtiun. Cf. Formm •. supm. at. S.JS- F-:50. St'<' :tl,:o n. 20,
' IIJllll . \\'t· notr that \\·ith fl'::']Wrt Jo ,;f;ttutor~· nu·rgrrs, thr :trl':l whrre
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Mn. JusTICE

PowELL delivered the opinion of the Court.

This case presents. the question whether a noncontributory,
compulsory pension pla.n constitutes a "security" within the
meaning of the Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 (Securities Acts) .
I
In 1954 multiemployer collective bargaining between Local
705 of the International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen , and Helpers of America and Chicago
trucking firms produced a pension plan for employees represented by the Local. The plan was compulsory and noncontributory. Employees had no choice as to participation
in the plan, and did not have the option ·Of demanding that
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the employet·'s contribution be paid directly to them as a
substitute for pension eligibility. The employees paid nothing
to the plan themselves. 1
The collective-bargaining agreement iHitially set employer
contributions to the Pension Trust Fund at $2 a week for each
man-week of covered employment.~ The Board of Trustees
of the FullCl, a body composed of an equal number of employer
and uniou representatives, was given sole authority to set the
level of benefits but had no control over the amount of
requirPd employer coutr·ibutions. Initially, eligible employees
received $75 a month in benefits upon retiremeut. Subsequent collective-bargaining agreements called for greater
employer contributions, which in turn led to higher benefit
payments for retirees. At the time respondent brought suit,
employers coutributed $21.50 per employee ma11-week and
pension paymeuts ranged from $425 to $525 a month depending on age at retirement. 3 In order to receive a pension an
employee was required to have 20 years of continuous service,
including time workecl before the start of the plan.
The meaning of "continuous service" is at the cellter of
this dispute. Rt>spondent began working as a truck driver
For PxamplP,; of other non eon! rihuf ory, compnl:'iory prll~ion plans,
set> Allied Structural Steel ea. v. Spannaus, 438 U. S. - , (1978);
Malone v. Ff'hite Motor Corp., 435 F. 8. 407, 500-501 (1978); Alabama
1

Power Oo v. Da.v·is. 4:n U. S. 581, 590 (1977) .
Contribution~ WPr<' tird 1o the mnnht>r of rmployreR ra tlwr thnn the
amount oJ' work pNformrd . For example, pa.,,·mrnts had to be m<tde even
for wePk~ where nn rmplo~·ec was on l<ea_vc of ah~ence, di~:thkd, or working for only n, fmetion of tht• wrrk. C'onver,;ely, rmplo~'f'l'~ did not ha,ve
to increase tlll'ir contribution for WPt>h in which n.n l'tnplo~·t>e worked
overtime or on n hohdny. Tru::>t AgrePmrnt, Art. :3, § 1, App. 63a.
3 Hec:mse tht> Fund ma.de lhr satnf' payments t·o !'nch <'mployer who
quahfied for n. prn,;iou nnd rrtired at the same age, rathrr tha.n establishmg au individual ncconnt. for rach rmployee tied to thl' :unmmt of
emp(oyPr eontributiom: nttributable to hi~ period of sf'l'vice, the plan
provJcit'CI a "defined bmefit." S<-'r 2!l U . S. C. § 1002 (35); A.labama
Pou:e'~' f'o . v . .Davi<l, s~tpra, a.t 59a 11. JS.
2
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in the Chicago area in 19.10, all(] joined Local 705 thr following year. When the plan first wPnt into effect. respondent
automatically rPceived 5 years credit toward the :20-year
service rf'quirrmeut becausf' of his f'arlier work experience.
He retired in 1973 and applif'd to thf' pla11 's administrator for
a penswn. The administrator determined that respondent
was ineligible because of a brf'ak in sf'rvicr betwef'1l Decf'mber·
1960, and July 1961. 1 Respondent appealed the decision to
the trustees, who affirmed. Respondent then asked the
trustees to waive the continuous servic<' rule as it applied to
him. After the trusteE's refus<>d to waive th<> rule, respondent
brought suit in federal court against tlw International union
(Teamsters), Local 705 (Local) , and Louis Feick. a trustee of
the fund.
Respondent's complaint alleged that the Teamsters, the
Local, and Feick misrepresented and omitted to state material
facts with respect to the value of a covered employee's interest
in th<' rwnsion pla11 . Count I of the complaint charged that
these misstatements and omissions constituted a fraud i11 connection with the sale of a S<'curity in violatio11 of § 10 (b) of
the Securities E~change Act of 1934, 48 Stat. 891, 15 U. S. C.
§ 78J (b). and the Securities and Exchange Commission 's Rule
10b-5, 17 CFR ~ 240.10b- 5. Count II charged that the same
conduct amounted to a violation of § 17 (a) of the Securities
Act of 1933, 48 Stat. 84. 15 L'. S. C. § 77q. Other counts
alleged violations of various labor law and common-law duties."
4

DaniPI wn;; lnid off from DPc<'mber Hl60, until April 1961. In addition, no contributions were paid 011 hi:< behalf bet.ween April and July
1961 , IH·<:HU:<t' of Pmbezz 1rment hy Ius ('mployrr's bookk<>q)('r. During
tlus :;ewn-month period re;;pondent euuld havr preservf'd his eligibility
by makmg thr c ontribution~ him:-:rlf, hut lw fail<'d to do ::;o.
5 Count III eharged the Temn~t <> r,; and the Local wtth violatmg their
dut y of f:nr n•prP~entation under § 9 (a) of thP ~a.tional Labor RPlations
Act, 29 l' . S. C. § 159 (a), aml Count V (lat<>r amended a.~ Count VI)
chargrd the TPmust('r,:, the Loca l, Prirk and all otlwr Team~l<• r;; pPnsion
tund trn:;tee:; with vtolating tlwir obhgation~ under § 302 (c) (5) .of tbe
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Respondent sought to proceed on behalf of all prospective
beneficiaries of Teamsters pension plans a,nd against all Teamsters pension funds.n
The petitioners moved to dismiss the first two counts of the
complaint on the ground that respondent had no cause of
action under the Securities or Securities Exchange Acts. The
District Court denied the motion. 410 F. Supp. 541 (ND Ill.
1976). It held that respondent's interest in the Pension Fund
constituted a security within the meaning of § 2 ( 1) of the
Securities Act, 15 U. S. C. § 77b ( 1), and § 3 (a) (10) of the
Securities Exchange Act, 15 U. S. C. § 78c (a)(10),' because
the plan created an "illvestment contract" as that term had
been interpreted in SEC v. W. J. Howey Co., 328 U. S. 293
( 1946). It also determined that there had been a "sale" of
this interest to respondent within the meaning of § 2 (3) of
the Securities Act, 15 U. S. C. § 77b (3), and § 3 (a)(14) of
the Securities Exchange Act, 15 U.S. C. § 78c (a)(14).~ It
National Lttbor Helationtl Act, 29 U. S. C. § 186 (c) (5) . Count IV
accused all defendant;; of common-law fmud and deceit.
6 As of the time of appeal to fhe Seventh Circuit the Di~trict Court had
not yet ruled on any class ct>rtificat.ion bsue8.
7 8<-'et.ion 2 (1) of the Securities Act dPfines n, ''secmity" ns
" any note, stock, treasury stock, bond, debentnre, evidence of indebtedness,
certificate of interest or participation in any profit-sharing agreement,
collateml-trust. certificate, preorganization certifieatc or subscription, transferable shan', investment contract, vot,i ng-trust certificate, eertificate of
depo;;it for a 1:1ecurity, fractiomu undivided intere::;t in oil, gas, or other
mineral rights, or, in general, any intrrest or instrumE-nt commonly known
as n. 'security,' or any ePrtificate of intere-::;t or pa.rtiripa.timl in, temporary
or interim certificate for, receipt for, guarantee of, or warrant or right to
l"Ubscribe to or purchase, any of t.he forrgoing. "
The drfinition of a "t>ecurity" in § :3 (a) (10) of thP Securities Exchange
Act is virtmtlly idPntical and, for th<' purpc:;es of this casr, t.he coverage
vf thP two Acts may be regarded a::; the same. United Hous£ng Foundat ion, Inc . v. Pumwn, 421 U. S. 887, 847 n. 12 (1975); 'l'cherepnin v.
Kmght , :189 U. S. 8a2, 342 ( 1967) .
8 Section 2 (3) of the SecuritiE-s Act providf'::;, in pertinent pa.r t, that
" [t,jhe term 'sale' or 'srll' shall include rvrry contract of saJe or dispoii!ition
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believed respondent voluntarily gave value for his interest in
the plan, because he had voted on collective-bargaining a.greements that chose employer contributions to the Fund instead
of other wages or benefits.
The motion to dismiss was certified for appeal pursuant to
28 U. S. C. § 1292 (b), and the Court of Appeals for the
Seventh Circuit affirmed. 561 F. 2d 1223 (1977). Relying
on its perception of the economic realities of pensio11 plans
and various actions of Congress and the SEC with respect to
such plans, the court ruled that respondent's interest in the
Pension Fund was a "security." Accordillg to the court, a
"sale" took place either when respondent ratified a collectivebargaiuing agreement embodying the Fund or when he
accepted or retaiued covered employment instead of seekiug
other work. 0 The Court did not believe the subsequent
enactment of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act
of 1974 (ERISA). 88 Stat. 832, 29 U. S. C. § 1001 et seq.,
affected the application of the Securities Acts to pension plans,
as the requirements and purposes of ERISA were perceived to
be different from those of the Securities Acts. 10 We granted
certiorari, 434 U.S. 1061 (1978), and now reverse.
of a security or iuterc~t in a 1:1ecurity, for value." Section 3 (a.) (14) of
the Securities Exchange Act slate;; that "[t]he terms 'sale' and 'sell' each
include any conf.raet to ,;ell or ot.lwrwise dispose of." Although the latter
definition dot',; not refer t'Xprt'.-;,;ly to a. disposition for val·ue, the court
below did not decide whether the Securitirs Exchange Act nevertheless
impliedly incorporaf.ed the Securilie« Act dPfinition, cf. n. \J , supra, as in
its view Daniel did give value for his intere1:1t in the pen~ion plan. In
light of onr disposition of the qurstion whether respondent's iutPrest wag
a "security," we nPPd not decidP whethN the meaning of "sale" under th·e
Securities Exchange Act iR any different from its meaning undet· the
Securities Ad .
11 The Court of Appeals and the District Court also held that § 17 (n.)
provides private parties with an implied cause of action for damages. In
light of our disposition of thil:-l case, we express no view,; on this issue.
t{) Hespondent did not have any cause of action nndrr ERISA itseJf, res:
tha1t A('.t t,ook efl"ect, after he had retired,
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II
"The starting point in rvery case involving the construe~
tion of a statute is the language itself." Blue (}hip Stamps v.
M'anor Drug Stores, 421 U. S. 723, 756 (1975) (PowJ<;LL, J ..
concurrihg); see Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U. S. 185,
197, 199, and n. 19 (1976). In spite of the substantial use
of employee pension plans at the time they were enacted,
neither § 2 (l) of the Securities Act nor § 3 (a) (10) of the
Securities Exchange Act, which define the term "security" in
considerable detail and with numerous examples, refers to
pension plans of any type. Acknowledging this omission in
the statutes, respondent contends that an employee's interest
in a pension plan is an "investment contract," an instrument
which is included in the statutory definitions of a security.n
To determine whether a particular fi11ancial relationship
constitutes an investment contract, "r t]he test is whether the
scheme involves an investment of mo11ey in a common enterprise with profits to come solely from the efforts of others."
Howey, supra, at 301. This test is to be applied in light of
"the substance-the economic realities of the transactionrather than the names that may have been employed by the
parties." United Housing Corp. v. J?orrnan, 421 U. S. 837,
851-852 (1975). Accord, rPcherepnin v . .Knight, 389 U. S.
332. 336 ( 1967); Howey, supra, at 298. Cf. SEC v. Variable
Daniel abo argues that his i11terr~t constituirR a "cr'rtificaio of interest
iu or participation in a profit-sharing agreement." Tlw eourt below did
not con>~ider thi~ claim, a;,: Daniel had not .serion~ly prE•8sed the argument
and the di~po~it.ion of the "iuve8tment routract " is~nr made it unnecessary
to decidP the que;;tion. 561 F . 2d 1228, 12a0 n. 15 (Hl77). Similarly,
Daniel here does not ,;eriously eontf'nd tha.t. a "crrtifieatr of interest
in , .. a. profit-sh:uing agreemrnt." has any broader me.Hning under the
Srcun1iel:' Act~ than an "invel:ltment, contract." In Fonnan. supm, we
ob~erwd that, the Ho·wey tr::;t, which has hePn us<•d to detc"rmine the
prr:>l:lence of an iiJve::;tment. coni met, "pmbodie::< ·the r:>S8entia1 att.ributes
that nm through all of thr Cou.rt's deri::;io.m~ d~·fining f1 secu.rity."' 42:1
11

lL. S..• a-t

',.

F-52.,

.,.
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Annuity Life Ins. Co., 359 U. S. 65, 80 (1959)

J.,
concurring) ("rOJne must apply a test in terms of the
purposes of the Federal Acts ... "). Looking separately at
each element of the Howey test, it is apparent that an
employee's participation in a noncontributory, compulsory
pension plan such as the Teamsters' does not comport with
the commonly held understanding of an investment contract.
(BRENNAN,

A. Investme,nt of Money
An employee who participates in a noncontributory, conlpulsory pension plan by definition makes no payment into the
pension fund. He only accepts employment, one of the conditions of which is eligibility for a possible benefit on retirement. Daniel contends, however, that he has "invested" in
the Pe11sion Fund by permitting part of his compensation
from his employer to take the form of a deferred pension
benefit. By allowing his employer to pay money into the
Fund, and by coutributing his labor to his employer in return
for these payments, Daniel asserts he has made the kind of
iuvestment which the Securities Acts were intended to
regulate.
[n order to determine whether respondent invested in the
Ji"und by accepting and remaining in covered employment, it
is necessary to look at the entire transaction through which
he obtained a chance to receive pension benefits. In every
decisio11 of this Court recognizi11g the presence of a "security"
under the Securities Acts, the person found to have been an
investor chose to give up a specific consideration in return for
a separable financial interest with the characteristics of a
security. See 'l'cherpnin, supra (money paid for bank capital
stock); SEC v. United Benefit Life Ins. Co., 387 U. S. 202
( Hlo7) (portion of premium paid for variable component of
mixed variable and fixed annuity contract); Variable A'n nuity
Life Ins. Co., s'Upra (premium pa,id for variable allnuity contract)~ Ho1cey, ~pra (money paid for purchase, maintenance.

77-753 & 77-754-0PINION
TEAl\ISTEHS

8

1J.

DANIEL

and harvesting of orang£> grove); SEC v. C. M. Jo·iner Lecu,"'ing
Corp., 320 U. S. 344 (1943) (mo11ey paid for land and oil
exploration). Even in thosp cases where the interest acquired had intermingled security and nonsecurity asppcts, the
interest obtained had "to a very substantial df'gree elements
of investment co11tracts . . . ." Variable A.nnuity Life Ins.
Co., supra, at 91 (BRENNAN, J.. concurring). In Pvery case
thP purchaser gave up some tallgible and df'finabl<' consideration in retum for an interrst that had substantially the
charactf'ristics of a security.
In a pension plan such as this one. by contmst, thP purpm·ted
investmeut is a relatively insignificaut part of an (•mployf'e's
total aml indivisible compensation package. No portion of
an employee's compensation other thall the poteutial pension
benefits has any of the eharacteristics of a security. yf't these
noninvestmellt interests cannot be segregated from the possible pf'nsion benefits. Only in tlw most abstract sensf' may
it be said that an employeE' "exchanges" some portion of his
labor in return for these possiblE' benefits.'~ Hr surr'<'tH1ers
his labor as a whole. aud in rE'tum receives a compensation
package that is substantially devoid of aspects rE'sembling a
security. His dE'cision to accept and retain covered employment must have only au extrf'mely at ten uatE'd relationship. if
any, to perceived investment possibilities of a futurf' pension.
Looking at thE' ecouomic rE'alities, it seems clear that an
employee is selliug his labor to obtain a livf'lihood, 11ot making
au investmf'nt for the future.
RespondPnt also argues that employer constributions on
his bf'half constituted his investment into the Fu11d. But it
is inaccurat<> to d<>scribe theS(> payments as having been "on
behalf" of any employee. Thr trust agrf'ement used employee man-weeks as a convenient 'vvay to m<>asure a.n employ\\'!' nPrd not. dl•ciclt\ hrrr whrthrr a JX·r~on'~ ''invr,.;!nwn1," in ordrr to
th1• drfinitwn of :.111 inn•,;tnwnt contra!'!, 11111~1 takr thr form of cash
(1111)· rnth<:r than of good:; and ,;ernt·t·~ . Sco Forman, supra, at. 852 n. 16.
1

~

llLt>Pt.
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<>r's owrall obligation to thP Fund. not as a means of measurillg the employer's obligation to any particular employee.
Indeed, therf' was no fixed relationship ht>tween contributions
to the Fund and an employf'<"'s potf'ntial benefits. A pension
plan with "fixed benefits," such as the Local's, does not tie a
qualifying employee's benefits to the time he has worked.
See n . 3, S'upra. One who has engaged in cowred employment for 20 years will r·eceivc- the sanw beuefits as a person
who has worked for 40. <wen though the latter has worked
twice as long and induced a substantially larger Pmployer
contribution. 1" Agaiu. it ignores the economic realitif's to
equate cn1ployer eontributions with an invPstmcnt by the
employee.

B. E:rpectal'io11 of Profit.~ From A Common Enterprise
As we observed in Forman, the "touchstone" of the Ho-wey
test "is the prf'sencf' of an irrvf'stment iu a common venture
premised on a reasonablP expectation of profits to be derived
from the entrepeneurial or managerial efforts of others." 421
U. S., at 852. The Court of Appeals believed that Daniel's
cxpectati011 of profit derived from the Fund's successful management and investment of its assets. To thf' extent pension
benefits exceeded employer contributions and depended on
rarnings from the assets. it was thought they contained a
profit element. The Fund's trustees provided the managerial
efforts which produced this profit eleme11t.
As in othPI' parts of its analysis, the court below fouud an
Pxpectation of profit in the pension plan only by focusing on
one of its lpss important aspects to the exclusion of its more
significant clements. It is true that the Fund. like other
holders of large assets, depends to some extent on earnings

_

I({'SfoA~l)E/11'1

lTndrr fhr 1rrm~ of the Lorn!'~; JWnsion plan, for <'X<lmplr, ~
t'eerivrd <'n,dit for t.lw fi\'(' yrar:-: IH' worked brforr the Fund waR {'I'Ca.trd,
ewu tho111!:h no ·<·mploypr l'Ontrihlltiom; had been made during tl1at
13

pl'riod.
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from its assets. In the case ot a pension fund, however, a
far larger portion of its income comes from employer colltributions, a souree in no way dependent on the efforts of the
Fund's managers. The Local 705 Fund, for example. ea.rned
a total of $31 million through investment of its assets between
February 1955, and January 1977. Duriug this same period
employer eontributions totaled $153 million.' 4 Not only does
the greater share of a pension plan's income ordinarily come
from new contributions. but unlike most entrepeneurs who
manage other people's money, a plan usually can count on
increased employer contributions, over which the plan itself
has no control, to cover shortfalls iu earnings.' "
The importance of asset earnings in relation to the other
benefits received from employment is diminished further by
the fact that where a plan has substantial preconditions to
vesting, the principal barrier to an individual employee's
realization of pension benefits is not the financial health of
the Fund. Ra.ther, it is his own ability to meet the Fund's
eligibility requirements. Thus. even if it were proper to
describe the benefits as a "profit" returned on some hypothetical investment by the employee, this profit would depend
primarily on the employee's efforts to meet the vesting
requirements. rather than the Fuud's iuvestment success.10
When viewed in light of the total compeusa.tion package an
employee must receive in order to be eligible for pension benefits. it becomes clear that the possibility of participating iu a
plan 's asset earnings "is far too speculative a.nd insubstantia1
to bring the entire transaetion within the Securities Acts,"
Fonnan, supra, at 856.
14
· In <~ddition, I he Fund 11eceived $7,500,000 from smallrr pension funds
with which it merged over the y~eari!.
1 " See Note , ThC' Application of thr Aniifraud ProvisionR of the Securities
Laws to Compulsory, Noncontributory Pen:;ion Plnm; Aftrr Daniel v.
International Bmther-hood oj 'l'earn-~Jter-s, fi4 Va.. L. Rev. 805, :n5 (1978).
H I See Not«:>, Intrre.st in Prn:sion Plans as Securities : Daniel v. lnterna~
t(ional Brotherhood of 'l'eamsters, 78 Cohun. ·L . Hev . 184, 20J (1918).

'.

t
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III
'fhe court below Lelievecl that its cot1struction of the term
'secur•ity" was compelled not only by thf:' perceived resemblance of a peusiou plan to an investment contract. but by
various actions of Congress and the REC's interprt•tation of
the Recurities Acts. In reaching this conclusion, the court
gave great weight to the REC's explanation of these events,
an explanation which for the most part the REC repeats here.
Our owu review of the t•ecord leads us to believe that this
reliance on the REC's interpretation of these legislative and
administrative actions was not justified.
1

A. Actions of Congress
The REC' in its amicus C1tria.e brief refers to sevrral actions
of Congress said to cvidE:'nC<' an understanding that pension
plans are securities. A close look at each instauce, however,
rewals only that Congress might have believed certaiu kinds
of pension plans. radically different from the one at issue here,
came within the coverage of the Securities Acts. There is no
evidence that Congress at any time thought noncontributory
plans similar to the one before us were subject to federal regulation as securities.
The first action cited was the rejection by Congress in 1934
of a11 amendment to the Securities Act that would have
exempted employee stock investment and stock option plans
from the Act's registratio11 requiremeuts. 17 The amendment
passed the Senate but was rlimi11ated in conferPnce. The
legislative history of the defeated proposal indicates it was
17 'l'lw murndmrnf would hnvc nddf•d the followinl!: bngnngr to § 4 (1)
t>f f hr , <·eu ni iP~ At'f :
"A::; 11:-<l•d 111 1hi~ paragra.ph, flw fl'l'ln 'puhlir offering' ~hall not be
dermPd to mrludt> :m off<'ring madr "ol<· l~· fo emplo~w~~ b~· nn i~HII<'I' or by
it;; a lfiliatr,; Ill <'Olllll'<'tion with a, bonn fidr plan for t IH· p;Jyuwnt of Pxtra
compt>n~ation or ~toek inw,;t nwnt plan for ilw l'X<·Iu"ive lwnl'fit, of such
t'mploy<'C:<." 78 Cong. Rec. R708 (1934).
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intended to cover plans under which Pmp]oyees contributed
their own funds to a segregated investment account Oil which
a return was realized. See H. R. Rep. No. 1838, 73d Cong.,
2d Sess., 41 (1934); HParings before the House Committee on
Interstate allcl Foreign Commerce on Proposed Anwndments
to the Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act
of 1934, 77th Cong., 1st Sess .. 895-896 (1941). In rejecting the
amendment, CongrPss revealed a concern that certain interests
havi,.g the charactPristics of a security not be excluded from
Securities Act protection simply because investors realjzed
their return in tlw form of retirement benefits. At no time,
however. did Congress indicate that p<:>nsion benefits in and
of tht-mselves gave a transaction the characteristics of a
security.
The SEC also relies on a 1970 ame1Hlment of the Securities
Act which extended § 3's exemption from registration to
include "any interest or participation in a single or collective
trust fund maintained by a bank ... which interest or participation is issued in connection with (A) a stock bonus,
pension, or· profit-sharing plan which meets the requirements
for qualification under section 401 of title 26, . . . . " § 3 (a)
(2) of the Securities Act, as amended. 84 Rtat. 1434, 1498,
15 U. R. C. § 77c (a) (2). It a.rgues that in creating a registration exemption, thP amendment manifested Congress'
understanding that the intf'rests covered by the amendment
otherwise were subject to the Recurities Acts. 18 It interprets
"interest or participatio11 in a single ... trust fund ... issued
in connection with .. . a stock bonus, pension, or profitsharillg plan" as referring to a prospective beneficiary's inter1~

Section 17 (e) of thH &·rmiti!'s Art, 15 U.S. C. § 77q (c), and § 10 (b)
of the 1:\Pcurities Ex('hauge Act, 15 lT. S. C. § 7Rj (h) (when rend witl1
~§ ;3 (a) (10) and (12) of that. Act), indieate t.lmt the antifmud provisions
of the respective Act:; c·ontinu(• to apply to iutrrc'-"t"' thnt com(' within the
exemptions c·rE'<tted by§ 3 (n)(2) of the Seruritic•:-; Act and § 3 (a) (12) of
"t-he SPl'llrihe.s Exchnngc Act.
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€St in a pension fund. But this construction of the 1970
amendlllent ignores that measure's central purpose. which was
to r<'lieve banks and insurance companies of certain registratration obligatiolls. The anH-'rHlmcnt rpcognizf'd only that a
pension plan had "au interest or participation'' in the fund in
which its assrts werP held. not that JWOSJWctive benf'ficiari<'s
of a plan had any interest in either the plan's bankmain taine<l assets or the plan itsel£. 10

B. SEC' lnterptetat·ion
Thr com-t helow believed. and it now is argued to us, that
almost from its inception the SEC has regarded peusion plru1s
as falling within the scope of the Securities Acts. We are
askeu to defPr to what is sf'en as a longstanding interpreta1 " SPn S. Rep. No. 91-1R4, p. 27 (1960): Hearing~ befor<· tlw Smat~
Banking ami CunrrH·y Commit1ec on \Iut.ual Fuud Legislation of 1967,
'90th Cong., 1st.&>~~-. pt. III, at l:Hl-1842 (19()7); Mundlwim & Heuder~on,
Applicability of the Frderal SeeuritiPi-' Law:< to Pmsion and Profit-Sharing
Plans, 29 L. <~ Cont<·mp. Prol>S. 7\1.'), l'l!H:m (Hl64): Saxon & Miller,
Common Tru:<t. Fund", 5~ Geo. L. J. H94 (19().')). Thr SEC argue;; tha:t
the addition b~- the Houfle of the languag<' '·single or" bPforo ''common
tru:st fuutl" indicated an intrnt to <'OV<'I' tlw underlying plan,.; tlu~L invested
in bank-maintairll'd fundi". The lrgi~lative histor~·. howewr, indic·atf'S fha't
the changt• wa" rrwant only to rlimitwtr thr rwgative inferPn<·<' :sugge;;ted
by thP unn•vi:-<rd [;Ulgllal!:e that hank,.; would hav<' to n·gi,.;(<'r the srgregated
invr,.;tnwnt. fund:; they achnini,.;t<•red for particular plan;-;. Bec;tuse the
provi,..ion as a whole dealt onJ~- with t lw rpfat ion,.;hip lwtwpc•n n plan nnd
itfl bank, tlw n•vision did not afft•rt the n•gistration :<t~t.tu;-; of tlH• underlying Jl('ll:<iou plaJJ. s('(' 116 Cong. HPc'. :~;~2~7 (1970). Thi~ was eonsi~t~
ent. with the· SEC':< interpretation of the JH'ovi;-;ion. Hea.ring,.:, supm, n.t
1326. Tho ,;ub:s~·qtH•nt addition of nnothf'r provi~<ion excrpt.inl!: from the
rxcmption fund,.; ''uudPr which a11 amount in excx..,;~ of tlw Pmployer's
L'ontrihution i;-; nllocated. to thl' pur<'hH:<(1 of s~·t•mitie:; ... i~urd b~' the
rmplo~· pr or h~ au~ eompmt~· dir<'l'tl~- or indirw·tl~· controlling, eontrolled
h~· or nndrr common control with th<• employer" apJWHT1' to havr been
-:nupl~ an additional o<afcguard to confirm tlw SF.('',_ a11thorit_,. to require
~ueh pl;tlls, .md only :m<'h plan.o;, to r<:'gi:stl'l'. &'€ H. H. ('onf'. HeJ>. No.
'91- HW , p. 31 (1970).
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tion of these statutes by the agency responsible for their
administration. But there are limits. groullded in thP language, pmpose aml history of the particular statute, on how
far an agency properly may go in its interpretative role.
Although these limits are not always easy to discern, it is
clear here that the REC's position is neither longstandiug nor·
even arguably within the outer limits of its authority to internret these Acts. 20
As we have demonstrated above, the type of pension plaJl
at issue in this case bears no resemblance to the kind of financial interests thr Secur·ities Acts wer·e designed to n'gulate.
Further, thr SEC's present position is flatly contradicted by
its past actions. Until the instant litigation arose, the public
record reveals no evideuce that the SEC had ever considered
the Securities Acts to be applicable to noncontributory pension pla11s. In 1941, the SEC fi.rst articulated the position
that ·voluntary, contributory plans had investment characteristics t,hat rendered them "securities" under the Acts. At the
It. is a commonplacP iu our jmisprudence thnt nn arlmiHistrativ~
agency's con:sist.ent, lon~:standing illtt•rpretation of thP :statute under which
it operate~:; iR ·entitled to considerable weight. Un-ited States v. National
Assn. of Securitie~ Dealrrs. 422 H. S. 694, 71H (1975); Sa.tbe v. B-ustos,
419 U. S. 65, 74 (HJ74); Invel!tmeut r'o. Institute v. CamJI, 401 U. S.
617, 62fi-()27 (1971); Udall v. Tallman, 380 F. S. 1. Hi (Hl(i5). This
deference is a prochtc1. both of a11 awareue"" of the pradica.l c~xpertise ·
which nn agPIICY norrnall~' develop~, n.nd of n. willingnP:ss to accord some
rnca::;ure of flexibility to such an agency as it encouJtters new a ,ud unfore- ·
seen problems over time. But. thi:s dPfCI'PllC.P i;.; con;;traitwd. by our obliga.tion to honor the clear mt>a.ning of a. ~tH.tnte, a;; rrvPalPd . b~· its langua.ge,
purpoi:ie and hi~tor~'· On a, nmnber of occasions in recPnt. ~·t'lll'il this Court
hm: found it twcc;;sa.ry to rejec·t t.he SEC':; interpt'Pta1ion of variou:,; provi~ion::~ of the Securities AetK Sec SEC v. 8loan. 4:)(i TT. S. 10:~, 117-119
(HI/~) ; Piper v. Clwi;s-Craft Industries. Inc., 4:30 n. S. 1, +1 n. 27 (Hl77);
E'l'nst t(: h''l'nst v. Huchfelder, 425 U. S. 185, 212-21+ (197(1); F'onnan,
wpra, a.t 858 n. 25; Blue Chip Stamps v. M anur Dm11 Stores. 421 U. S.
'723, 759 n. 4 (1975) (Pow1m,, J., <'OH<'lllTing); lleliance Electt·ic Co. v.
Emr.rson Electric Co., 404 U.S. 418, 425:-427 -(1H72)..
2"
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same time, however. the SEC recognized that noncontributory
plans were 11ot covered by the Securities Acts because such
plans did not involve a "sale'' withju the meaniug of the
statutes. Opinions of Assistant General Counsel, [1941-1944
Transfer Binder] CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. ~75,195 (1941);
Hearings before the House Committee on lnterstate and Foreign Commerce on Proposed Amendments to th€' Securities
Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 77th
Cong .. 1st Sess., 895, 896-897 (1941) (testimony of C'onunissioner Purcell). 2 1
In an attempt to reconcile these interpretations of the
Securities Acts with its present stand, the SEC Dow augments
its past position with two additional propositions. First, it
is argued. noncontributory plans ar€' "securities'' even where
a "sale" is not involved. Second, the previous concession that
uoncontributory plans do not involve a "sale" was mf'ant to
apply only to the registration and reportiug requirements of
the Securities Acts; for purposes of the antifraud provisions,
a "sale" is involved. As for the first proposition. we observe
that none of the SEC opinions, reports, or testimouy cited to
us address the question. As for the sf'cond, the record is
SubsequPnt to 1941, thP SEC made no fmther pffort~; to regulate even
contributory, voluntary peno:ion plans except whPrP the employee,;' contributions wrre investrd in th(' Pmployer'R :>f'rmit.ie~>. Cf. 11. 21, supra. It
H,)so continued to dio:avow any tLuthority to regulate noncontributory,
compul::>ory plan:>. Ser Lt'tter from As:;istant. DirP<"tor, Divi,;ron of Corporate Finance, ~lay 12, 195:~. CCH Frcl. S<'C. L. R.rp. 2105.51; Letter
from Chirf ( '01msel, Division of Corporate .Finan<'P, August 1, 1962, CCH
Fed. Se<•. L. Rep. ~ 2105.52 ; Hmring~ before the SenatP Banking and
CurrPnry Committt-H on :\Iutual Fund LPgislation of 1967, 90th Cong., 1st
Scss., 1:32() (Hl67) ; 1 L. Lo~s. SPcuritiPs Regulation, 510-511 (1st. ed.
1901), 4 1<! .. at. 255a-2554 (2d rd. H)t)!)); Hyde, Employee Stock Plans
:md tlw Seeuritit·~ Act of 19:3:3, W W . i{(•s. L. Hrv. 75, 8(i (1964);
Mundlwrm & H<·mkrson. Applicahrlity of the Fcdl'ral SeCllritiP,; L,'\,ws to
]>eno:ion and Profit-Sharing Plans, 2U L. & C'ontemp. Probs. 795, 809-811
(1904! , Note, Pension Plaut; a:s Seeurities, 96 U. Ya. L. Rev . 549, 549-551
21
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unambiguously to the contrary.~~ Both in its 1041 statements
and repeatedly since then, tlw f-lEC has deelared that. its "no
sale" position applied to the Seeurities Acts as a whole. Sec
Opinion of Assistant General Counsel. 11941- 1044 Transfer
Binder I CCH Feel. Sec. L. R(•p. ~ 75,HJ5, at. 75,:387 (1941);
Hearings beforf' the House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce Otl Proposed Amendments to the Securities Act
of 1933 and the Securities ExchaDge Act of 1034. 77th Cong ..
1st Sc•ss .. 888, 896-897 (1041); lnstitutionaJ IJ1vestor Study
Report of the Securities and Exchange Commission. H. Jl.
Doc. ~o. 9:2 - ()4, p. 096 (l\l71) ("[T !he Securities Act does not
apply . . ."); Hearings on Welfarf' and Pension Plans Inv<'stigation before the SubcoHnnittPc on Welfare and Pension
wr 1h<'
tr·a.n,.;aei .i()ll to~<':!,!OJl,it JJ.I.l;~~H@o"'""''tl~
me 1iii')('i;;e0T H'.
t· Ot1H'l'" On O<'ea~ion the SEC
haH contl'mled 1hat b(•<·au,;c• § :1 of lite Sccnriti<>~ Art and § 3 of the
Securilie~ Exrlwngc Art. 11ppl~· tltf' cpwlif\illg phra.o;c " mrlf':-:s tho ron1ext
oLlwrwi"t' n•quir('~" to the Arts' ~<'BPral d<·finition>~, it iN Jll'l'mi,:,"ihle to
regnrd n. part-ie1Jiar traBsaelion( ns inn>h·iug a ~alP or not dt'pmding on
t Iw form of rq~ulat ion involwc1. S<·t' Schil/ner v. If. Vau1Jitll Cla.rk & Co.,
134 F. 2d ~i5, RiS (CA2 Hl-l~); l L. Lo"'"• St·enrrti<'~ Hegulation 524-528
<: R ma.~· he

, a.,., a ,.. <'·a. a
rend io pPrmit a

<'I' w H'i

~ingl<·

,.,;il..J,I
.

(1st. ('0. Wol): 4 l~rl., at. 25n2-2565 (2d Pd. Hlt\0). n~ rt t .hi~o~EC h:rlllil"lt
:W.rm.~:l i;d;n1.1 .t.lw· Jo~:Jttil'!n : In Hl+:~ it ~uhmit. tPd an amir-111> hri(·f in t.he

&u..~
~

JLt_ .5 f!C.,

~~

Ninth Cireuit arguing t
. · , 1St clid not lwgin t.o r·ply on its
·rC'gu a .or·~' <'Oil l'Xt th<:'or·y unt.il 1951. I L. Lo'*i, ~'li]J1'a, aL 524 n . 211;
ColH'n, Hul<• 1~:~ of t lw SPeltrrtit•s Ex('h:t.ngt• Commi::;.~ion, I+ J1,<·cord of
N . Y. C. B. A. 102, W+-105 (HJi)~l). Thi:-; Court noted tlH· doetrino but
.
to adopt·. 1t in ,'IE(' v. Nntiona/. Srcw·itii:'IJ. fuc., 393
U. S. 45:~, -lH5-4Gti (Hl(i9). lL "<'.t'li1H mon• Jilwly that the "eon text"
referred to 111 t.lu· Aets' ddinitJOna.l ,.;f'('LionR i,.; the •ceonomic· co.ntext of a
parti<•HJar tmu"adiou, .no(. th<• form Of n•gn]at.ion 1hu.t might he 3pp)ied
to that. 1ran~actwn . Cf. Formm1, s'Upra, a.t. 84F:-~50. S<'C' nl~o n. 20,
'W pw. IV!' not0 that with rrspPrt, to :<tatutory mergPrs, 1h<• arPa whrrc
~------~~~~~t ht• SEC ongina lly drvrlop<:'d it.~ theory a bout the bifml'atPd dpfinition of
a "ale, tlw SEC ,;Jilt'<' has nband01wd it:-: position am! now trPn1s surh
•rnn,;ndiou::> m; entailing a ";.;,\lc" for all pnrpo~<.\~ of the SPeuriti<:s Act.
SP.<' li4 C~'H §2:30.145.1'1 ~ ~, ~, ~
~
~,

4.fl-#~·c.f~;~~:

...;

~'~t9-j~C~-L~~~~
~~~Hut!_.~~ He~ •• ;
~ ~~-k.-~.L ,Lo ~a.
~Lc.., J-,· zt.+LAL.d~~ ,to ~

a-

~~~,,~p~~a.r~

~4:1~~-.

·Funds of tlw SC'uah• Lahor a11d Public Welfare C'onlnlitleC',
f;4th Con g .. 1st Sesf': .. !14:3-!141) ( 1\lr).:')). Congn•ss aetPd on th if$
undN:stand i11g "·hc•11 it procc•pded to dew lop tlw lPgisla tion
that hc•r.anH' RH 1:-IA. Sec•. e. If., Tnterim Hc•port of Activities
of tlw Privu,tp \Yc•lfare and Pe11sion Plan fitudy, S. Rep .
.r~o. 0~- 6!~4. p. 0() (1!172) ("Pc•nsion awl profit-sharing plans
Ill'<' e.rempt from covcrayc lllHkr til!' :-\pc·uritie~ ,\ct of
HJ3:3 ... un]pss the plan is a voluntary contributory peJisiml
pla11 and inv<•sts in the SC'curiti<•s of th<' employc·r company
an amount greatc•r tha11 that paid into the plan by thP
f'lllployc·r.") (Pmphasis adclc,d). As far as we at·e aware, at
110 tinH' lwfon• this case> arol:i<' did the' SE<' intimate that tlw
antifraud provi~ion ~ of the• :-l<'curities Acts ne,·ertlwlesll
applic·d to noneontributory ]Wllsion plaus.

IV
lf any further evidPtiC<' wrn• n<'<'Ut'd to ckmonstrat<' that
plans of tlw iy]H' involwd an• not ~ombject to tlw
, pc•uritics Acts. the <•nactnwllt of EIUSA iu Hl74 would put
the matter to rest. Fulike the Sec·uritie~ Acts. BRIRA deals
expn•ssly awl in detail with ]H•nsion plans. ERlf.IA n•quires
JWIIsion pla11:-: to disclose• sp<'cified information to <'ll1ployecs
in a. spt•cified ma1111E:>r. ~<'<' :.W l ~ . S. C. ~~ 1021-10:~0. i11 contJ·ast to the indefi11ite a11cl uncertain disclosure obligations
imposc•u by the antifraud ]H'ovisiolls of the , ecurities Aets,
H<'C k anla Fe lodustries, Inc . v. Green, 430 C. ~- 4(i:l, 474-477
(1977); ?'SC Industries, Inc. v. Yorti11NLy, l11c., 42(i lT. S.
43S (1D7fi). FurthPr. EHl~.\ n'gulatt•s tlw substantive tNms
of JWIJ ~:iion plans. H<'ttlllg standards for plan fundi11g aud limit.<~
on tlw Pligibility requin'llH'Ilts au <'!tlployee must tueet. For·
t'XUlnpl<•. w1th rrsp<'ct to tlw uncfpt·lying issue in this casewlwthc·•· n·spo ndt'll t sf'rved long <'llO ugh to I'<'Ct->i V<' a 1><'nsion~ 2m (a) of EHIRA. 20 l·. R. ('. ~ 1053 (a). now sds tlw minillllllll lt•vpl of bPnPfits a11 prnployl'(' must ree<'ivt· aft~·r accruing
·sp<'t'ifit·d years of ~:~<·nic<'. a11d ~ 2m (h). 2\l 1·. fi. C. ~ 10.:)3
JH~ IIHiou
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(1>). gowms eontinuous ~rrvie<• r·pquir<'lll<'llts. Thus if DaniC'l
had rrtired afkr ~ 1053 took pff<'et. tlw Fund would have• hC'<'n
requin•d to pay him at lt-'ast a partial p<'nsion. The f-ipeurities Aets. on tlw other hand. do not purport to sf't tlw ~ubstan
tiv<' tNms of financial tramoactim1s.
Tlw <'XistmC<' of this comprt'hensivc IPgislation gov<'ming
tlH• US<' and terms of employN' JWnsion plans S<'VC't'<'ly und<'t'euts all argun)('nts for f'xtrnding the RrcuritiPR Ad~ to noncontrilJutory, compulsory P<'llHion plans. Congrf'~s beli<•ved
that it was filling a regulatory void when it <•nactf'd ERlf-;A. a
ul'liPf which thf' REC' actiwly cncourag<'<L Xot only is tlw
extension of the Recuritics Arts by tlw court below unsupported uy tlw language and history of those Acts. but in light
of ERTHA it sf'rves no genf'ral purpose. , PC C'nlifano v.
Sanders, 430 U. R. 99, 104- 107 ( 1977). Cf. Boys Jt arkets,
Inc. '· Retail C'lerks rrnio11, :39R FR. 235.250 (ln70). Whatewr· L<•nefits employers might der·ive from the pffect of the
Secuntirs Acts arc now pwvi( led i11 mor·p definite form
through ERISA.

v

'W<• holcl that the 8<'curili('K Acts do not apply to a noncontributor·y. compulsory pension plan. Becausp thP first two
counts of respondent's complaint do 110t Jll"Ovide grounds for
relief in fed<'ral court. thP District Court should haY(' gran ted
the motioll to dismiss them. Th<• judgment below is tlwrc•forc

R evensed.
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77-753 Int'l Brotherhood v. Daniel

Dear Chief:
In accordance with suggestions from you and Byron
I have rewritten footnote 22. Byron agrees that, in my
second draft circulated today, the note is in satisfactory
form .
The other sugqestion in your letter of January 2,
relates to the paragraph that commences on page 12, which
you suggest may not be necessary. It probably isn't
essential to the opinion, and yet it seems desirable to me
to include it in view of reliance by the SEC, and
respondent, on specified legislative and administrative
actions.
The inference in your letter is that the 1970
amendment of the Securities Act really has nothing to do
with this case. I agree. Inasmuch, however, as the SEC
argues that it is relevant, it seems desirable to meet the
argument.
I appreciate your commenting on my draft.
Sincerely,

The Chief Justice
lfp/ss

- _,.,
.~-

...

,,
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ll, 197q

v. DaniPl
-·-------------Broth~rhood

' Chief:
Dear

Tn ~ccordance with ~uqq•stion~ from you and Byron
I have rewritten footnote ~2. Byron aqreoq that, in my
second draft circulated t0day, the note is in satisf~ctocy
for11.

in your letter of January 2,
rel~tes to the paraqraph t~at co~mencP~ on paqp 12, which
you suqgPst rnav not be qpcessary. It probably isn't
ess~ntial to thP ooinion, and yet it sa8~S desirable to me
to i ncl ud"" it in vi~w of reliance by t~w cn-;c, and
respondent, on snecifie~ lPqisl~ti•e and 3dministrative
actions.
TJP

oth~r

suon~stion

The inferencr in your lett~r is that the 1970
of t~~ ~ecuriti~~ Act rPallv has not~inq to rio
with this cAse. I aqr~~. In~smuch, howev~r, as ~he SEC
argues that it is rc>le"ant., it se<?ms dN3ir.able to meet the
arqul"(lent.
~mendm~nt

I opnreriate vour commenting on my
Sincerely,

The Chief JusticP
lfp/ss

~raft.
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COURT OF THE .UNITED STATFB
Nos. 77-753

AND

77-754

International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen
and Helpers of America,
Petitioner,
77-753
v.
On Writs of Certiorari
John Daniel.
to the United States
Local 105, International Brotherhood
Court of Appeals for
of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warethe Seventh Circuit.
housemen and Helpers of
America, et al.,
Petitioners,

'17- '154

v.
John Daniel.
[January - , 1979]

MR. JusTICE PowELL delivered the ppinion of the Court.
This case presents the question whether a noncontributory,
compulsory pension plan constitutes a "security" within the
meaning of the Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 (Recurities Acts).
I
In 1954 multiemployer collective bargaining between Local
705 of the International Brotherhood of Teamsters, ,Chauffeurs, Warehousemen, and Helpers of America and Chicago
trucking firms produced a pension plan for employees represented by the Local. The plan was comp:ulsory and noncontributory. Employees had no choice as to participation
in the plan, and did not have the option of demanding that

·.

J~N 1979

""17-153 & 77-754.-0PINION
TEAMSTERS v. DANIEL

the employer's contribution be paid directly to them as a
substitute for pension eligibility. 'The employees paid nothing
to the plan themselves. 1
The collective-bargaining agreement initially set employer
contributions to the PensiOn Trust Fund at $2 a week for each
man-week of covered employment. 2 'The Board of Trustees
of the Fund, a body composed of an equal number of employer
and union representatives, was given sole authority to set the
level of benefits ·but had no control over the amount of
required employer contributions. Initially, eligible employees
received $75 a month in benefits upon retirement. Subsequent collective-bargaining agreements called for greater
employer contributions, which in turn led to higher benefit
payments for retirees. At the time respondent brought suit,
employers contributed $21.50 per employPe man-week and
pension payments ranged from $425 to $525 a month dependillg on age at retirement.M In order to receive a pension an
employee was required to have 20 years of continuous service,
including time worked before the start of the plan .
The meaning of "continuous service" is at the center of
this dispute. Respondent began working as a truck driver
1 For examples of other noncontributory, compulsory pension plan.~,
see Allied Structural Steel Co. v. Spannaus, 438 U. S. - , (1978);
Malone v. White Mot01· Corp., 435 U.S. 497, 500-501 (1978); Alabama
Power Co v. Davi.s, 431 U.S. 581, 590 (1977).
:2 Contributions were t.ted to the number of employees rather than the
amount of work performed. For \)Xample, payments had to be made even
t'or weeks where :m emplo:-·ee was on Leave of absence, disabled, or working for only a fraction of the week. Conversely, employers did not have
to increase their contributiOn for weeks in which an employee worked
overtime or on a holiday. Trust Agreement, Art. 3, § 1, App. 63a.
3 Because the Fund made the same payments to each employee who
qualified for a prnsion and retired at the same age, rather than establish. iug an individual account, for . each employee tied to the amount of
employer contributions attnbutable to his period of service, the plan
provided a "defined benefit." See 29 U. S. C. § 1002 (35); AlabaJ'IUJ
Power Co v. DaVIs, supm, at, 593 n. 18

I
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in the Chicago area in 1950, and joined Local 705 the follow~
ing year. When the plan first went into effect, respondent
automatically received 5 years credit toward the 20-year
service requirement because of his earlier work experience.
He retired in 1973 and applied to the plan's administrator for
a pension. The administrator determined that respondent
was ineligible because of a break in service between December
1960, and July 19(H. 1 Respondent appealed the decision to
the trustees, who affirmed. Respondent then asked the
trustees to waive the cot1tinuous service rule as it applied to
him. After the trustees refused to waive the rule, respondent
brought suit in federal court against the International union
(Teamsters). Local 705 (Local), and Louis Peick, a trustee of
the fund.
Respondent's complaint alleged tha.t the Teamsters, the
Local, and Peick misrepresented and omitted to state material
facts with respect to the value of a covered employee's interest
111 the pension plan. Count I of the complaint charged that
these misstatements and omissions constituted a fraud in connection with the sale of a security in violation of § 10 (b) of
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 48 Stat. 891, 15 U. S. C.
§ 78j (b), and the Securities and Exchange Commission's Rule
lOb-5, 17 CFR ~ 240.10b-5. Count II charged that the same
conduct amounted to a violation of § 17 (a) of the Securities
Act of 1933, 48 Stat. 84, 15 U. S. C. § 77q. Other counts
alleged violations of various labor law and common-law duties. 5
4

Daniel was laid off from December 1960, until April 1961. In addition, no contributions were paid on his behalf between April and July
1961, because of embezzlement by his employer's bookkeeper. During
th1s seven-month period rrspondent could have preserved his eligibility
by maldng the contribution~ hnru;elf, but he failed to do so.
5 Count III chargrd the Tramsters and the Local with violating their
·d uty of fair representatiOn under § 9 (a.) of the National Labor Relation!!!
Act, 29 U. S. C. § 159 (a), and Count V (later amended as Count VI)
charged the Teamsters, the Local, Peick and ull other Teamsters pensioa
lund trustees w1th violating their obligations under § 302 (c) (5) of th~

77-753 & 77-754-0PINION
4

TEAMSTERS v. DANIEL

Respondent sought to proceed on behalf of all prospective
beneficiaries of Teamsters pension plans and against all Team~
sters pension funds. 0
The petitioners moved to dismiss the first two counts of the
complaint on the ground that respondent had no cause of
action under the Securities or Securities Exchange Acts. The
District Court denied the motion. 410 F. Supp. 541 (ND Ill.
1976). It held that respondent's interest in the Pension Fund
constituted a security within the meaning of § 2 ( 1) of the
Securities Act, 15 U. S. C. § 77b (1), and § 3 (a) (10) of the
Securities Exchange Act, 15 U. S. C. § 78c (a)(10), 7 because
the plan created an "investment contract" as that term had
been interpreted in SEC v. W. J. Howey Co., 328 U. S. 293
(1946). It also determined that there had been a "sale" of
this interest to respondent within the meaning of § 2 (3) of
the Securities Act, t5 U.S. C.§ 77b (3), and§ 3 (a)(14) of
the Securities Exchange Act, 15 U. S. C. § 78c (a)(14). 8 •It
National Labor Relations Act, 29 U. S. C. § 186 (e) (5). Count. IV
accused all defendants of common-law fraud and deceit.
0 As of the time of appeal to the Seventh Circuit the District Court had
not yet ruled on any class certification issues.
7 Section 2 (1) of the Securities Act defines a "security" as
· "any note, stock, treasury stock, bond, debenture, evidence of indebtedness,
certificate of interest or participat.ion in any profit-sharing agreement,
collateral-trust certificate, preorgani~ation certificate or subscription, transferable share, investment cont,ract, vot.ing-trust certificate, certificate of
deposit for a security, fractional undivided interest in oil, gas, or other
mineral rights, or, in general, any interest or instrument commonly known
as a 'security ,' or any certificate of interest or participation in, temporary
or interim certificate for, receipt for, guarantee of, or warrant or right to
subscribe to or purchase, any of the foregoing."
The definition of a "security" in § 3 (a) ( 10) of the Securities Exchange
Act is virtually identical and, for the purposes of this case, the coverage
of the two Acts may be regarded as the same. United Housing ·Fourcdat!on, Inc . v. Forman, 421 U. S. 837, 847 n. 12 (1975); Tcherepnin v.
Knight, 389 U.S. 332, 342 (1967) .
8 Section 2 (3) of the Securities Act provides, in pertinent part., that
" [t lhe term 'sale' or 'sell ' shall mclude every contract of sale or dispositiou
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believed respondent voluntarily gave value for his interest in
the plan, because he had voted on collective-bargaining agreements that chose employer contributions to the Fund instead
of other wages or benefits.
The order denying the motion to dismiss was certified for
appeal pursuant to 28 U. S. C. § 1292 (b). and the Court of
Appeals for·. the Seventh Circuit affirmed. 561 F. 2d 1223
( 1977). Relying on its perception of the economic realities of
pension plans and various actions of Congress and the SEC
with respect to such plans. the court ruled that respondent's
interest in the Pension Fund was a "security." According to
the court. a "sale" took place either when respondent ratified a
collective-bargaining agreement embodying the Fund or when
he accepted or retaiued covered employment instead of seeking other work. 0 The Court did not believe the subsequent
enactment of the Employee Retir~ment Income Security Act
of 1974 (ERISA). 88 Stat. 832, 29 U. S. C. § 1001 et seq.,.
affected the application of the Securities Acts to pension plans,
as the requirements and purposes of ERISA were perceived to
be different from those of the Securities Acts. 10 We granted
certiorari, 434 U.S. 1061 (1978), and now reverse.
of a security or interest in a security, for value." Section 3 (a) (14) of
the Securities Exchange Act stat~s that "[t]he terms 'sale' and 'sell' each
include any contract to sell or otherwise dispose of." Although the latter
definition does not refer expressly to a disposition for value, the court
below did not decide whether the Securities Exchange Act nevertheless·
impliedly incorporated the Securities Act definit.ion, cf. n. 9, supra, as .in
its view Daniel did give value for his interest in the pension plan. In
light of our disposition of the question whether respondent's interest was·
a "security," we need. not decide whether the meaning of "sale" under the
Securities Exchange Act is any different from its meaning under theSecurities Act
8 The Court of Appeals and the Distnct Court also held that § 17 (a)
provides private parties with an implied cause of action for damages. .In
hght of our disposition of thi:; case, we express no views on this issue.
10 Respondent did not. have any cause of action under ERISA itself, as;
·fthat Act took effect after he had retired.

·.
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II
"The starting point in every case involving the construe~
tion of a statute is the language itself." Blue Chip Stamps v.
Manor Drug Stores, 421 U. S. 723, 756 (1975) (HowELL, J.,
·concurring); see Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U. S. 185,
197, 199, and n. 19 (1976). In spite of the substantial use
of employee pension plans at the time they were enacted,
neither § 2 (1) of the s~curities Act nor § 3 (a)(10) of the
Securities Exchange Act, which define the term "security" in
considerable detail and with numerous examples, refers to
pension plans of any type. Acknowledging this omission in
the statutes, respondent contends that an employee's interest
in a pension plan is an "investment contract," an instrument
which is included in the statutory definitions of a security.n
To determine whether a particular financial relationship
constitutes an investment contract, "[t]he test is whether the
scheme involves an investment of money in a common enter~
prise with profits to come solely from the efforts of others."
Howey, supra, at 301. This test is to be applied in light of
"the substance-the economic realities of the transactionrather than the names that may have been employed by the
parties." United Housing Corp. v. Forman, 421 U. S. 837,
851-852 (1975). Accord, Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389 U. S.
332, 336 (1967); Howey, supra, at 298. Cf. SEC v. Variable
11 Daniel also argues that his interest constitutes a "certificate of interest
in or participation in a profit-sharing agreement." The court below did
not consider this claim, as Daniel had not seriously pressed the a.rgumen.t
and the disposition of the "investment contract" issue made it unnecessary
to decide the question. 561 F. 2d 1223, 1230 n. 15 (1977). Similarly,
Daniel here does not :-::f'nously contend that a "certificate of interest
in , , . a profit-sharing agreement" . has any broader meaning under the
Secunties Acts than an "iuve~t ment contract." In Forman, supra, we
obserVlcd that the Howey tc.>Ht, which has been used to determine the
presence of an mve::;tmc.>nt rontract, "embodies the essential a.tt.ributes:
that run through all of the Court's decisions defining a security." 421
tL S 11.t 852
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Annuity Life Ins. Co., 359 U. S. 65, 80 (1959) (BRENNAN, J.,
concurring) (" [ 0] ne must a,pply a test in terms of the
purposes of the Federal Acts ... "). Looking separately at
each element of the Howey test, it is apparent that an
employee's participation in a noncontributory, compulsory
pension plan such as the Teamsters' does not comport with
the commonly held understanding of an investment contract.
A.. Investment of Money

An employee who participates in a noncontributory, compulsory pension plan by definition makes no payment into the
pension fund. He only accepts employment, one of the conditions of which is eligibility for a possible benefit on retiremeut. Daniel contends. however, that he has "invested" in
the Pensiou Fund by permitting part of his compensation
from his employer to take the form of a deferred pension
benefit. By allowing his employer to pay money into the
Fund, and by contributing his labor to his employer in return
for these payments, Daniel asserts he has made the kind of
investment which the Securities Acts were intended to
regulate.
In order to determine whether respondent invested in the
Fund by accepting and remaining in covered employment, it
is necessary to look at the entire transaction through which
he obtained a chance to receive pension benefits. in every
decision of this Court recognizing the presence of a "security"
under the Securities Acts, the person found to have been an
investor chose to give up a specific consideration in return for
a separable financial interest with the characteristics of a
security. See Tcherpnin, supra (money paid for bank capital
stock); SEC v. United Benefit Life Ins. Co., 387 U. S. 202
(1967) (portion of premium paid for variable component of
mixed variable and fixed annuity contract); Variable Annuity
Life Ins. Co., supra (premium pa.id for variable annuity contract); Howey, supra (money paid for purchase, maintenance,
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and harvesting of orange grove); SEC v. C. M. Joiner Leasing
Corp., 320 U. S. 344 (1943) (money paid for land and oil
exploration). Even in those cases where the interest ac"
quired had intermingled security and nonsecurity aspects, the
interest obtained had "to a very substantial degree elements
of investment contracts . . . ." Variable Annuity Life Ins.
Co., supra, at 91 (BRENNAN, J., concurring). In every case
the purchaser gave up some tangible and definable considera"
tion in return foy £Ll1 interest that had substantially the
characteristics of a Security.
In a pension plan such as.this one, by contrast, the purported
investment is a relatively insignificant part of an employee's
total and indivisible compensation package. No portion of
an employee's compensation other than the potential pension
benefits has any of the characteristics of a security, yet these
noninvestment interests cannot be segregated from the possible pension benefits. Only in the most abstract sense may
it be said that an employee "exchanges" some portion of his
labor in return for these possible benefits. 12 He surrenders
his labor as a whole, a1id in return receives a comp~nsation
package that is substantially devoid of aspects resembling a
security. His decision to accept and retain covered employment must have only an extremely attenuated relationship, if
any, to perceived investment possibilities of a future pension.
Looking at the economic realities, it seems clear that an
employee is selling his labor to obtain a livelihood, not making
an investment for the future.
Respondent also argues that employer constributions on
his behalf constituted his investment into the Fund. But it
is inaccurate to describe these payments as having been uon
behalf'' of any employee. The trust agreement used employee man-weeks as a convenient way to measure an employ"
H Tim; iK not to ~ny tlwt n per~on 'H " investment ," in order to meet the·
clC'fi111t10n of an mvC'Stment rontntct, mu~t, take the form of cash only
rnthrr than of good~ and ~eJ:virrH . Sec Fomum, supra, at 852 n . 16.
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er's overall obligation to the Fund, not as a means of measuring the employer's obligation to any particular employee.
Indeed. there was no fixed relationship between contributions
to the Fund and an employee's potential benefits. A pension
plan with "fixed benefits," such as the Local's, does not tie a
qualifying employee's benefits to the time he has worked.
See n. 3, supra. One who has engaged in covered employment for 20 years will receive the same benefits as a person
who has worked for 40, even though the latter has worked
twice as long and induced a substantially larger employer
contribution. 1 3 Again, it ignores the economic realities to
equate employer contributions with an investment by the
employee.
B. Expectation of Profits From A Common Enterprise

As we observed in Forman, the "touchstone" of the Howey
test "is the presence of an investment in a common venture
premised 011 a reasonable expectation of profits to be derived
from the entrepeneurial or managerial efforts of others." 421
U. S., at 852. The Court of Appeals believed that Daniel's
expectation of profit denved from the Fund's successful management and investment of its assets. To the extent pension
benefits exceeded employer contributions and depended on
earnings from the assets, it was thought they contained a
profit element. The Fund's trustees provided the managerial
efforts which produced this profit element.
As in other parts of its analysis, the court below found an
expectatio11 of profit in the pension plan only by focusing on
one of its less important aspects to the exclusion of its more
significant elements. It is true that the Fund, like other
holders of large assets, depends to some extent on earnings
1·' Ondrr f]1(1 trrms of tlw Local'~ pension plan, for rxampiP, rpspondent
received credJt. for t.he five yrars hP worked before the Fund was created,
even though no emptoy('r contrihnt10ns ha.d been made during that
period.
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from its assets. In the case of a pension fund, however, -a
far larger portion of its income comes from employer contributions, a source in no way dependent on the efforts of the
Fund's managers. The Local 705 Fund, for example, earned
a total of $31 milliop through investment of its assets between
February 1955, and January 1977. During this same period
employer contributions totaled $153 million. 14 Not only does
the greater share of a pension plan's income ordinarily come
from new contributions, but unlike most entrepeneurs who
manage other people's money, a plan usually can count on
increased employer contributions, over which the plan itself
has no control, to cover shortfalls in earnings. 15
The importance of asset earnings in relation to the other
benefits received from employment is diminished further by
the fact that wherB a plan has substantial preconditions to
vesting, the principal barrier to an individual employee's
realization of pension benefits is not the financial health of
the Fund. Rather, it is his ow11 ability to meet t~e Fund's
eligibility requirements. Thus. even if it were proper to
describe the benefits as a "profit" returned on some hypothetical investment by the employee, this profit would depend
primarily 011 the employee's efforts to meet the vesting
requirements, rather than the Fund's investment success. 16
When viewed in light of the total compensation package an
employee must receive in order to be eligible for pension benefits, it becomes clear that the possibility of participating in a
plan's asset earnings "is far too speculative and insubstantial
to bring the entire transaction within the Securities Acts,"
Forman, supra, at 856.
14 ln addition, the Fund r.eceived $7,500,000 from smaller pension fun~
with which it merged over the years.
1
'' See Note, The Application of the Antifraud Provisions of the Securities·
Laws to CompuiBory, Noncontributory Pension Plans After Daniel v.
International Brotherhood of Teamsters, 64 Va. L. Rev. 305, 315 (1978) .
10 See Note, Interest 111 Pension Plans as Securities: Daniel v. lnterna·'tional Brotherhood of 1'eamsters, 78 Colum. L. Rev. 184, 201 (1978) .
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III
The court below believed that its construction of the term
usecurity" was compelled not only by the perceived resemblance of a pension plan to an investment contract, but by
various actiolls of Congress and the SEC's interpretation of
the Securities Acts. In reaching this conclusion, the court
gave great weight to the SEC's explanation of these events,
an explanation which for the most part the SEC repeats here.
Our own review of the record leads us to believe that this
reliance on the SEC's interpretation of these legislative and
administrative actions was not justified.
A. Actions of Congress

The SEC in its amicus curiae brief refers to several actions
of Congress said to evidence an understanding that pension
plans are securities. A close 1ook at each instance, however,
reveals only that Congress might have believed certain kinds
of pension plans. radically different from the one at issue here,
came within the coverage of the Securities Acts. There is no
evidence that Congress at any time thought noncontributory
plans similar to the one before us were subject to federal regulation as securities.
The first action cited was the rejection by Congress in 1934
of an amendment to the Securities Act that would have
exempted employee stock investment and stock option plans
from the Act's registration requirements. 17 The amendment
passed the Senate but was eliminated in conference. The
legislative history of the defeated proposal indicates it was
The amendment would have added the following language to § 4 (1)
of the Securities Act :
''A:s used in this parngra.ph, the term ' public offering' shall not be
deemed to mcludc an offermg made solely to employees by an issuer or· by
its affi.liatt's in conncction with a bona fide plan for the payment of extr$
compensatiOn or stock mvestment plan for the exclusive benefit of sqc}\
-employees." 78 Cong. Rec. 8708 (1934) .
17

'

'

I
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intended to cover plans under which employees contributed
their own funds to a segregated investment account on which
a return was realized. See H. R. Rep. No. 1838, 73d Cong.,
2d Sess., 41 (1934); Hearings before the House Committee on
Interstate and Foreign Commerce on Proposed Amendments
to the Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act
of 1934, 77th Cong., 1st Sess., 895:--896 (1941). In rejecting the
amendment, Congress revealed a concern that certain interests
having the characteristics of a s~curity not be excluded from
Securities Act protection simply because investors realized
their return in the form of retirement benefits. At no time,
however, did Congress indicate that pension benefits in and
of themselves gave a transaction the characteristics of a
security.
The SEC also relies on a 1970 amendment of the Securities
Act which extended § 3's exemption from registration to
include "a.ny interest or participation in a single or collective
trust fund maintained by a bank ... which interest or participation is issued in connection with (A) a stock bonus,
pension, or profit-sharing plan which meets the requirements
for qualification under section 401 of title 26, . . . . " § 3 _(a)
(2) of the Securities Act, as amended, 84 Stat. 1434, 1498,
15 U. S. C. § 77c (a) (2). It argues that in creating a registratiOn exemption, the amendment m11nifested Congress'
understanding that the interests covered by the amendment
otherwise were subject to the Securities Acts. 18 It interprets
11
interest or participation in a single ... trust fund ... issued
in connection with . . . a stock bonus, pension, or profitsharing plan" as referring to a prospective beneficiary's inter'8 Section 17 (c) of the &•curities Act, 15 U.S. C.§ 77q (c), and§ 10 (b)
of the Securities Exchange Act, 15 U. S. C. § 78j (b) (when read with
§§ 3 (a) (10) and (12) of that Act), indicate that the antifraud provisions
of the respective Act;; contmur to apply to interests that come within theexemptions created by § 3 (a) (2) of the Securities Act and § 3 (a) (12) of'
the Securities Exchange Act.
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est in a pension fund. But this construction of the 1970
amendment ignores that measure's central purpose, which was
to relieve banks and insurance companies of certain registratration obligations. The amendmeJlt recognized only that a
pension plan had "an interest or participation" in the fund in
which its assets were held, not that prospective beneficiaries
of a plan had any interest in 'either the plan's bankmaintained assets or the plan itself.10

B. SEC Interpretation
The court below believed, and it now is argued to us, that
almost from its inception the SEC has regarded pension plans
as falling within the scope of the Securities Acts. We are
asked to defer to what is seen as a lqngstanding interpreta19 See S. Rep. No. 91-184, p. 27 (1969); Hearings before the Senate
Banking !!Jld Currency Committee on Mutual Fund Legislation of 1967,
90th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. III, at 1341-1342 (1967); Mundheim & Henderson,
Applicability of the Federal Securities Laws oo Pension and Profit-Sharing
Plans, 29 L. & Contemp. Probs. 795, 819-837 (1964); Saxon & Miller,
Common Trust Funds, 53 Geo. L. ,T. 994 ( 1965). The SEC argues that
the addition by the House of the language "single or" before "common
trust fund" indicated an intent oo cover the underlying plans that invested
in bank-maintained funds. The legislative hisoory, however, indicates that
the change was meant only to eliminate the negative inference suggested
by the unrevised language that banks would have to register the segregated
investment funds they administered for particular plans. Because the
provision as a whole dealt. only with the relationship between a plan and
its bank, the revis10n did not affect. the registration status of the underlying pension plan. See 116 Cong. Rec. 33287 (1970). This was consistent, with the SEC's interpretation of the provision. Hearings, supra, at
1326. The subsequent addition of another provision excepting from the
exemption funds "under which an amount in excesS of the employer's
contribution 1s allocated to tlw purcha..,;e of securities ... issued by the
employer or by any company directly or indirectly controlling, controlled
by or under common control with the employer" appen.rs to have been
simply an additional safeguard to confirm the SEC's authority to req).lire
such plans, and only such plam5, to register. See H. R. Conf. Rep. No.
91- 1631, p. 31 (1970) .
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tion of these statutes by the agency responsible for their
administration. But there are limits, grounded in the language, purpose and history of the particular statute, on how
far an agency properly may go in its interpretative role.
Although these limits are not always easy to discern, it is
clear here that the SEC's positiou is neither longstanding nor
even arguably within the outer limits of its authority to interpret these Acts.20
As we have demonstrated above, the type of pension plan
at issue in this case bears no resemblance to the kind of financial interests the Securities Acts were designed to regulate.
Further, the SEC's present position is flatly contradicted by
·its past actions. Until the instant litigation arose, the public
record reveals no evidence that the SEC had ever considered
the Securities Acts to be applicable to noncontributory pension plans. In 1941, the SEC first artic~lated the position
that voluntary, contributory plans had investment characterjstics that rendered them "securities" under the Acts. At the·
20 It is a commonplace in our jurisprudence that an administrative
agency's consistent, longstanding interpretation of the statute under which
tt operates is entitled to considerable weight. United States v. National
Assn. of Securities Dealers, 422 U. S. 694, 719 (1975); Sax be v. Bustos,
419 U. S. 65, 74 (1974); Investment Co. Institute v. Camp, 401 U. S.
617, 626-627 (1971); Uilall v. Tallman , 380 U. S. 1, 16 (1965). This·
deference is a product both of an awareness of the pract.ica.l expertise
which an agency normally devrlops, n.nd of.. a willingness to accord some
measure of flexibility to such an agency as it ·encounters new and unfore-·
seen problrms over time , But this deference is constrained by our obliga-.
tion to honor the clear meaning of a statuto, as revealed by its language,
purpose and history, On a munber of occasions in recent years this Court
has found it necessary to re,iect the SEC's interpretation of various provisioml of the Securities Act:s. See SEC v. Sloan, 436 U. S. 103, 117-119'
(197S) ; Piper v. Chris-Craft Industries, Inc ., 430 U.S. 1, 41 n. 27 (1977);
Er1tst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U. S. 185, 212-214 (1976); F'orman~
supra, a.t 858 n. 25; Blue Chip Stamps v. Mwwr Drug Stores, 421 U. s_
723, 759 n. 4 (1975) (PowELL, J., concurring); Reliance Electric Co. v_
Emerson Electri-c Co., 404 U S. 418, 425-427 (1972) .
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same time, however, the SEC recognized that noncontributory
plans were not covered by the Securities Acts because such
plans did not involve a "sale" within the meaning of the
statutes. Opinions of Assistant General Counsel, [1941-1944
Transfer Binder] CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. 1T 75,195 (194l);
Hearings before the House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce on Proposed Amendments to the Securities
Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 77th
Cong., 1st Sess., 895, 896-897 (1941) (testimony of Commissioner Purcell) .21
In an attempt to reconcile these interpretations of the
Securities Acts with its present stand, the SEC now augments
its past position with two additional propositions. First, it
is argued, noncontributory plans are "securities" even where
a "sale" is not involved. Second, the ·previous concession that
noncontributory plans do not involve a "sale" was meant to
apply only to the registration and reporting requirements of
the Securities Acts; for purposes of the antifraud provisions,
a "sale" is involved. As for the first proposition, we observe
that none of the SEC opinions, reports, or testimony cited to
us address the question. As for the second, the record is
2 1 Subsequent to 1941, the SEC made no further efforts to regulate even
contributory, voluntary pension plans except where the employees' contributions were invested in the employer's securWes. Cf. n. 21, supra. It
also continued to disavow any aut! ority to regulate noncontributory,
compulsory plans. See LPtter from Assistant Director, Division of Corporate Finance, May 12, 1953, CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. ~ 2105.51; Letter
from Chief Counsel, Division of Corporate Finance, August 1, 1962, CCH
Fed. Sec. L. Rep. f 2105.52; Hearings before the Senate Banking and
Currency Committee on Mutual Fund Legis)ation of 1967, 90th Cong., 1st
Sess., 1326 (1967); 1 L. Loss, Securities Regulation, 510-511 (1st ed.
1961) ; 4 id., at. 2553-2554 (2d ed. 1969); Hyde , Employee Stock Plans·
a.nd the Securities Act of 1933, 16 W. Res. L. Rev. 75, 86 (1964);
Mundheim & Henderson, Applicability of the Federal Securities Laws toPension n.nd Profit-Sharing .Plans, 29 L. & Contemp. Probs. 795, 809-81!
(1964) , Note, Pension Pla~1 s a~> Securities, 96 U. Pa. L. Rev. 549, 549-55!_
(1948) .
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unambiguously to the contra.ry. 22 Both in its 1941 statements
and repeatedly since then, the SEC has declared that its "no
sale" position applied to the Securities Acts as a whole. See
Opinion of Assistant General Counsel, [ 1941-1944 Transfer
Binder] CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. ~ 75,195, at 75,387 (1941);
Hearings before the House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce on Proposed Amendments to the Securities Act
of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 77th Cong.,
1st Sess., 888, 896-897 (1941); Institutional Investor Study
Report of the Securities and Exchange Commission, H. R.
Doc. No. 92-64, p. 996 (1971) ("[T]he Securities Act does not
apply ..."); Hearings on Welfare and Pensiou Plans Investigation before the Subcommittee on Welfare and Pension
Funds of the Senate Labor and Public Welfare Committee,
84th Cong., 1st Sess.. 943-946 (1955). Congress acted on·this
understanding when it proceeded to develop the legislation
!! 2 On orrn;;ion the SEC ha~ contrnded that becRusr § 2 of the Securities
Ari and § 3 of thP Src1trit ir~ Exclwngr Act apply thP qualifying ph1:ase
" unlr~~ the ront,rxt othrrwi~r rrquirrs" to the ActR' general drfinitions, it
id prrmi:-;sihlfl io rrg;ard a partieular trnnHaction as involving a AAlr or not
drpcnding on thr form of rrgulntion involved. SeP 1 L. Lo;,:~, Securities
Regulation 524-52~ (bt ed. 19(11); 4 id., at 2562-2565 (2d rd. Hl69).
The Conri, notrd the rontrntion in SE(' v. National Securities. Inc .. 393
U. S. 45:3, 4fl5--4fl6 (Hlfi9) . On prrvious occasion" thr SEC apprars to
have tnkrn 1L clif'ft>rrnt. po,.itiotl: In 1943 it submittrcl an amicus brirf in
the Ninth C'ir<"uii. arguing that a tranHnrtion must br a salr for all purpose
oi the SeruritieH Act or for nonr, and it did not begin to rely on its
" regulatory eontext" theor~· uutil 1951. Sre Brief for thr SEC in National
S1qrp/y Co. \'.Leland Stanford Jum:or University, No. 10272 (CA9); 1 L.
Lo~H, supm, at. 52-1- n. 211; Cohrn, Rule 1:3:~ of the SeruritieR Exchange
CommisHion, 14 Rrrord of N.Y. C. B. A. 162, 164--165 (1959). We also
note that with re;;pect. to ,.;tatutor~· rnerger8, the arra in which thr SEC
ongmall~· deVPloped it .~ thror~· as to the bifurratrd definition of :1 sal'e, the
SEC "inre ha>' abandonrd ii~ po~ition 11.nd find:s thr prrsrncr of a ",.;Rle'~
for all purpoHe>' in thr ca;;r ol' :-;urh mergers. See 17 CFR § :2:30.1-1-5, In
view of our dispo>'ition of tht" caHr, we exprl'<' · no opinion aH to the correct
l'l'solution of the clivergrnt virwl" on thiH i~uc.
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that became ERISA. See, e. g., Interim Report of Activities
of the Private Welfare and Pension Plan Study, S. Rep.
No. 92-634, p. 96 (1972) ("Pension and profit-sharing plans
are exempt from coverage under the Securities Act of
1933 ... unless the plan is a voluntary contributory pension
plan and invests in the securities of the employer company
an amount greater than that paid into the plan by the
employer.") (emphasis added). As far as we are aware, at
no time before this case arose did the SEC intimate that the
antifraud provisions of the Secudties Acts nevertheless
applied to noncontributory pension plans.

IV
If any further evidence were needed to demonstrate that
pension plans of the type involved are not subject to the
Securities Acts, the enactment of ERISA in 1974 would put
the matter to rest. Unlike the Securities Acts, ERISA deals
expressly and in detail with pension plans. ERISA requires
pension plans to disclose specified information to employees
in a specified manner. see 29 U. S. C. §§ 1021-1030, in contrast to the indefinite and uncertain disclosure obligations
imposed by the antifraud provisions of the Securities Acts,
see Santa Fe Industries, Inc. v. Green, 430 U. S. 462, 474-477
(1977); TSC Industries, Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U. S.
438 (1976). Further, ERISA r~gulates the substantive terms
of pension plans, setting standards for plan funding and limits
on the eligibility requirements an employee must meet. For
example, with respect to the underlying issue in this casewhether respondent served long enough to receive a pension~ 203 (a) of ERISA, 29 U.S. C. § 1053 (a), now sets the minimum level of benefits an employee must receive after accruing
specified yea.rs of service. and § 203 (b), 29 U. S. C. § 1053
(b), governs continuous service requirements. Thus if Daniel
had retired after § 1053 took effect, the Fund would have been
Tequired to pay him at least a partial pension. 'The Securi-
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ties Acts, on the other hand, do not purport to set the substan.
tive terms of financ~'l.-1 transactions.
The existence of this comprehensive legislation governing
the use and terms of employee pension plans severely undercuts all arguments for extending the Securities Acts to noncontributory, compulsory pensio11 plans. Congress believed
that it was filling a regulatory void when it enacted ERISA, a
belief which the SEC actively encouraged. Not only is the
-extension of the Securities Acts by the court below unsupported by the language and history of those Acts, but in light
of ERISA it serves no general purpose. See Califa:no v.
Sanders, 430 U. S. 99, 104-107 (1977). Cf. Boys Markets,
Inc. v. Retail Clerks Union, 398 U.S. 235,250 (1970). Whatever benefits employees might derive from the effect of the
Securities Acts are now provided in more definite form
through ERISA.

v

W<> hold that the Securities Acts do not apply to a noncontributory, eompulsory pension plan. Because the first two
couuts of respondent's complaint do not provide grounds for
relief in federal court. the District Court should have granted
the motion to dismiss them. The judgment below is therefore

Reversed.
Mn. JusTICrJ fi'l'EVENS took ro part in the consideration or
' dt'eision of this case.
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Mr. Chief Justice Burger, concurring.
I join in the opinion of the Court except as to the discussion of the 1970 amendment to section 3(a) (2) of the Securities Act.

There is no need to deal, in this case, with the

scope of the exemption, since it is not an issue presented for
decision.
The Commission argues that the new exemption from the registration requirements of the Act applies to participation in a
pension plan, and infers that Congress must have understood
that such participation is a security which otherwise would be
subject to the Act.

It is not necessary to evaluate the Comm-

ission's interpretation, however, because even if it is correct, it does not support the conclusion the Commission draws.
First, the inference concerning Congress' understanding of
the Act in 1970 is tenuous.

The language of the amendment cov-

ers a variety of financial interests, some of which clearly are

- 2 -

"securities" as defined in the Act.

Congress most likely acted

with a view to those interests, without considering other financial interests like those involved here, for which registration never had been required.
Second, even if a draftsman concerned with exempting a
variety of interests from the registration requirements may
have believed, in 1970, that certain pension interests were
within the statutory definition of "security," that would have
little, if any, bearing on this case.

At issue here is the

construction of definitions enacted in 1933 and 1934.
The briefs at least suggest that the construction of the
1970 amendment may be problematic.

The scope of the exemption

may be of real importance to someone in some future case--but
it is not so in connection with this action.

Accordingly, I

rserve any expression of views on the issue at this time.

This case comes to us;ffrom the Court of Appeals
for the Seventh Circuit.

applicatio~f

~

It presents a question as to the

~

the Federal Securities Acts to

no d contributory,

compul
plan.
__,. ~ory pension
;::.

Under the plan at issue,; 'contributions to a
pension

fund~ere

made by the

of weeks worked by employees.

employer~ased

on the number

Upon accepting employment, f an

~t~~~-~~

employee was automatically covered by the plan. ~ ~e paid no
money into the fund.

The employee was required, however, to

have 20 years of continuous service to be entitled to a
pension.
Respondent in

~case
'\

was employed for more than

20 years 'l'but because his service was not entirely
continuous/ he did not qualify for a pension.

He thereupon

brought this suit against the International Union, / the local
to which he belonged/ and the pension fund.

He alleged that

petitioners had misrepresented/ and failed to disclos , ;
material facts about the plan.

He charged common law fraud

and deceit, violation¢ of the National Labor Relations Act,
and violation? of the Federal Securities Acts.
concerned in this
securities Acts.

cas~o~

We are

with the claim under the

·--,/

2.

The applicability of these

Act ~turns

upon whether

an employee's interest in a pens ion plan is a "secur i ty'/ as

f:~Vv

~ defined
1\

by the Acts.

Respondent argued, successfully before

the Court of Appeals, that his interest in the plan was an
I
~
"investment contract" within the definiton of the term

!

...

"security". llfteer tft.ti. Aeta-s.
We reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals.
A

no~ontributory, com~ sory

pension plan/ is

~t

a security

withing the meaning of the Federal Securites Acts. We base
our decision on the plain
standards applied in our
of Congress / and

t1.~e

langu~e

pr ~r

of these statutes,j on

opinions,/ and on the actions

SEC/ with respect to pension plans of the

type involved in this case.
We express no opinionJ'as to respondent's
entitlement to proceed on the other counts;fset forth in his
complaint.
The Chief Justice has filed a concurring opinion.
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INTERNATIONAL BROTHERHOOD OF TEAMSTERS,
CHAUFFEURS, WAREHOUSEMEN & HELPERS
OF AMERICA ET AL. v. DANIEL
CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE
SEVENTH CIRCUIT

No. 77-753.

Argued October 31, 1978-Decided J anuary 16, 1979*

A pension plan entered into under a collective-bargaining agreement
between petitioner local labor union and employer trucking firms
required all employees to participate in the plan but not to pay anything into it. All contributions to the plan were to be made by the
employers at a specified amount per week for each man-week of covered
employment. To be eligible for a pension, an employee was required
to have 20 years of continuous service. Respondent employee, who
had over 20 years' service, was denied a pension upon retirement because
of a break in service. He then brought suit in Federal District Court,
alleging, inter alia, that the union and petitioner trustee of the pension
fund had misrepresented and omitted to state material facts with respect
to the value of a covered employee's interest in the pension plan, and
that such misstatements and omisRions constituted a fraud in connection with the sale of a security in violation of § 10 (b) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 and the Securities and Exchange Commission's
Rule 10b-5, and also violated § 17 (a) of the Securities Act of 1933.
Denying petitioners' motion to dismiss, the District Court held that
respondent's interest in the pension fund constituted a "security" within
the meaning of § 2 (1) of the Securities Act and § 3 (a) (10) of the
Securities Exchange Act because the plan created an "investment contract," and also that there had been a "sale" of this interest to respondent within the meaning of § 2 (3) of the Securities Act and § 3 (a) (14)
of the Securities Exchange Act. The Court of Appeals affirmed. Held:
*Together with No. 77-754, Local 705, International Brotherhood of
Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen & Helpers of America et al. v.
Daniel, also on certiorari to the same court.
I

II
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Syllabus

The Securities Act and the Securities Exchange Act do not apply to a
noncontributory, compulsory pension plan. Pp. 6-18.
(a) To determine whether a particular financial relationship constitutes an investment contract, "[t]he test is whether the scheme involves
an investment of money in a common enterprise with profits to come
solely from the efforts of others." SEC v. W. J. Howey Co., 328 U. S.
293, 301. Looking separately at each element of this test, it is apparent
that an employee's participation in a noncontributory, compulsory pension plan such as the one in question here does not comport with the
commonly held understanding of an investment contract. With respect
to the investment-of-money element, in such a pension plan the purported investment is a relatively insignificant part of the total and
indivisible compensation package of an employee, who, from the standpoint of the economic realities, is selling his labor to obtain a livelihood,
not making an investment for the future. And with respect to the
expectation-of-profits element, while the pension fund depends to some
extent on earnings from its assets, the possibility of participating in
asset earnings is too insubstantial to bring the entire transaction within
the Securities Acts. Pp. 6-10.
(b) There is no evidence that Congress at any time thought noncontributory plans were subject to federal regulation as securities. Nor
until the instant litigation arose is there any evidence that the SEC had
ever considered the Securities Act and Securities Exchange Act to be
applicable to such plans. Accordingly, there is no justification for deference to the SEC's present interpretation. Pp. 11-17.
(c) The Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, which
comprehensively governs the usc and terms of employee pension plans,
severely undercuts all argument for e:-.iending the Securities Act and
Securities Exchange Act to noncontributory, compulsory pension plans,
and whatever benefits employees might derive from the effect of these
latter Acts are now provided in more definite form through ERISA.
Pp. 17-18.
561 F. 2d 1223, reversed.
PowELL, J., delivered the opmwn of the Court, in which BRENNAN,
STEWART, WHITE, MARSHALL, BLACKMUN, and REHNQUI!>'l', JJ., joined,
and in nil but the last paragmph of Part III-A of which, BuRGER, C. J.,
joined. BuRGER, C. J., filed an opinion conrurring in part. S'l'EVENS, J.,
took no part in the consideration or decision of the cases.
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Dear Henry:
I would appreciate your making the changes indicated
on the enclosed copy of my opinion for the Court in the
above case.
The changes are purely stylistic, except for those
on page 8. These were approved by the Court at our
Conference on Friday.
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Mr.

